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Storekeeper, the owner of a large hardware store, sells power saws for both personal and commercial use. He often takes old power saws as trade-ins on new ones. The old power saws are then completely disassembled and rebuilt with new bearings by Storekeeper's employees and sold by Storekeeper as "reconditioned saws." Purchaser, the owner and operator of a cabinetmaking shop, informed Storekeeper that he wanted to buy a reconditioned circular saw for use in his cabinetmaking business. However, the blade that was on the saw he picked out had very coarse teeth for cutting rough lumber. Purchaser told Storekeeper that he wanted a saw blade that would cut plywood. Storekeeper exchanged the coarse blade for a new one with finer teeth that would cut plywood smoothly. The new blade was manufactured by Saw-Blade Company, which uses all available techniques to inspect its products for defects. The reconditioned saw had been manufactured by Power Saw Company. The week after the saw was purchased, Employee, who works for Purchaser in Purchaser's cabinetmaking shop, was injured while using the saw. Employee's arm was severely cut. As a result, the cabinetmaking shop was shut down for a week until a replacement for Employee could be foundIf Employee was injured while cutting plywood because the shaft holding the saw blade came loose when a bearing gave way and the shaft and blade flew off the saw, and if Employee asserts a claim based on strict liability in tort against Power Saw Company, Employee will probably | [
"recover if the shaft that came loose was a part of the saw when it was new.",
"recover, because Power Saw Company was in the business of manufacturing dangerous machines. ",
"not recover, because Employee was not the buyer of the power saw. ",
"not recover, because the saw had been rebuilt by Storekeepe"
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
Storekeeper, the owner of a large hardware store, sells power saws for both personal and commercial use. He often takes old power saws as trade-ins on new ones. The old power saws are then completely disassembled and rebuilt with new bearings by Storekeeper's employees and sold by Storekeeper as "reconditioned saws." Purchaser, the owner and operator of a cabinetmaking shop, informed Storekeeper that he wanted to buy a reconditioned circular saw for use in his cabinetmaking business. However, the blade that was on the saw he picked out had very coarse teeth for cutting rough lumber. Purchaser told Storekeeper that he wanted a saw blade that would cut plywood. Storekeeper exchanged the coarse blade for a new one with finer teeth that would cut plywood smoothly. The new blade was manufactured by Saw-Blade Company, which uses all available techniques to inspect its products for defects. The reconditioned saw had been manufactured by Power Saw Company. The week after the saw was purchased, Employee, who works for Purchaser in Purchaser's cabinetmaking shop, was injured while using the saw. Employee's arm was severely cut. As a result, the cabinetmaking shop was shut down for a week until a replacement for Employee could be foundIf Employee was injured while cutting plywood because the shaft holding the saw blade came loose when a bearing gave way and the shaft and blade flew off the saw, and if Purchaser asserts a claim based on strict liability in tort against Storekeeper for loss of business because of the injury to Employee, Purchaser probably will | [
"not recover, because economic loss from injury to an employee is not within the scope of Storekeeper's duty. ",
"not recover, because Storekeeper was not the manufacturer of the power saw. ",
"recover, because Storekeeper knew that the power saw was to be used in Purchaser's cabinetmaking business. ",
"recover, because the reconditioned power saw was the direct cause of Purchaser's loss of business"
] | 0 | professional_law |
|
Storekeeper, the owner of a large hardware store, sells power saws for both personal and commercial use. He often takes old power saws as trade-ins on new ones. The old power saws are then completely disassembled and rebuilt with new bearings by Storekeeper's employees and sold by Storekeeper as "reconditioned saws." Purchaser, the owner and operator of a cabinetmaking shop, informed Storekeeper that he wanted to buy a reconditioned circular saw for use in his cabinetmaking business. However, the blade that was on the saw he picked out had very coarse teeth for cutting rough lumber. Purchaser told Storekeeper that he wanted a saw blade that would cut plywood. Storekeeper exchanged the coarse blade for a new one with finer teeth that would cut plywood smoothly. The new blade was manufactured by Saw-Blade Company, which uses all available techniques to inspect its products for defects. The reconditioned saw had been manufactured by Power Saw Company. The week after the saw was purchased, Employee, who works for Purchaser in Purchaser's cabinetmaking shop, was injured while using the saw. Employee's arm was severely cut. As a result, the cabinetmaking shop was shut down for a week until a replacement for Employee could be foundIf Employee was injured while cutting plywood because the shaft holding the saw blade came loose when a bearing gave way and the shaft and blade flew off the saw, and if Employee asserts a claim based on strict liability in tort against Storekeeper, Employee probably will | [
"not recover unless Purchaser told Storekeeper that Employee would use the power saw.",
"not recover if Employee failed to notice that the shaft was coming loose.",
"recover unless Employee knew that the shaft was coming loose.",
"recover unless Storekeeper used all possible care in reconditioning the power saw"
] | 2 | professional_law |
|
Storekeeper, the owner of a large hardware store, sells power saws for both personal and commercial use. He often takes old power saws as trade-ins on new ones. The old power saws are then completely disassembled and rebuilt with new bearings by Storekeeper's employees and sold by Storekeeper as "reconditioned saws." Purchaser, the owner and operator of a cabinetmaking shop, informed Storekeeper that he wanted to buy a reconditioned circular saw for use in his cabinetmaking business. However, the blade that was on the saw he picked out had very coarse teeth for cutting rough lumber. Purchaser told Storekeeper that he wanted a saw blade that would cut plywood. Storekeeper exchanged the coarse blade for a new one with finer teeth that would cut plywood smoothly. The new blade was manufactured by Saw-Blade Company, which uses all available techniques to inspect its products for defects. The reconditioned saw had been manufactured by Power Saw Company. The week after the saw was purchased, Employee, who works for Purchaser in Purchaser's cabinetmaking shop, was injured while using the saw. Employee's arm was severely cut. As a result, the cabinetmaking shop was shut down for a week until a replacement for Employee could be foundIf Employee was cutting a sheet of plywood, and while he was doing so, the saw blade flew to pieces and severely cut Employee's arm, and if Employee asserts a claim against Storekeeper, the theory on which Employee is most likely to prevail is | [
"strict liability in tort.",
"express warranty.",
"negligence, relying on res ipsa loquitur. ",
"negligence, relying on the sale of an inherently dangerous produc"
] | 0 | professional_law |
|
Storekeeper, the owner of a large hardware store, sells power saws for both personal and commercial use. He often takes old power saws as trade-ins on new ones. The old power saws are then completely disassembled and rebuilt with new bearings by Storekeeper's employees and sold by Storekeeper as "reconditioned saws." Purchaser, the owner and operator of a cabinetmaking shop, informed Storekeeper that he wanted to buy a reconditioned circular saw for use in his cabinetmaking business. However, the blade that was on the saw he picked out had very coarse teeth for cutting rough lumber. Purchaser told Storekeeper that he wanted a saw blade that would cut plywood. Storekeeper exchanged the coarse blade for a new one with finer teeth that would cut plywood smoothly. The new blade was manufactured by Saw-Blade Company, which uses all available techniques to inspect its products for defects. The reconditioned saw had been manufactured by Power Saw Company. The week after the saw was purchased, Employee, who works for Purchaser in Purchaser's cabinetmaking shop, was injured while using the saw. Employee's arm was severely cut. As a result, the cabinetmaking shop was shut down for a week until a replacement for Employee could be foundIf Employee was cutting a sheet of hard plastic, and while he was doing so, the saw blade flew to pieces and severely cut Employee's arm, and if Employee asserts a claim based on strict liability in tort against Saw-Blade Company, the defense most likely to prevail is | [
"Employee did not purchase the saw blade.",
"the blade was being put to an improper use.",
"Employee was contributorily negligent in using the blade to cut hard plastic.",
"Saw-Blade Company used every available means to inspect the blade for defects."
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
In which of the following situations is Defendant most likely to be guilty of common law murder? | [
"Angered because his neighbor is having a noisy party, Defendant fires a rifle into the neighbor's house. The bullet strikes and kills a guest at the party. ",
"During an argument, Harry slaps Defendant. Angered, Defendant responds by shooting and killing Harry. ",
"Defendant drives his car through a red light and strikes and kills a pedestrian who is crossing the street.",
"Using his fist, Defendant punches Walter in the face. As a result of the blow, Walter falls and hits his head on a concrete curb, suffers a concussion, and dies"
] | 0 | jurisprudence |
|
Miller is tried for armed robbery of the First Bank of City.The prosecution, in its case in chief, offers evidence that when Miller was arrested one day after the crime, he had a quantity of heroin and a hypodermic needle in his possession. This evidence should be | [
"admitted to prove Miller's motive to commit the crime.",
"admitted to prove Miller's propensity to commit crimes.",
"excluded, because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. ",
"excluded, because such evidence may be offered only to rebut evidence of good character offered by a defendan"
] | 2 | jurisprudence |
|
Miller is tried for armed robbery of the First Bank of City.. The prosecutor offers the testimony of a bartender who will say that when he saw the money in Miller's wallet, he said, "You must have robbed a bank," to which Miller made no reply. This evidence is | [
"admissible to prove that Miller's conduct caused the bartender to believe that Miller robbed the bank.",
"admissible as a statement made in the presence of the defendant.",
"inadmissible, because it would violate Miller's privilege against selfincrimination. ",
"inadmissible, because Miller had no reason to respond to the bartender's statement."
] | 3 | jurisprudence |
|
Miller is tried for armed robbery of the First Bank of City.At the request of police, the teller who was robbed prepared a sketch bearing a strong likeness to Miller, but the teller died in an automobile accident before Miller was arrested. At trial the prosecution offers the sketch. The sketch is | [
"admissible as an identification of a person after perceiving him.",
"admissible as past recollection recorded.",
"inadmissible as hearsay, not within any exception. ",
"inadmissible as an opinion of the teller"
] | 2 | jurisprudence |
|
Miller is tried for armed robbery of the First Bank of City.Miller testified on direct examination that he had never been in the First Bank of City. His counsel asked, "What, if anything, did you tell the police when you were arrested?" If his answer was "I told them I had never been in the bank," this answer would be | [
"admissible to prove that Miller had never been in the bank.",
"admissible as a prior consistent statement.",
"inadmissible as hearsay, not within any exception. ",
"inadmissible, because it was a self-serving statement by a person with a substantial motive to fabricate"
] | 2 | jurisprudence |
|
Miller is tried for armed robbery of the First Bank of City.On cross-examination of Miller, the prosecutor asks Miller whether he was convicted the previous year of tax fraud. This question is | [
"proper to show that Miller is inclined to lie.",
"proper to show that Miller is inclined to steal money.",
"improper, because the conviction has insufficient similarity to the crime charged. ",
"improper, because the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice"
] | 0 | jurisprudence |
|
In an effort to relieve serious and persistent unemployment in the industrialized state of Onondaga, its legislature enacted a statute requiring every business with annual sales in Onondaga of over one million dollars to purchase goods and/or services in Onondaga equal in value to at least half of the annual sales in Onondaga of the business. Which of the following constitutional provisions is the strongest basis on which to attack this statute? | [
"The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.",
"The equal protection clause.",
"The commerce clause.",
"The privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"
] | 2 | jurisprudence |
|
Tess occupied an apartment in a building owned by Len. She paid rent of $125 in advance each month. During the second month of occupancy, Tess organized the tenants in the building as a tenants' association and the association made demands of Len concerning certain repairs and improvements the tenants wanted. When Tess tendered rent for the third month, Len notified her that rent for the fourth and subsequent months would be $200 per month. Tess protested and pointed out that all other tenants paid rent of $125 per month. Thereupon, Len gave the required statutory notice that the tenancy was being terminated at the end of the third month. By an appropriate proceeding, Tess contests Len's right to terminate. If Tess succeeds, it will be because | [
"a periodic tenancy was created by implication.",
"the doctrine prohibiting retaliatory eviction is part of the law of the jurisdiction.",
"the $200 rent demanded violates the agreement implied by the rate charged to other tenants.",
"the law implies a term of one year in the absence of any express agreement"
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
Meadowview is a large tract of undeveloped land. Black, the owner of Meadowview, prepared a development plan creating 200 house lots in Meadowview with the necessary streets and public areas. The plan was fully approved by all necessary governmental agencies and duly recorded. However, construction of the streets, utilities, and other aspects of the development of Meadowview has not yet begun, and none of the streets can be opened as public ways until they are completed in accordance with the applicable ordinances of the municipality in which Meadowview is located. College Avenue, one of the streets laid out as part of the Meadowview development, abuts Whiteacre, an adjacent one-acre parcel owned by White. Whiteacre has no access to any public way except an old, poorly developed road which is inconvenient and cannot be used without great expense. White sold Whiteacre to Breyer. The description used in the deed from White to Breyer was the same as that used in prior deeds except that the portion of the description which formerly said, "thence by land of Black, northeasterly a distance of 200 feet, more or less," was changed to "thence by College Avenue as laid out on the Plan of Meadowview North 46, East 201.6 feet," with full reference to the plan and its recording data. Breyer now seeks a building permit which will show that Breyer intends to use College Avenue for access to Whiteacre. Black objects to the granting of a building permit on the grounds that he has never granted any right to White or Breyer to use College Avenue. There are no governing statutes or ordinances relating to the problem. Black brings an appropriate action in which the right of Breyer to use College Avenue without an express grant from Black is at issue."The best argument for Black in this action is that | [
"Breyer's right must await the action of appropriate public authorities to open College Avenue as a public street, since no private easements arose by implication. ",
"the Statute of Frauds prevents the introduction of evidence which might prove the necessity for Breyer to use College Avenue.",
"Breyer's right to use College Avenue is restricted to the assertion of a way by necessity and the facts preclude the success of such a claim.",
"Breyer would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to use College Avenue"
] | 0 | professional_law |
|
John Doe, the owner of a milk container manufacturing firm, sought to focus public attention on the milk packaging law of the State of Clinton in order to have it repealed. On a weekday at 12 noon, he delivered an excited, animated, and loud harangue on the steps of the State Capitol in front of the main entryway. An audience of 200 onlookers, who gathered on the steps, heckled him and laughed as he delivered his tirade. Doe repeatedly stated, gesturing expressively and making faces, that "the g ddamned milk packaging law is stupid," and that "I will strangle every one of those g ddamned legislators I can get hold of because this law they created proves they are all too dumb to live." After about 15 minutes, Doe stopped speaking, and the amused crowd dispersed. There are three relevant statutes of the State of Clinton. The first statute prohibits "all speech making, picketing, and public gatherings of every sort on the Capitol steps in front of the main entryway during the hours of 7:45 a.m. 8:15 a.m., 11:45 a.m. 12:15 p.m., 12:45 p.m. 1:15 p.m., and 4:45 p.m. 5:15 p.m. on Capitol working days.""If Doe is prosecuted under the "Capitol steps" statute and defends on constitutional grounds, which of the following best describes the proper burden of proof? | [
"Doe would have to prove that the state did not have a rational basis for enacting this statute.",
"Doe would have to prove that the state did not have a compelling need for this statute or that it had less restrictive means by which it could satisfy that need.",
"The state would have to prove that it had a rational basis for enacting this statute.",
"The state would have to prove that it had a compelling need for this statute and that there were no less restrictive means by which it could satisfy that need"
] | 3 | jurisprudence |
|
John Doe, the owner of a milk container manufacturing firm, sought to focus public attention on the milk packaging law of the State of Clinton in order to have it repealed. On a weekday at 12 noon, he delivered an excited, animated, and loud harangue on the steps of the State Capitol in front of the main entryway. An audience of 200 onlookers, who gathered on the steps, heckled him and laughed as he delivered his tirade. Doe repeatedly stated, gesturing expressively and making faces, that "the g ddamned milk packaging law is stupid," and that "I will strangle every one of those g ddamned legislators I can get hold of because this law they created proves they are all too dumb to live." After about 15 minutes, Doe stopped speaking, and the amused crowd dispersed. There are three relevant statutes of the State of Clinton. The first statute prohibits "all speech making, picketing, and public gatherings of every sort on the Capitol steps in front of the main entryway during the hours of 7:45 a.m. 8:15 a.m., 11:45 a.m. 12:15 p.m., 12:45 p.m. 1:15 p.m., and 4:45 p.m. 5:15 p.m. on Capitol working days.""Which of the following possible plaintiffs other than Doe would be most likely to obtain an adjudication in a federal court on the validity of the "Capitol steps" statute? | [
"A state taxpayer in the highest tax bracket.",
"A politician intending to make a campaign speech on the Capitol steps during a prohibited time.",
"A legislator who voted against the statute because he thought it unconstitutional.",
"An organization whose purpose was \"to seek judicial invalidation of unconstitutional laws.\""
] | 1 | jurisprudence |
|
John Doe, the owner of a milk container manufacturing firm, sought to focus public attention on the milk packaging law of the State of Clinton in order to have it repealed. On a weekday at 12 noon, he delivered an excited, animated, and loud harangue on the steps of the State Capitol in front of the main entryway. An audience of 200 onlookers, who gathered on the steps, heckled him and laughed as he delivered his tirade. Doe repeatedly stated, gesturing expressively and making faces, that "the g ddamned milk packaging law is stupid," and that "I will strangle every one of those g ddamned legislators I can get hold of because this law they created proves they are all too dumb to live." After about 15 minutes, Doe stopped speaking, and the amused crowd dispersed. There are three relevant statutes of the State of Clinton. The first statute prohibits "all speech making, picketing, and public gatherings of every sort on the Capitol steps in front of the main entryway during the hours of 7:45 a.m. 8:15 a.m., 11:45 a.m. 12:15 p.m., 12:45 p.m. 1:15 p.m., and 4:45 p.m. 5:15 p.m. on Capitol working days."". The "Capitol steps" statute is probably | [
"constitutional both on its face and as applied to Doe.",
"constitutional on its face, but unconstitutional as applied to Doe. ",
"unconstitutional on its face, because it applies to all working days. ",
"unconstitutional on its face, because it concerns the State Capito"
] | 0 | jurisprudence |
|
John Doe, the owner of a milk container manufacturing firm, sought to focus public attention on the milk packaging law of the State of Clinton in order to have it repealed. On a weekday at 12 noon, he delivered an excited, animated, and loud harangue on the steps of the State Capitol in front of the main entryway. An audience of 200 onlookers, who gathered on the steps, heckled him and laughed as he delivered his tirade. Doe repeatedly stated, gesturing expressively and making faces, that "the g ddamned milk packaging law is stupid," and that "I will strangle every one of those g ddamned legislators I can get hold of because this law they created proves they are all too dumb to live." After about 15 minutes, Doe stopped speaking, and the amused crowd dispersed. There are three relevant statutes of the State of Clinton. The first statute prohibits "all speech making, picketing, and public gatherings of every sort on the Capitol steps in front of the main entryway during the hours of 7:45 a.m. 8:15 a.m., 11:45 a.m. 12:15 p.m., 12:45 p.m. 1:15 p.m., and 4:45 p.m. 5:15 p.m. on Capitol working days.""A second state statute punishes "any person who shall intentionally threaten the life or safety of any public official for any act which he performed as part of his public office." Which of the following statements is correct concerning the possible punishment of Doe under the second statute? | [
"The statute is unconstitutional on its face.",
"The statute is constitutional on its face, but Doe could not constitutionally be punished under it for this speech. ",
"Doe could constitutionally be punished under the statute for his speech.",
"Doe could constitutionally be punished under the statute for his speech, but only if one or more legislators were actually present when he delivered it"
] | 1 | jurisprudence |
|
John Doe, the owner of a milk container manufacturing firm, sought to focus public attention on the milk packaging law of the State of Clinton in order to have it repealed. On a weekday at 12 noon, he delivered an excited, animated, and loud harangue on the steps of the State Capitol in front of the main entryway. An audience of 200 onlookers, who gathered on the steps, heckled him and laughed as he delivered his tirade. Doe repeatedly stated, gesturing expressively and making faces, that "the g ddamned milk packaging law is stupid," and that "I will strangle every one of those g ddamned legislators I can get hold of because this law they created proves they are all too dumb to live." After about 15 minutes, Doe stopped speaking, and the amused crowd dispersed. There are three relevant statutes of the State of Clinton. The first statute prohibits "all speech making, picketing, and public gatherings of every sort on the Capitol steps in front of the main entryway during the hours of 7:45 a.m. 8:15 a.m., 11:45 a.m. 12:15 p.m., 12:45 p.m. 1:15 p.m., and 4:45 p.m. 5:15 p.m. on Capitol working days.""A third state statute, enacted in 1880, makes criminal "the utterance in any public place of any blasphemy or sacrilege." Assume that there have been only a few recorded prosecutions under the 1880 statute. Doe is charged with violating its proscriptions. The charge is based wholly on the speech he delivered on the steps of the Clinton State Capitol. Which of the following constitutional defenses to this prosecution under the 1880 statute would be the LEAST likely to succeed? | [
"This statute is vague and therefore violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.",
"This statute is an establishment of religion and therefore violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.",
"Application of this statute to Doe denies him equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.",
"Application of this statute to Doe denies him freedom of speech in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment"
] | 2 | jurisprudence |
|
Peri sued Denucci for a libelous letter received by Investigator. The authenticity and contents of the letter are disputed.Peri's attorney asks Investigator to testify that, a week before receiving the libelous letter, he had written to Denucci inquiring about Peri. The testimony is | [
"admissible provided that this inquiry was made in the regular course of Investigator's business.",
"admissible without production of the inquiry letter or the showing of its unavailability.",
"inadmissible unless Peri's attorney has given Denucci notice of Investigator's intended testimony.",
"inadmissible unless the inquiry letter itself is shown to be unavailable."
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
Peri sued Denucci for a libelous letter received by Investigator. The authenticity and contents of the letter are disputed.Investigator, if permitted, will testify that "I received a letter that I cannot now find, which read: Dear Investigator, You inquired about Peri. We fired him last month when we discovered that he had been stealing from the stockroom. Denucci'." The testimony should be admitted in evidence only if the | [
"jury finds that Investigator has quoted the letter precisely.",
"jury is satisfied that the original letter is unavailable.",
"judge is satisfied that Investigator has quoted the letter precisely.",
"judge finds that the original letter is unavailable"
] | 3 | jurisprudence |
|
Photo, a freelance photographer, took a picture of Player in front of Shoe Store. Player was a nationally known amateur basketball star who had received much publicity in the press. At the time, the window display in Shoe Store featured "Jumpers," a well-known make of basketball shoes. Photo sold the picture, greatly enlarged, to Shoe Store and told Shoe Store that Photo had Player's approval to do so and that Player had consented to Shoe Store's showing the enlarged picture in the window. Shoe Store made no effort to ascertain whether Player had given his consent to Photo. In fact, Player did not even know that Photo had taken the picture. Shoe Store put the enlarged picture in the window with the display of "Jumpers" shoes. The college that Player attended believed that Player had intentionally endorsed Shoe Store and "Jumpers" shoes, and the college cancelled his athletic scholarship."If Player asserts a claim based on defamation against Shoe Store, will Player prevail? | [
"Yes, if Shoe Store was reckless in accepting Photo's statement that Photo had Player's approval. ",
"Yes, because the defamatory material was in printed form. ",
"No, if Shoe Store believed Photo's statement that Photo had Player's approval. ",
"No, because the picture of Player was not defamatory per se"
] | 0 | jurisprudence |
|
Photo, a freelance photographer, took a picture of Player in front of Shoe Store. Player was a nationally known amateur basketball star who had received much publicity in the press. At the time, the window display in Shoe Store featured "Jumpers," a well-known make of basketball shoes. Photo sold the picture, greatly enlarged, to Shoe Store and told Shoe Store that Photo had Player's approval to do so and that Player had consented to Shoe Store's showing the enlarged picture in the window. Shoe Store made no effort to ascertain whether Player had given his consent to Photo. In fact, Player did not even know that Photo had taken the picture. Shoe Store put the enlarged picture in the window with the display of "Jumpers" shoes. The college that Player attended believed that Player had intentionally endorsed Shoe Store and "Jumpers" shoes, and the college cancelled his athletic scholarship."If Player asserts a claim based on invasion of privacy against Shoe Store, will Player prevail? | [
"Yes, because Photo had no right to take Player's picture. ",
"Yes, because Shoe Store, without Player's permission, used Player's picture for profit. ",
"No, because Player was already a basketball star who had received much publicity in the press. ",
"No, because Shoe Store believed it had permission to put the picture in the window"
] | 1 | jurisprudence |
|
Landover, the owner in fee simple of Highacre, an apartment house property, entered into an enforceable written agreement with VanMeer to sell Highacre to VanMeer. The agreement provided that a good and marketable title was to be conveyed free and clear of all encumbrances. However, the agreement was silent as to the risk of fire prior to closing, and there is no applicable statute in the state where the land is located. The premises were not insured. The day before the scheduled closing date, Highacre was wholly destroyed by fire. When VanMeer refused to close, Landover brought an action for specific performance. If Landover prevails, the most likely reason will be that | [
"the failure of VanMeer to insure his interest as the purchaser of Highacre precludes any relief for him.",
"the remedy at law is inadequate in actions concerning real estate contracts and either party is entitled to specific performance.",
"equity does not permit consideration of surrounding circumstances in actions concerning real estate contracts.",
"the doctrine of equitable conversion applie"
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
Realco Realtors acquired a large tract of land upon which Realco developed a mobile home subdivision. The tract was divided into 60 lots, appropriate utilities were installed, and a plat of the entire tract, including a Declaration of Restrictions, was properly drawn and recorded. The Declaration of Restrictions included the following: "3. Ownership and/or occupancy are restricted to persons 21 years of age or over, one family per lot." As the separate lots were sold, the deed to each lot included the following provision: "As shown on recorded plat [properly identified by page and plat book reference] and subject to the restrictions therein contained." One of the lots was purchased by Dawson, who now resides in a mobile home on the lot together with his wife and two children, aged 11 and 13. Other lot owners in the subdivision brought action against Dawson to enjoin further occupancy by the children under 21 years of age. If judgment is for Dawson, the issue that most likely will determine the case will be whether | [
"the mobile home is treated as personalty or realty.",
"the restriction constitutes an unlawful restraint on alienation.",
"enforcement of the restriction is considered a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.",
"the terms of the restriction are expressly repeated verbatim in Dawson's dee"
] | 2 | professional_law |
|
Defendant became intoxicated at a bar. He got into his car and drove away. Within a few blocks, craving another drink, he stopped his car in the middle of the street, picked up a brick, and broke the display window of a liquor store. As he was reaching for a bottle, the night watchman arrived. Startled, Defendant turned and struck the watchman on the head with the bottle, killing him. Only vaguely aware of what was happening, Defendant returned to his car, consumed more liquor, and then drove off at a high speed. He ran a red light and struck and killed a pedestrian who was crossing the street. Relevant statutes define burglary to include "breaking and entering a building not used as a dwelling with the intent to commit a crime therein." Manslaughter is defined as the "killing of a human being in a criminally reckless manner." Criminal recklessness is "consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk resulting from the actor's conduct." Murder is defined as "the premeditated and intentional killing of another or the killing of another in the commission of committing rape, robbery, burglary, or arson." Another statute provides that intoxication is not a defense to crime unless it negates an element of the offense. Defendant was charged with the murder of the watchman and manslaughter in the death of the pedestrian. Assume that he is tried separately on each charge "At Defendant's trial for the murder of the watchman, the court should in substance charge the jury on the issue of the defense of intoxication that | [
"intoxication is a defense to the underlying crime of burglary if Defendant, due to drunkenness, did not form an intent to commit a crime within the building, in which case there can be no conviction for murder unless Defendant intentionally and with premeditation killed the watchman. ",
"voluntary intoxication is not a defense to the crime of murder.",
"Defendant is guilty of murder despite his intoxication only if the state proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing of the watchman was premeditated and intentional.",
"voluntary intoxication is a defense to the crime of murder if Defendant would not have killed the watchman but for his intoxication"
] | 0 | jurisprudence |
|
Defendant became intoxicated at a bar. He got into his car and drove away. Within a few blocks, craving another drink, he stopped his car in the middle of the street, picked up a brick, and broke the display window of a liquor store. As he was reaching for a bottle, the night watchman arrived. Startled, Defendant turned and struck the watchman on the head with the bottle, killing him. Only vaguely aware of what was happening, Defendant returned to his car, consumed more liquor, and then drove off at a high speed. He ran a red light and struck and killed a pedestrian who was crossing the street. Relevant statutes define burglary to include "breaking and entering a building not used as a dwelling with the intent to commit a crime therein." Manslaughter is defined as the "killing of a human being in a criminally reckless manner." Criminal recklessness is "consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk resulting from the actor's conduct." Murder is defined as "the premeditated and intentional killing of another or the killing of another in the commission of committing rape, robbery, burglary, or arson." Another statute provides that intoxication is not a defense to crime unless it negates an element of the offense. Defendant was charged with the murder of the watchman and manslaughter in the death of the pedestrian. Assume that he is tried separately on each charge "At Defendant's trial on the charge of manslaughter in the death of the pedestrian, his best argument would be that | [
"he was too intoxicated to realize that he was creating a substantial and unjustifiable risk in the manner in which he was operating his car.",
"when he got into the car, his acts were not voluntary because he was too intoxicated to know where he was or what he was doing. ",
"the pedestrian was contributorily negligent in failing to see Defendant's car approaching.",
"he was too intoxicated to form any intent to voluntarily operate the automobil"
] | 0 | jurisprudence |
|
Defendant became intoxicated at a bar. He got into his car and drove away. Within a few blocks, craving another drink, he stopped his car in the middle of the street, picked up a brick, and broke the display window of a liquor store. As he was reaching for a bottle, the night watchman arrived. Startled, Defendant turned and struck the watchman on the head with the bottle, killing him. Only vaguely aware of what was happening, Defendant returned to his car, consumed more liquor, and then drove off at a high speed. He ran a red light and struck and killed a pedestrian who was crossing the street. Relevant statutes define burglary to include "breaking and entering a building not used as a dwelling with the intent to commit a crime therein." Manslaughter is defined as the "killing of a human being in a criminally reckless manner." Criminal recklessness is "consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk resulting from the actor's conduct." Murder is defined as "the premeditated and intentional killing of another or the killing of another in the commission of committing rape, robbery, burglary, or arson." Another statute provides that intoxication is not a defense to crime unless it negates an element of the offense. Defendant was charged with the murder of the watchman and manslaughter in the death of the pedestrian. Assume that he is tried separately on each charge "The state's best argument to counter Defendant's argument in Question 137 on the intoxication issue in the manslaughter death of the pedestrian is that | [
"intoxication is no defense to the crime charged, because manslaughter is historically a general intent crime. ",
"intoxication is a defense only to a specific intent crime, and no specific intent is involved in the definition of the crime of manslaughter. ",
"conscious risk-taking refers to Defendant's entire course of conduct, including drinking with the knowledge that he might become intoxicated and seriously injure or kill someone while driving. ",
"whether Defendant was intoxicated or not is not the crucial issue here; the real issue is whether the manner in which Defendant was operating his car can be characterized under the facts as criminally reckless"
] | 2 | jurisprudence |
|
The Federal Automobile Safety Act establishes certain safety and performance standards for all automobiles manufactured in the United States. The Act creates a five-member "Automobile Commission" to investigate automobile safety, to make recommendations to Congress for new laws, to make further rules establishing safety and performance standards, and to prosecute violations of the act. The chairman is appointed by the President, two members are selected by the President pro tempore of the Senate, and two members are selected by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Minicar, Inc., a minor United States car manufacturer, seeks to enjoin enforcement of the Commission's rules"The best argument that Minicar can make is that | [
"legislative power may not be delegated by Congress to an agency in the absence of clear guidelines.",
"the commerce power does not extend to the manufacture of automobiles not used in interstate commerce.",
"Minicar is denied due process of law because it is not represented on the Commission.",
"the Commission lacks authority to enforce its standards because not all of its members were appointed by the President"
] | 3 | jurisprudence |
|
The Federal Automobile Safety Act establishes certain safety and performance standards for all automobiles manufactured in the United States. The Act creates a five-member "Automobile Commission" to investigate automobile safety, to make recommendations to Congress for new laws, to make further rules establishing safety and performance standards, and to prosecute violations of the act. The chairman is appointed by the President, two members are selected by the President pro tempore of the Senate, and two members are selected by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Minicar, Inc., a minor United States car manufacturer, seeks to enjoin enforcement of the Commission's rules"The appropriate decision for the court is to | [
"allow the Commission to continue investigating automobile safety and making recommendations to Congress.",
"allow the Commission to prosecute violations of the act but not allow it to issue rules.",
"forbid the Commission to take any action under the act.",
"order that all members of the Commission be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senat"
] | 0 | jurisprudence |
|
Johnson wanted to purchase a used motor vehicle. The used car lot of Car Company, in a remote section away from town, was enclosed by a 10-foot chainlink fence. While Johnson and Sales Representative, an employee of Car Company, were in the used car lot looking at cars, a security guard locked the gate at 1:30 p.m., because it was Saturday and the lot was supposed to be closed after 1:00 p.m. Saturday until Monday morning. At 1:45 p.m., Johnson and Sales Representative discovered that they were locked in. There was no traffic in the vicinity and no way in which help could be summoned. After two hours, Johnson began to panic at the prospect of remaining undiscovered and without food and water until Monday morning. Sales Representative decided to wait in a car until help should come. Johnson tried to climb over the fence and, in doing so, fell and was injured. Johnson asserts a claim against Car Company for damages for his injuries."If Johnson's claim is based on negligence, is the defense of assumption of the risk applicable? | [
"Yes, if a reasonable person would have recognized that there was some risk of falling while climbing the fence. ",
"Yes, because Sales Representative, as Car Company's agent, waited for help. ",
"No, if it appeared that there was no other practicable way of getting out of the lot before Monday. ",
"No, because Johnson was confined as the result of a volitional act"
] | 2 | professional_law |
|
Johnson wanted to purchase a used motor vehicle. The used car lot of Car Company, in a remote section away from town, was enclosed by a 10-foot chainlink fence. While Johnson and Sales Representative, an employee of Car Company, were in the used car lot looking at cars, a security guard locked the gate at 1:30 p.m., because it was Saturday and the lot was supposed to be closed after 1:00 p.m. Saturday until Monday morning. At 1:45 p.m., Johnson and Sales Representative discovered that they were locked in. There was no traffic in the vicinity and no way in which help could be summoned. After two hours, Johnson began to panic at the prospect of remaining undiscovered and without food and water until Monday morning. Sales Representative decided to wait in a car until help should come. Johnson tried to climb over the fence and, in doing so, fell and was injured. Johnson asserts a claim against Car Company for damages for his injuries."If Johnson's claim is based on false imprisonment, will Johnson prevail? | [
"Yes, because he was confined against his will. ",
"Yes, because he was harmed as a result of his confinement. ",
"No, unless the security guard was negligent in locking the gate. ",
"No, unless the security guard knew that someone was in the lot at the time the guard locked the gate"
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
Lester, the owner in fee simple of a small farm consisting of 30 acres of land improved with a house and several outbuildings, leased the same to Tanner for a 10-year period. After two years had expired, the government condemned 20 acres of the property and allocated the compensation award to Lester and Tanner according to their respective interest so taken. It so happened, however, that the 20 acres taken embraced all of the farm's tillable land, leaving only the house, outbuildings, and a small woodlot. There is no applicable statute in the jurisdiction where the property is located nor any provision in the lease relating to condemnation. Tanner quit possession, and Lester brought suit against him to recover rent. Lester will | [
"lose, because there has been a frustration of purpose which excuses Tanner from further performance of his contract to pay rent. ",
"lose, because there has been a breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment by Lester's inability to provide Tanner with possession of the whole of the property for the entire term. ",
"win, because of the implied warranty on the part of the tenant to return the demised premises in the same condition at the end of the term as they were at the beginning. ",
"win, because the relationship of landlord and tenant was unaffected by the condemnation, thus leaving Tanner still obligated to pay rent."
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
Statutes in the jurisdiction define criminal assault as "an attempt to commit a criminal battery" and criminal battery as "causing an offensive touching." As Edward was walking down the street, a gust of wind blew his hat off. Edward reached out, trying to grab his hat, and narrowly missed striking Margaret in the face with his hand. Margaret, fearful of being struck by Edward, pushed Edward away "If charged with criminal assault, Edward should be found | [
"guilty, because he caused Margaret to be in apprehension of an offensive touching. ",
"guilty, because he should have realized that he might strike someone by reaching out. ",
"not guilty, because he did not intend to hit Margaret. ",
"not guilty, because he did not hit Margaret"
] | 2 | jurisprudence |
|
Statutes in the jurisdiction define criminal assault as "an attempt to commit a criminal battery" and criminal battery as "causing an offensive touching." As Edward was walking down the street, a gust of wind blew his hat off. Edward reached out, trying to grab his hat, and narrowly missed striking Margaret in the face with his hand. Margaret, fearful of being struck by Edward, pushed Edward away "If charged with criminal battery, Margaret should be found | [
"guilty, because she intentionally pushed Edward. ",
"guilty, because she caused the touching of Edward whether she meant to do so or not. ",
"not guilty, because a push is not an offensive touching. ",
"not guilty, because she was justified in pushing Edward"
] | 3 | jurisprudence |
|
Police were concerned about an increase in marijuana traffic in Defendant's neighborhood. One night, Police Officers, accompanied by dogs trained to sniff out marijuana, went into the backyard of Defendant's house and onto his porch. Defendant and his friend were inside 34 having dinner. The dogs acted as if they smelled marijuana. Police Officers knocked on the back door. Defendant answered the door and let them in. Defendant was immediately placed under arrest. After a brief search, Police Officers confiscated a large quantity of marijuana which they found in Defendant's linen closet. Defendant's motion to prevent introduction of the marijuana into evidence will most probably be | [
"denied, because the search was incident to a valid arrest. ",
"denied, because Defendant permitted Police Officers to enter his house. ",
"granted, because under the circumstances the police activity violated Defendant's reasonable expectations of privacy. ",
"granted, because this kind of detection by trained dogs has not been scientifically verified and cannot be the basis for probable cause."
] | 2 | jurisprudence |
|
Drew was tried for the July 21 murder of Victor.In his case in chief, Drew called his first witness, Wilma, to testify to Drew's reputation in his community as a "peaceable man." The testimony is | [
"admissible as tending to prove that Drew is believable.",
"admissible as trying to prove that Drew is innocent.",
"inadmissible, because Drew has not testified. ",
"inadmissible, because reputation is not a proper way to prove character"
] | 1 | jurisprudence |
|
Drew was tried for the July 21 murder of Victor.Drew called William to testify that on July 20 Drew said that he was about to leave that day to visit relatives in a distant state. The testimony is | [
"admissible, because it is a declaration of present mental state. ",
"admissible, because it is not hearsay. ",
"inadmissible, because it is irrelevant. ",
"inadmissible, because it is hearsay, not within any exception."
] | 0 | jurisprudence |
|
Drew was tried for the July 21 murder of Victor."Drew called Wilson to testify to alibi. On crossexamination of Wilson, the prosecution asked, "Isn't it a fact that you are Drew's first cousin?" The question is | [
"proper, because it goes to bias. ",
"proper, because a relative is not competent to give reputation testimony. ",
"improper, because the question goes beyond the scope of direct examination. ",
"improper, because the evidence being sought is irrelevant"
] | 0 | jurisprudence |
|
Drew was tried for the July 21 murder of Victor.Drew called Warren to testify to alibi. On crossexamination of Warren, the prosecutor asked, "Weren't you on the jury that acquitted Drew of another criminal charge?" The best reason for sustaining an objection to this question is th | [
"the question goes beyond the scope of direct examination.",
"the probative value of the answer would be outweighed by its tendency to mislead.",
"the question is leading.",
"prior jury service in a case involving a party renders the witness incompetent."
] | 1 | jurisprudence |
|
Redirect examination of a witness must be permitted in which of the following circumstances? | [
"To reply to any matter raised in crossexamination.",
"Only to reply to significant new matter raised in cross-examination.",
"Only to reiterate the essential elements of the case.",
"Only to supply significant information inadvertently omitted on direct examination"
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
On March 1, Mechanic agreed to repair Ohner's machine for $5,000, to be paid on completion of the work. On March 15, before the work was completed, Mechanic sent a letter to Ohner with a copy to Jones, telling Ohner to pay the $5,000 to Jones, who was one of Mechanic's creditors. Mechanic then completed the work. Which of the following, if true, would best serve Ohner as a defense in an action brought against him by Jones for $5,000? | [
"Jones was incapable of performing Mechanic's work.",
"Mechanic had not performed his work in a workmanlike manner. 35",
"On March 1, Mechanic had promised Ohner that he would not assign the contract. ",
"Jones was not the intended beneficiary of the Ohner-Mechanic contract"
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
BCD, a manufacturer of computers, pays its salespeople a salary of $1,000 per month and a commission of five percent on billings actually rendered for machines that they sell. BCD salespeople are employed at will under written agreements which provide that in order to receive a commission the salesperson must be in the employment of the company when the bill is sent to the customer. In 1976, John, a salesperson for BCD, worked for eight months to get an order from Bobb Corporation for a large $750,000 computer. He consulted extensively with Bobb's top executives and worked with its operating personnel to develop detailed specifications for the new equipment. He also promised Bobb, with BCD's knowledge and approval, to assist Bobb for six months after installation in making the equipment work. On January 1, 1977, Bobb signed an order, and on March 1, the computer was installed. On March 15, BCD fired John on the stated ground that he had failed to meet his 1975 and 1976 sales quotas. John thought that BCD was correct in this statement. Another salesperson, Franklin, was thereupon assigned to service the Bobb account. On March 31, BCD billed Bobb for the computer."Assume for this question only that BCD's termination of John's employment was not wrongful. If John, after demand and refusal, sues BCD for the Bobb sale commission, which of the following is the most likely to result? | [
"John will win, because he had procured the sale of the computer. ",
"John will win, because he had promised Bobb to assist in making the equipment work. ",
"BCD will win, because Franklin is entitled to the commission on a quantum meruit basis. ",
"BCD will win, because John was not employed as a BCD salesperson when Bobb was billed for the computer."
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
BCD, a manufacturer of computers, pays its salespeople a salary of $1,000 per month and a commission of five percent on billings actually rendered for machines that they sell. BCD salespeople are employed at will under written agreements which provide that in order to receive a commission the salesperson must be in the employment of the company when the bill is sent to the customer. In 1976, John, a salesperson for BCD, worked for eight months to get an order from Bobb Corporation for a large $750,000 computer. He consulted extensively with Bobb's top executives and worked with its operating personnel to develop detailed specifications for the new equipment. He also promised Bobb, with BCD's knowledge and approval, to assist Bobb for six months after installation in making the equipment work. On January 1, 1977, Bobb signed an order, and on March 1, the computer was installed. On March 15, BCD fired John on the stated ground that he had failed to meet his 1975 and 1976 sales quotas. John thought that BCD was correct in this statement. Another salesperson, Franklin, was thereupon assigned to service the Bobb account. On March 31, BCD billed Bobb for the computer."Assume for this question only that BCD's termination of John's employment was not wrongful. If John sues BCD for the reasonable value of his services, which of the following is the most likely result? | [
"John will win, because BCD benefited as a result of John's services. ",
"John will win, because BCD made an implied-in-fact promise to pay a reasonable commission for services that result in sales. ",
"John will lose, because there is an express contractual provision pre-empting the subject of compensation for his services. ",
"John will lose, because he cannot perform his agreement to assist the customer for six months"
] | 2 | professional_law |
|
BCD, a manufacturer of computers, pays its salespeople a salary of $1,000 per month and a commission of five percent on billings actually rendered for machines that they sell. BCD salespeople are employed at will under written agreements which provide that in order to receive a commission the salesperson must be in the employment of the company when the bill is sent to the customer. In 1976, John, a salesperson for BCD, worked for eight months to get an order from Bobb Corporation for a large $750,000 computer. He consulted extensively with Bobb's top executives and worked with its operating personnel to develop detailed specifications for the new equipment. He also promised Bobb, with BCD's knowledge and approval, to assist Bobb for six months after installation in making the equipment work. On January 1, 1977, Bobb signed an order, and on March 1, the computer was installed. On March 15, BCD fired John on the stated ground that he had failed to meet his 1975 and 1976 sales quotas. John thought that BCD was correct in this statement. Another salesperson, Franklin, was thereupon assigned to service the Bobb account. On March 31, BCD billed Bobb for the computer.""Which of the following additional facts, if shown by the evidence, would support a claim by John against BCD? I. BCD terminated John because Franklin is the son of the company's president, who wanted his son to have the commission instead of John. II. BCD and John were mistaken; John had in fact exceeded his sales quotas for 1975 and 1976. III. John had worked for BCD as a salesperson for 20 years. | [
"I only",
"II only",
"I and II only",
"I, II, and II"
] | 2 | professional_law |
|
In 1963, Hobson was appointed to a tribunal established pursuant to a congressional act. The tribunal's duties were to review claims made by veterans and to make recommendations to the Veterans Administration on their merits. Congress later abolished the tribunal and established a different format for review of such claims. Hobson was offered a federal administrative position in the same bureau at a lesser salary. He thereupon sued the government on the ground that Congress may not remove a federal judge from office during good behavior nor diminish his compensation during continuance in office. Government attorneys filed a motion to dismiss the action. The court should | [
"deny the motion, because of the independence of the federal judiciary constitutionally guaranteed by Article III. ",
"deny the motion, because Hobson has established a property right to his federal employment on the tribunal. ",
"grant the motion, because Hobson lacks standing to raise the question. ",
"grant the motion, because Hobson was not a judge under Article III and is not entitled to life tenure"
] | 3 | jurisprudence |
|
In 1940, Cattle Company paid $30,000 for a 150- acre tract of agricultural land well suited for a cattle feedlot. The tract was 10 miles from the city of Metropolis, then a community of 50,000 people, and five miles from the nearest home. By 1976, the city limits extended to Cattle Company's feedlot, and the city had a population of 350,000. About 10,000 people lived within three miles of the cattle-feeding operation. The Cattle Company land is outside the city limits and no zoning ordinance applies. The Cattle Company land is now worth $300,000, and $25,000 has been invested in buildings and pens. Cattle Company, conscious of its obligations to its neighbors, uses the best and most sanitary feedlot procedures, including chemical sprays, to keep down flies and odors, and frequently removes manure. Despite these measures, residents of Metropolis complain of flies and odors. An action has been filed by five individual homeowners who live within half a mile of the Cattle Company feedlot. The plaintiffs' homes are valued currently at $25,000 to $40,000 each. Flies in the area are five to ten times more numerous than in other parts of Metropolis, and extremely obnoxious odors are frequently carried by the wind to the plaintiffs' homes. The flies and odors are a substantial health hazard."If plaintiffs assert a claim based on public nuisance, plaintiffs will | [
"prevail if plaintiffs sustained harm different from that suffered by the public at large.",
"prevail if Cattle Company's acts interfered with any person's enjoyment of his property.",
"not prevail, because only the state may bring an action based on public nuisance. ",
"not prevail, because plaintiffs came to the nuisance"
] | 0 | jurisprudence |
|
Alan, who was already married, went through a marriage ceremony with Betty and committed bigamy. Carl, his friend, who did not know of Alan's previous marriage, had encouraged Alan to marry Betty and was best man at the ceremony. If Carl is charged with being an accessory to bigamy, he should be found | [
"not guilty, because his encouragement and assistance were not the legal cause of the crime. ",
"not guilty, because he did not have the mental state required for aiding and abetting. ",
"guilty, because he encouraged Alan, and his mistake as to the existence of a prior marriage is not a defense to a charge of bigamy. ",
"guilty, because he was present when the crime occurred and is thus a principal in the second degre"
] | 1 | jurisprudence |
|
Darlene was arrested on a murder charge. She was given Miranda warnings and refused to talk further with the police. At trial, she testified in her own defense. She recounted in some detail her whereabouts on the day of the crime and explained why she could not have committed the crime. On cross-examination and over defense objection, the prosecution emphasized the fact that she did not tell the police this story following her arrest. The prosecution thereby suggested that her testimony was false. Darlene was convicted. On appeal, she claims error in the prosecutor's cross-examination. Her conviction will most probably be | [
"affirmed, because Darlene's silence at time of arrest is tantamount to a prior inconsistent statement, giving rise to an inference that the story was fabricated. ",
"affirmed, because Darlene's silence was not used as direct evidence but only for impeachment, a purpose consistent with legitimate cross-examination. ",
"reversed, because post-arrest silence constituted Darlene's exercise of her Miranda rights and use of that silence against her at trial violated due process. ",
"reversed, because to require the defense to acquaint the prosecution with Darlene's testimony prior to trial would constitute unconstitutional pretrial discover"
] | 2 | jurisprudence |
|
Alice was held up at the point of a gun, an unusual revolver with a red-painted barrel, while she was clerking in a neighborhood grocery store. Dennis is charged with armed robbery of Alice. The prosecutor calls Winthrop to testify that, a week after the robbery of Alice, he was robbed by Dennis with a pistol that had red paint on the barrel. Winthrop's testimony is | [
"admissible as establishing an identifying circumstance.",
"admissible as showing that Dennis was willing to commit robbery.",
"inadmissible, because it is improper character evidence. ",
"inadmissible, because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudic"
] | 0 | jurisprudence |
|
Maria is the owner and possessor of Goodacre, on which there is a lumberyard. Maria conveyed to Reliable Electric Company the right to construct and use an overhead electric line across Goodacre to serve other properties. The conveyance was in writing, but the writing made no provision concerning the responsibility for repair or maintenance of the line. Reliable installed the poles and erected the electric line in a proper and workmanlike manner. Neither Maria nor Reliable took any steps toward the maintenance or repair of the line after it was built. Neither party complained to the other about any failure to repair. Because of the failure to repair or properly maintain the line, it fell to the ground during a storm. In doing so, it caused a fire in the lumberyard and did considerable damage. Maria sued Reliable Electric Company to recover for damages to the lumberyard. The decision should be for | [
"Maria, because the owner of an easement has a duty to so maintain the easement as to avoid unreasonable interference with the use of the servient tenement by its lawful possessor. ",
"Maria, because the owner of an easement is absolutely liable for any damage caused to the servient tenement by the exercise of the easement. ",
"Reliable Electric Company, because the possessor of the servient tenement has a duty to give the easement holder notice of defective conditions. ",
"Reliable Electric Company, because an easement holder's right to repair is a right for his own benefit, and is therefore inconsistent with any duty to repair for the benefit of another"
] | 0 | professional_law |
|
Sartorial, Inc., a new business enterprise about to commence the manufacture of clothing, entered into a written agreement to purchase all of its monthly requirements of a certain elasticized fabric for a period of three years from the Stretch Company at a specified unit price and agreed delivery and payment terms. The agreement also provided: 1. The parties covenant not to assign this contract. 2. Payments coming due hereunder for the first two months shall be made directly by Sartorial to Virginia Wear and Son, Inc., a creditor of Stretch. Stretch promptly made an "assignment of the contract" to Finance Company as security for a $100,000 loan. Sartorial subsequently ordered, took delivery of, and paid Stretch the agreed price ($5,000) for Sartorial's requirement of the fabric for the first month of its operation.Which of the following accurately states the legal effect of the covenant not to assign the contract? | [
"The covenant made the assignment to Finance Company ineffective.",
"The covenant had no legal effect.",
"Stretch's assignment was a breach of its contract with Sartorial but was 38 nevertheless effective to transfer to Finance Company Stretch's rights against Sartorial.",
"By normal interpretation, a covenant against assignment in a sale-of-goods agreement applies to only the buyer, not the seller"
] | 2 | professional_law |
|
Sartorial, Inc., a new business enterprise about to commence the manufacture of clothing, entered into a written agreement to purchase all of its monthly requirements of a certain elasticized fabric for a period of three years from the Stretch Company at a specified unit price and agreed delivery and payment terms. The agreement also provided: 1. The parties covenant not to assign this contract. 2. Payments coming due hereunder for the first two months shall be made directly by Sartorial to Virginia Wear and Son, Inc., a creditor of Stretch. Stretch promptly made an "assignment of the contract" to Finance Company as security for a $100,000 loan. Sartorial subsequently ordered, took delivery of, and paid Stretch the agreed price ($5,000) for Sartorial's requirement of the fabric for the first month of its operation.Assume for this question only that the assignment from Stretch to Finance Company was effective, and that Sartorial was unaware of the assignment when it paid Stretch the $5,000. Which of the following is correct? | [
"Sartorial is liable to Finance Company for $5,000. ",
"Stretch is liable to Finance Company for $5,000. ",
"Sartorial and Stretch are each liable to Finance Company for $2,500. ",
"Neither Sartorial nor Stretch is liable to Finance Company for any amount"
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
Sartorial, Inc., a new business enterprise about to commence the manufacture of clothing, entered into a written agreement to purchase all of its monthly requirements of a certain elasticized fabric for a period of three years from the Stretch Company at a specified unit price and agreed delivery and payment terms. The agreement also provided: 1. The parties covenant not to assign this contract. 2. Payments coming due hereunder for the first two months shall be made directly by Sartorial to Virginia Wear and Son, Inc., a creditor of Stretch. Stretch promptly made an "assignment of the contract" to Finance Company as security for a $100,000 loan. Sartorial subsequently ordered, took delivery of, and paid Stretch the agreed price ($5,000) for Sartorial's requirement of the fabric for the first month of its operation."Assume for this question only that the assignment from Stretch to Finance Company was effective, and that Virginia Wear and Son, Inc., did not become aware of the original agreement between Sartorial and Stretch until after Stretch's acceptance of the $5,000 payment from Sartorial. Which of the following, if any, is/are correct? I. Virginia Wear and Son, Inc., was an incidental beneficiary of the SartorialStretch agreement. II. Virginia Wear and Son, Inc., has a prior right to Sartorial's $5,000 payment as against either Stretch or Finance Company. | [
"I only",
"II only",
"Both I and II",
"Neither I nor I"
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
Sartorial, Inc., a new business enterprise about to commence the manufacture of clothing, entered into a written agreement to purchase all of its monthly requirements of a certain elasticized fabric for a period of three years from the Stretch Company at a specified unit price and agreed delivery and payment terms. The agreement also provided: 1. The parties covenant not to assign this contract. 2. Payments coming due hereunder for the first two months shall be made directly by Sartorial to Virginia Wear and Son, Inc., a creditor of Stretch. Stretch promptly made an "assignment of the contract" to Finance Company as security for a $100,000 loan. Sartorial subsequently ordered, took delivery of, and paid Stretch the agreed price ($5,000) for Sartorial's requirement of the fabric for the first month of its operation.Assume for this question only that, two weeks after making the $5,000 payment to Stretch, Sartorial by written notice to Stretch terminated the agreement for purchase of the elasticized fabric because market conditions had in fact forced Sartorial out of the clothing manufacture business. In an immediate suit by Finance Company against Sartorial for total breach, which of the following would be useful in Sartorial's defense? | [
"Stretch's rights under its agreement with Sartorial were personal and therefore nonassignable.",
"Stretch's \"assignment of the contract\" to Finance Company to secure a loan would normally be interpreted as a delegation of Stretch's duties under the contract as well as an assignment of its rights; and its duties, owed to Sartorial, were personal and therefore nondelegable. ",
"The original contract between Sartorial and Stretch was unenforceable by either party for want of a legally sufficient consideration for Stretch's promise to supply Sartorial's requirements of the elasticized fabric.",
"Sartorial ceased in good faith to have any further requirements for elasticized fabric"
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
Seth owned a vacant lot known as Richacre. Seth entered into a written contract with Bobto build a house of stated specifications on Richacre and to sell the house and lot to Bob. The contract provided for an "inside date" of April 1, 1977, and an "outside date" of May 1, 1977, for completion of the house and delivery of a deed. Neither party tendered performance on the dates stated. On May 3, 1977, Bob notified Seth in writing of Bob's election to cancel the contract because of Seth's failure to deliver title by May 1. On May 12, Seth notified Bob that some unanticipated construction difficulties had been encountered but that Seth was entitled to a reasonable time to complete in any event. The notification also included a promise that Seth would be ready to perform by May 29 and that he was setting that date as an adjourned closing date. Seth obtained a certificate of occupancy and appropriate documents of title, and he tendered performance on May 29. Bob refused. Seth brought an action to recover damages for breach of contract. The decision in the case will most likely be determined by whether | [
"Seth acted with due diligence in completing the house.",
"Bob can prove actual \"undue hardship\" caused by the delay. ",
"the expressions \"inside date\" and \"outside date\" are construed to make time of the essence. ",
"there is a showing of good faith in Bob's efforts to terminate the contract."
] | 2 | professional_law |
|
Metterly, the owner in fee simple of Brownacre, by quitclaim deed conveyed Brownacre to her daughter, Doris, who paid no consideration for the conveyance. The deed was never recorded. About a year after the delivery of the deed, Metterly decided that this gift had been illadvised. She asked Doris to destroy the deed, which Doris dutifully and voluntarily did. Within the month following the destruction of the deed, Metterly and Doris were killed in a common disaster. Each of the successors in interest claimed title to Brownacre. In an appropriate action to determine the title to Brownacre, the probable outcome will be that | [
"Metterly was the owner of Brownacre, because Doris was a donee and therefore could not acquire title by quitclaim deed. ",
"Metterly was the owner of Brownacre, because title to Brownacre reverted to her upon the voluntary destruction of the deed by Doris. ",
"Doris was the owner of Brownacre, because her destruction of the deed to Brownacre was under the undue influence of Metterly. ",
"Doris was the owner of Brownacre, because the deed was merely evidence of her title, and its destruction was insufficient to cause title to pass back to Metterly. "
] | 3 | jurisprudence |
|
Motorist arranged to borrow his friend Owner's car to drive for one day while Motorist's car was being repaired. Owner knew that the brakes on his car were faulty and might fail in an emergency. Owner forgot to tell Motorist about the brakes when Motorist picked up the car, but Owner did telephone Spouse, Motorist's wife, and told her about them. Spouse, however, forgot to tell Motorist. Motorist was driving Owner's car at a reasonable rate of speed and within the posted speed limit, with Spouse as a passenger. Another car, driven by Cross, crossed in front of Motorist at an intersection and in violation of the traffic signal. Motorist tried to stop, but the brakes failed, and the two cars collided. If the brakes had been in proper working order, Motorist could have stopped in time to avoid the collision. Motorist and Spouse were injured.If Motorist asserts a claim against Cross, Motorist will | [
"recover the full amount of his damages, because Motorist himself was not at fault. ",
"recover only a proportion of his damages, because Spouse was also at fault. ",
"not recover, because Spouse was negligent and a wife's negligence is imputed to her husband. ",
"not recover, because the failure of the brakes was the immediate cause of the collisio"
] | 0 | professional_law |
|
Motorist arranged to borrow his friend Owner's car to drive for one day while Motorist's car was being repaired. Owner knew that the brakes on his car were faulty and might fail in an emergency. Owner forgot to tell Motorist about the brakes when Motorist picked up the car, but Owner did telephone Spouse, Motorist's wife, and told her about them. Spouse, however, forgot to tell Motorist. Motorist was driving Owner's car at a reasonable rate of speed and within the posted speed limit, with Spouse as a passenger. Another car, driven by Cross, crossed in front of Motorist at an intersection and in violation of the traffic signal. Motorist tried to stop, but the brakes failed, and the two cars collided. If the brakes had been in proper working order, Motorist could have stopped in time to avoid the collision. Motorist and Spouse were injured.If the jurisdiction has adopted "pure" comparative negligence and Spouse asserts a claim against Cross, Spouse will | [
"recover in full for her injuries, because Motorist, who was driving the car in which she was riding, was not himself at fault. ",
"recover a proportion of her damages based on the respective degrees of her negligence and that of Cross.",
"not recover, because but for the failure of the brakes the collision would not have occurred. ",
"not recover, because she was negligent and her negligence continued until the moment of impact."
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
Motorist arranged to borrow his friend Owner's car to drive for one day while Motorist's car was being repaired. Owner knew that the brakes on his car were faulty and might fail in an emergency. Owner forgot to tell Motorist about the brakes when Motorist picked up the car, but Owner did telephone Spouse, Motorist's wife, and told her about them. Spouse, however, forgot to tell Motorist. Motorist was driving Owner's car at a reasonable rate of speed and within the posted speed limit, with Spouse as a passenger. Another car, driven by Cross, crossed in front of Motorist at an intersection and in violation of the traffic signal. Motorist tried to stop, but the brakes failed, and the two cars collided. If the brakes had been in proper working order, Motorist could have stopped in time to avoid the collision. Motorist and Spouse were injured.If Motorist asserts a claim against Owner, will Motorist prevail? | [
"Yes, in negligence, because Owner knew the brakes were faulty and failed to tell Motorist. ",
"Yes, in strict liability in tort, because the car was defective and Owner lent it to Motorist. ",
"No, because Owner was a gratuitous lender, and thus his duty of care was slight. ",
"No, because the failure of Spouse to tell Motorist about the brakes was the cause in fact of Motorist's harm"
] | 0 | professional_law |
|
In which of the following situations is Defendant most likely to be guilty of larceny? | [
"Defendant took Sue's television set, with the intention of returning it the next day. However, he dropped it and damaged it beyond repair. ",
"Defendant went into Tom's house and took $100 in the belief that Tom had damaged Defendant's car to that amount. 40",
"Mistakenly believing that larceny does not include the taking of a dog, Defendant took his neighbor's dog and sold it. ",
"Unreasonably mistaking George's car for his own, Defendant got into George's car in a parking lot and drove it home"
] | 2 | professional_law |
|
Acting on an anonymous telephone call, police went to Desmond's apartment, knocked on the door, and demanded to search the apartment for narcotics. When Desmond refused, the police forced the door open and placed him under arrest. As they were removing him from the apartment, Desmond offered to give the officers "valuable information" in exchange for his release. Before he could say anything else, Desmond was given Miranda warnings by the police. Thereafter he told the police that he had stored some heroin in his friend's apartment and that he and his friend had been going to sell it. The heroin was recovered, and Desmond was prosecuted for conspiracy to sell narcotics and for possession of narcotics. At his trial, Desmond moved to suppress his statements. Which of the following is Desmond's best argument in support of the motion to suppress? | [
"Desmond is entitled to know the identity of his accuser, and the state cannot supply this information. ",
"The police should have given Desmond Miranda warnings prior to entry into the apartment, and the warnings were ineffectual once Desmond offered to give the police information. ",
"Desmond was intimidated by the forced entry into the apartment, and since the statements were involuntary and coerced, their use against him would violate due process of law. ",
"The statements were fruits of an unlawful arrest, and though the Miranda warnings may have been sufficient to protect Desmond's right against selfincrimination, they were not sufficient to purge the taint of the illegal arrest"
] | 3 | jurisprudence |
|
Kane, a member of the legislature of State, is prosecuted in federal court for a violation of the Federal Securities Act arising out of the activities of a state-owned corporation. Kane's defense includes a claim that the alleged wrongful acts were committed in the course of legislative business and are immune from scrutiny"Which of the following is the strongest constitutional argument supporting Kane? | [
"Because of doctrines of federalism, federal law generally cannot be applied to state legislators acting in the course of their official duties. ",
"State legislators enjoy the protection of the speech and debate clause of the United States Constitution.",
"A federal court must follow state law respecting the scope of legislative immunity.",
"To apply the Federal Securities Act to state legislators would violate the due process clause"
] | 0 | jurisprudence |
|
Kane, a member of the legislature of State, is prosecuted in federal court for a violation of the Federal Securities Act arising out of the activities of a state-owned corporation. Kane's defense includes a claim that the alleged wrongful acts were committed in the course of legislative business and are immune from scrutiny"Which of the following is the strongest argument against Kane's constitutional defense? | [
"Congress has plenary power under the commerce clause",
"Congress may impose liability on state legislators as a means of guaranteeing a republican form of government.",
"Congress does not significantly interfere with state government by applying this law to state legislators.",
"Congress may impose liability on state legislators by virtue of the necessary and proper clause"
] | 2 | jurisprudence |
|
Jim watched a liquor store furtively for some time, planning to hold it up. He bought a realistic-looking toy gun for the job. One night, just before the store's closing time, he drove to the store, opened the front door, and entered. He reached into his pocket for the toy gun, but he became frightened and began to move back toward the front door. However, the shopkeeper had seen the butt of the gun. Fearing a holdup, the shopkeeper produced a gun from under the counter, pointed it at Jim, and yelled, "Stop!" Jim ran to the door and the toy gun fell from his pocket. The shopkeeper fired. The shot missed Jim, but struck and killed a passerby outside the store A statute in the jurisdiction defines burglary as "breaking and entering any building or structure with the intent to commit a felony or to steal therein." On a charge of burglary, Jim's best defense would be that | [
"the intent required was not present.",
"the liquor store was open to the public.",
"he had a change of heart and withdrew before committing any crime inside the store.",
"he was unsuccessful, and so at most could be guilty of attempted burglary"
] | 1 | jurisprudence |
|
A water pipe burst in the basement of Supermart, a grocery store, flooding the basement and damaging cases of canned goods on the floor. The plumbing contractor's workmen, in repairing the leak, knocked over several stacks of canned goods in cases, denting the cans. After settling its claims against the landlord for the water leak and against the plumbing contractor for the damage done by his workmen, Supermart put the goods on special sale. Four weeks later, Dotty was shopping in Supermart. Several tables in the market were covered with assorted canned foods, all of which were dirty and dented. A sign on each of the tables read: "Damaged Cans Half Price." Dotty was having Guest for dinner that evening and purchased two dented cans of tuna, packed by Canco, from one of the tables displaying the damaged cans. Before Guest arrived, Dotty prepared a tuna casserole which she and Guest ate. Both became ill, and the medical testimony established that the illness was caused by the tuna's being unfit for consumption. The tuna consumed by Dotty and Guest came from the case that was at the top of one of the stacks knocked over by the workmen. The tuna in undamaged cans from the same Canco shipment was fit for consumption"If Dotty asserts a claim against Canco based on negligence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is | [
"applicable, because the tuna was packed in a sealed can. ",
"applicable, because Canco as the packer is strictly liable. ",
"not applicable, because the case of tuna had been knocked over by the workmen. ",
"not applicable, because of the sign on the table from which Dotty purchased the tuna"
] | 2 | professional_law |
|
A water pipe burst in the basement of Supermart, a grocery store, flooding the basement and damaging cases of canned goods on the floor. The plumbing contractor's workmen, in repairing the leak, knocked over several stacks of canned goods in cases, denting the cans. After settling its claims against the landlord for the water leak and against the plumbing contractor for the damage done by his workmen, Supermart put the goods on special sale. Four weeks later, Dotty was shopping in Supermart. Several tables in the market were covered with assorted canned foods, all of which were dirty and dented. A sign on each of the tables read: "Damaged Cans Half Price." Dotty was having Guest for dinner that evening and purchased two dented cans of tuna, packed by Canco, from one of the tables displaying the damaged cans. Before Guest arrived, Dotty prepared a tuna casserole which she and Guest ate. Both became ill, and the medical testimony established that the illness was caused by the tuna's being unfit for consumption. The tuna consumed by Dotty and Guest came from the case that was at the top of one of the stacks knocked over by the workmen. The tuna in undamaged cans from the same Canco shipment was fit for consumption"If Guest asserts a claim against Dotty, Dotty most likely will | [
"be held strictly liable in tort for serving spoiled tuna.",
"be held liable only if she was negligent.",
"not be held liable unless her conduct was in reckless disregard of the safety of Guest.",
"not be held liable, because Guest was a social visito"
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
A water pipe burst in the basement of Supermart, a grocery store, flooding the basement and damaging cases of canned goods on the floor. The plumbing contractor's workmen, in repairing the leak, knocked over several stacks of canned goods in cases, denting the cans. After settling its claims against the landlord for the water leak and against the plumbing contractor for the damage done by his workmen, Supermart put the goods on special sale. Four weeks later, Dotty was shopping in Supermart. Several tables in the market were covered with assorted canned foods, all of which were dirty and dented. A sign on each of the tables read: "Damaged Cans Half Price." Dotty was having Guest for dinner that evening and purchased two dented cans of tuna, packed by Canco, from one of the tables displaying the damaged cans. Before Guest arrived, Dotty prepared a tuna casserole which she and Guest ate. Both became ill, and the medical testimony established that the illness was caused by the tuna's being unfit for consumption. The tuna consumed by Dotty and Guest came from the case that was at the top of one of the stacks knocked over by the workmen. The tuna in undamaged cans from the same Canco shipment was fit for consumption"If Guest asserts a claim against Supermart, the most likely result is that Guest will | [
"recover on the theory of res ipsa loquitur.",
"recover on the theory of strict liability in tort.",
"not recover, because Supermart gave proper warning. ",
"not recover, because Guest was not the purchaser of the cans"
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
Addle, who has been in the painting and contracting business for 10 years and has a fine reputation, contracts to paint Boone's barn. Boone's barn is a standard red barn with a loft. The contract has no provision regarding assignment."If Addle assigns the contract to Coot, who has comparable experience and reputation, which of the following statements is correct? | [
"Addle is in breach of contract.",
"Boone may refuse to accept performance by Coot.",
"Boone is required to accept performance by Coot.",
"There is a novation"
] | 2 | professional_law |
|
Addle, who has been in the painting and contracting business for 10 years and has a fine reputation, contracts to paint Boone's barn. Boone's barn is a standard red barn with a loft. The contract has no provision regarding assignment."If Addle assigns the contract to Coot and thereafter Coot does not meet the contract specifications in painting Boone's barn, Boone | [
"has a cause of action against Addle for damages.",
"has a cause of action only against Coot for damages.",
"has a cause of action against Addle for damages only after he has first exhausted his remedies against Coot.",
"does not have a cause of action against Addle for damages, because he waived his rights against Addle by permitting Coot to perform the wor"
] | 0 | professional_law |
|
Jackson and Brannick planned to break into a federal government office to steal food stamps. Jackson telephoned Crowley one night and asked whether Crowley wanted to buy some "hot" food stamps. Crowley, who understood that "hot" meant stolen, said, "Sure, bring them right over." Jackson and Brannick then successfully executed their scheme. That same night they delivered the food stamps to Crowley, who bought them for $500. Crowley did not ask when or by whom the stamps had been stolen. All three were arrested. Jackson and Brannick entered guilty pleas in federal court to a charge of larceny in connection with the theft. Crowley was brought to trial in the state court on a charge of conspiracy to steal food stamps. On the evidence stated, Crowley should be found | [
"guilty, because, when a new confederate enters a conspiracy already in progress, he becomes a party to it. ",
"guilty, because he knowingly and willingly aided and abetted the conspiracy and is chargeable as a principal. ",
"not guilty, because, although Crowley knew the stamps were stolen, he neither helped to plan nor participated or assisted in the theft. ",
"not guilty, because Jackson and Brannick had not been convicted of or charged with conspiracy, and Crowley cannot be guilty of conspiracy by himself."
] | 2 | jurisprudence |
|
Owens contracted to sell a tract of land, Overlea, to Painter by general warranty deed. However, at the closing Painter did not carefully examine the deed and accepted a quitclaim deed without covenants of title. Painter later attempted to sell Overlea to Thompson, who refused to perform because Owens had conveyed an easement for a highway across Overlea before Painter bought the property. Painter sued Owens for damages. Which of the following arguments will most likely succeed in Owens' defense? | [
"The existence of the easement does not violate the contract.",
"The mere existence of an easement which is not being used does not give rise to a cause of action.",
"Painter's cause of action must be based on the deed and not on the contract.",
"The proper remedy is rescission of the deed"
] | 2 | professional_law |
|
Rider, a bus passenger, sued Transit Company for injuries to his back from an accident caused by Transit's negligence. Transit denies that Rider received any injury in the accident.Rider's counsel seeks to introduce an affidavit he obtained in preparation for trial from Dr. Bond, who has since died. The affidavit avers that Dr. Bond examined Rider two days after the Transit Company accident and found him suffering from a recently incurred back injury. The judge should rule the affidavit | [
"admissible, as a statement of present bodily condition made to a physician. ",
"admissible, as prior recorded testimony. ",
"inadmissible, because it is irrelevant. ",
"inadmissible, because it is hearsay, not within any exception"
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
Rider, a bus passenger, sued Transit Company for injuries to his back from an accident caused by Transit's negligence. Transit denies that Rider received any injury in the accident."Transit Company calls Observer to testify that right after the accident, Rider told him that he had recently suffered a recurrence of an old back injury. The judge should rule Observer's testimony | [
"admissible, as an admission of a party opponent. ",
"admissible, as a spontaneous declaration. ",
"inadmissible, because it is irrelevant. ",
"inadmissible, because it is hearsay, not within any exception"
] | 0 | professional_law |
|
Johnston bought 100 bolts of standard blue wool, No. 1 quality, from McHugh. The sales contract provided that Johnston would make payment prior to inspection. The 100 bolts were shipped, and Johnston paid McHugh. Upon inspection, however, Johnston discovered that the wool was No. 2 quality. Johnston thereupon tendered back the wool to McHugh and demanded return of his payment. McHugh refused on the ground that there is no difference between No. 1 quality wool and No. 2 quality wool."Which of the following statements regarding the contract provision for preinspection payment is correct? | [
"It constitutes an acceptance of the goods. 43",
"It constitutes a waiver of the buyer's remedy of private sale in the case of nonconforming goods.",
"It does not impair a buyer's right of inspection or his remedies.",
"It is invalid"
] | 2 | professional_law |
|
Johnston bought 100 bolts of standard blue wool, No. 1 quality, from McHugh. The sales contract provided that Johnston would make payment prior to inspection. The 100 bolts were shipped, and Johnston paid McHugh. Upon inspection, however, Johnston discovered that the wool was No. 2 quality. Johnston thereupon tendered back the wool to McHugh and demanded return of his payment. McHugh refused on the ground that there is no difference between No. 1 quality wool and No. 2 quality wool.What is Johnston's remedy because the wool was nonconforming? | [
"Specific performance.",
"Damages measured by the difference between the value of the goods delivered and the value of conforming goods.",
"Damages measured by the price paid plus the difference between the contract price and the cost of buying substitute goods.",
"None, since he waived his remedies by agreeing to pay before inspection"
] | 2 | professional_law |
|
Johnston bought 100 bolts of standard blue wool, No. 1 quality, from McHugh. The sales contract provided that Johnston would make payment prior to inspection. The 100 bolts were shipped, and Johnston paid McHugh. Upon inspection, however, Johnston discovered that the wool was No. 2 quality. Johnston thereupon tendered back the wool to McHugh and demanded return of his payment. McHugh refused on the ground that there is no difference between No. 1 quality wool and No. 2 quality wool.Can Johnston resell the wool? | [
"Yes, in a private sale. ",
"Yes, in a private sale but only after giving McHugh reasonable notice of his intention to resell. ",
"Yes, but only at a public sale. ",
"No"
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
Lord leased a warehouse building and the lot on which it stood to Taylor for a term of 10 years. The lease contained a clause prohibiting Taylor from subletting his interest. Can Taylor assign his interest under the lease? | [
"Yes, because restraints on alienation of land are strictly construed. ",
"Yes, because disabling restraints on alienation of land are invalid. ",
"No, because the term \"subletting\" includes \"assignment\" when the term is employed in a lease. ",
"No, because, even in the absence of an express prohibition on assignment, a tenant may not assign without the landlord's permission"
] | 0 | professional_law |
|
Diner, a drive-in hamburger and ice cream stand, recently opened for business in the suburban town of Little City. Diner's business hours are from 9:00 a.m. to midnight. It is in an area that for 15 years has been zoned for small retail businesses, apartment buildings, and one- and two-family residences. The zoning code specifies that "small retail businesses" include "businesses where food and drink are dispensed for consumption on the premises." Diner is the first drive-in in Little City. For seven years Mr. and Mrs. Householder have owned and lived in their single-family residence, which is across the street from Diner. On opening day a brass band played in the parking lot of Diner until midnight, and the noise of cars and the unusual activity as a result of the new business prevented the Householders from getting to sleep until well after midnight, long after their usual time. Diner is heavily patronized during the day and night by highschool students. The noise of cars, the lights of the cars, the lights illuminating the parking lot at Diner, and the noise from the loudspeaker of the ordering system prevent the Householders from sleeping before midnight. Paper cups, napkins, and other items from the drive-in are regularly blown into the Householders' front yard by the prevailing wind. The traffic to and from Diner is so heavy on the street in front of their house that the Householders are afraid to allow their small children to play in the front yard. The Householders have asserted a claim against Diner based on private nuisance. The most likely effect of the fact that Householders were in the area before Diner is that it | [
"requires that the Householders' interest be given priority.",
"is irrelevant because of the zoning ordinance.",
"is irrelevant because conforming economic uses are given priority.",
"is some, but not controlling, evidence"
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
Jack and Paul planned to hold up a bank. They drove to the bank in Jack's car. Jack entered while Paul remained as lookout in the car. After a few moments, Paul panicked and drove off. Jack looked over the various tellers, approached one, and whispered nervously, "Just hand over the cash. Don't look around, don't make a false move or it's your life." The teller looked at the fidgeting Jack, laughed, flipped him a dollar bill, and said, "Go on, beat it." Flustered, Jack grabbed the dollar and left. Soon after leaving the scene, Paul was stopped by the police for speeding. Noting his nervous condition, the police asked Paul if they might search the car. Paul agreed. The search turned up heroin concealed in the lid of the trunk"Paul's best defense to a charge of robbery would be that | [
"Jack alone entered the bank.",
"Paul withdrew before commission of the crime when he fled the scene.",
"Paul had no knowledge of what Jack whispered to the teller.",
"the teller was not placed in fear by Jack"
] | 3 | jurisprudence |
|
Jack and Paul planned to hold up a bank. They drove to the bank in Jack's car. Jack entered while Paul remained as lookout in the car. After a few moments, Paul panicked and drove off. Jack looked over the various tellers, approached one, and whispered nervously, "Just hand over the cash. Don't look around, don't make a false move or it's your life." The teller looked at the fidgeting Jack, laughed, flipped him a dollar bill, and said, "Go on, beat it." Flustered, Jack grabbed the dollar and left. Soon after leaving the scene, Paul was stopped by the police for speeding. Noting his nervous condition, the police asked Paul if they might search the car. Paul agreed. The search turned up heroin concealed in the lid of the trunk"The prosecution's best argument to sustain the validity of the search of Jack's car would be that | [
"the search was reasonable under the circumstances, including Paul's nervous condition. ",
"the search was incident to a valid arrest.",
"Paul had, under the circumstances, sufficient standing and authority to consent to the search. ",
"exigent circumstances, including the inherent mobility of a car, justified the search"
] | 2 | jurisprudence |
|
Pace sued Def Company for injuries suffered when Pace's car collided with Def Company's truck. Def's general manager prepared a report of the accident at the request of the company's attorney in preparation for the trial and delivered the report to the attorney. Pace now demands that the report be produced. Will production of the report be required? | [
"Yes, because business reports are not generally privileged. ",
"No, because it is a privileged communication from the client to the attorney. ",
"No, because such reports contain hearsay. ",
"No, because such reports are self-servin"
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
The following facts concern a tract of land in a state which follows general United States law. Each instrument is in proper form and recorded, marital property rights were waived when necessary, and each person named was adult and competent at the time of the named transaction. 1. In 1940 Oleg, the owner, conveyed his interest in fee simple "to my brothers Bob and Bill, their heirs and assigns as joint tenants with right of survivorship." 2. In 1950 Bob died, devising his interest to his only child, "Charles, for life, and then to Charles' son, Sam, for life, and then to Sam's children, their heirs and assigns." 3. In 1970 Bill died, devising his interest "to my friend, Frank, his heirs and assigns." 4. In 1972 Frank conveyed by quitclaim deed "to Paul, his heirs and assigns whatever right, title, and interest I own." Paul has never married. Paul has contracted to convey marketable record title in the land to Patrick. Can Paul do so? | [
"Yes, without joinder of any other person in the conveyance. ",
"Yes, if Charles, Sam, and Sam's only child (Gene, aged 25) will join in the conveyance. ",
"No, regardless of who joins in the conveyance, because Sam may have additional children whose interests cannot be defeated. ",
"No, regardless of who joins in the conveyance, because a title acquired by quitclaim deed is impliedly unmerchantable."
] | 0 | professional_law |
|
Peter was rowing a boat on a mountain lake when a storm suddenly arose. Fearful that the boat might sink, Peter rowed to a boat dock on shore and tied the boat to the dock. The shore property and dock were the private property of Owner. While the boat was tied at the dock, Owner came down and ordered Peter to remove the boat, because the action of the waves was causing the boat to rub against a bumper on the dock. When Peter refused, Owner untied the boat and cast it adrift. The boat sank. Peter was wearing only a pair of swimming trunks. He had a pair of shoes and a parka in the boat, but they were lost when Owner set the boat adrift. Peter was staying at a cabin one mile from Owner's property. The only land routes back were a short, rocky trail that was dangerous during the storm, and a 15-mile road around the lake. The storm continued with heavy rain and hail, and Peter, having informed Owner of the location of his cabin, asked Owner to take him back there in Owner's car. Owner said, "You got here by yourself and you'll have to get back home yourself." After one hour the storm stopped, and Peter walked home over the trail. "A necessary element in determining if Peter is liable for a trespass is whether | [
"Owner had clearly posted his property with a sign indicating that it was private property.",
"Peter knew that the property belonged to a private person.",
"Peter had reasonable grounds to believe that the property belonged to a private person.",
"Peter had reasonable grounds to believe that his boat might be swamped and sink"
] | 3 | jurisprudence |
|
Peter was rowing a boat on a mountain lake when a storm suddenly arose. Fearful that the boat might sink, Peter rowed to a boat dock on shore and tied the boat to the dock. The shore property and dock were the private property of Owner. While the boat was tied at the dock, Owner came down and ordered Peter to remove the boat, because the action of the waves was causing the boat to rub against a bumper on the dock. When Peter refused, Owner untied the boat and cast it adrift. The boat sank. Peter was wearing only a pair of swimming trunks. He had a pair of shoes and a parka in the boat, but they were lost when Owner set the boat adrift. Peter was staying at a cabin one mile from Owner's property. The only land routes back were a short, rocky trail that was dangerous during the storm, and a 15-mile road around the lake. The storm continued with heavy rain and hail, and Peter, having informed Owner of the location of his cabin, asked Owner to take him back there in Owner's car. Owner said, "You got here by yourself and you'll have to get back home yourself." After one hour the storm stopped, and Peter walked home over the trail. ". If Peter asserts a claim against Owner for loss of the boat, the most likely result is that Owner will | [
"have no defense under the circumstances.",
"prevail, because Peter was a trespasser ab initio. ",
"prevail, because the boat might have damaged the dock. ",
"prevail, because Peter became a trespasser when he refused to remove the boat"
] | 0 | professional_law |
|
Park brought an action against Dan for injuries received in an automobile accident, alleging negligence in that Dan was speeding and inattentive. Park calls White to testify that Dan had a reputation in the community of being a reckless driver and was known as "daredevil Dan." White's testimony is | [
"admissible as habit evidence.",
"admissible, because it tends to prove that Dan was negligent at the time of this collision. ",
"inadmissible, because Dan has not offered testimony of his own good character. ",
"inadmissible to show negligence"
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
Alex and Sam were arrested for holding up a gas station. They were taken to police headquarters and placed in a room for interrogation. As a police officer addressing both started to give them the Miranda warnings prior to the questioning, Alex said, "Look, Sam planned the damned thing and I was dumb enough to go along with it. We robbed the place what else is there to say?" Sam said nothing. Sam was escorted into another room and a full written confession was then obtained from Alex. If Sam is brought to trial on an indictment charging him with robbery, the fact that Sam failed to object to Alex's statement and remained silent after Alex had implicated him in the crime should be ruled | [
"admissible, because his silence was an implied admission by Sam that he had participated in the crime. ",
"admissible, because a statement of a participant in a crime is admissible against another participant. ",
"inadmissible, because, under the circumstances, there was no duty or responsibility on Sam's part to respond. ",
"inadmissible, because whatever Alex may have said has no probative value in a trial against Sam"
] | 2 | jurisprudence |
|
Duffer and Slicker, who lived in different suburbs 20 miles apart, were golfing acquaintances at the Interurban Country Club. Both were traveling salesmen Duffer for a pharmaceutical house and Slicker for a widget manufacturer. Duffer wrote Slicker by United States mail on Friday, October 8: I need a motorcycle for transportation to the country club, and will buy your Sujocki for $1,200 upon your bringing it to my home address above [stated in the letterhead] on or before noon, November 12 next. This offer is not subject to countermand. Sincerely, [signed] Duffer Slicker replied by mail the following day: I accept your offer, and promise to deliver the bike as you specified. Sincerely, [signed] Slicker This letter, although properly addressed, was misdirected by the postal service and not received by Duffer until November 10. Duffer had bought another Sujocki bike from Koolcat for $1,050 a few hours before. Koolcat saw Slicker at the Interurban Country Club on November 11 and said, "I sold my Sujocki to Duffer yesterday for $1,050. Would you consider selling me 46 yours for $950?" Slicker replied, "I'll let you know in a few days." On November 12, Slicker took his Sujocki to Duffer's residence; he arrived at 11:15 a.m. Duffer was asleep and did not answer Slicker's doorbell rings until 12:15 p.m. Duffer then rejected Slicker's bike on the ground that he had already bought Koolcat's"In Duffer's letter of October 8, what was the legal effect of the language: "This offer is not subject to countermand"? | [
"Under the Uniform Commercial Code the offer was irrevocable until noon, November 12. ",
"Such language prevented an effective acceptance by Slicker prior to noon, November 12. ",
"At common law, such language created a binding option in Slicker's favor. ",
"Such language did not affect the offerer's power of revocation of the offer"
] | 3 | professional_law |
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Duffer and Slicker, who lived in different suburbs 20 miles apart, were golfing acquaintances at the Interurban Country Club. Both were traveling salesmen Duffer for a pharmaceutical house and Slicker for a widget manufacturer. Duffer wrote Slicker by United States mail on Friday, October 8: I need a motorcycle for transportation to the country club, and will buy your Sujocki for $1,200 upon your bringing it to my home address above [stated in the letterhead] on or before noon, November 12 next. This offer is not subject to countermand. Sincerely, [signed] Duffer Slicker replied by mail the following day: I accept your offer, and promise to deliver the bike as you specified. Sincerely, [signed] Slicker This letter, although properly addressed, was misdirected by the postal service and not received by Duffer until November 10. Duffer had bought another Sujocki bike from Koolcat for $1,050 a few hours before. Koolcat saw Slicker at the Interurban Country Club on November 11 and said, "I sold my Sujocki to Duffer yesterday for $1,050. Would you consider selling me 46 yours for $950?" Slicker replied, "I'll let you know in a few days." On November 12, Slicker took his Sujocki to Duffer's residence; he arrived at 11:15 a.m. Duffer was asleep and did not answer Slicker's doorbell rings until 12:15 p.m. Duffer then rejected Slicker's bike on the ground that he had already bought Koolcat's"In a lawsuit by Slicker against Duffer for breach of contract, what would the court probably decide regarding Slicker's letter of October 9? | [
"The letter bound both parties to a unilateral contract as soon as Slicker mailed it.",
"Mailing of the letter by Slicker did not, of itself, prevent a subsequent, effective revocation by Duffer of his offer. ",
"The letter bound both parties to a bilateral contract, but only when received by Duffer on November 10. ",
"Regardless of whether Duffer's offer had proposed a unilateral or a bilateral contract, the letter was an effective acceptance upon receipt, if not upon dispatch"
] | 1 | professional_law |
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Duffer and Slicker, who lived in different suburbs 20 miles apart, were golfing acquaintances at the Interurban Country Club. Both were traveling salesmen Duffer for a pharmaceutical house and Slicker for a widget manufacturer. Duffer wrote Slicker by United States mail on Friday, October 8: I need a motorcycle for transportation to the country club, and will buy your Sujocki for $1,200 upon your bringing it to my home address above [stated in the letterhead] on or before noon, November 12 next. This offer is not subject to countermand. Sincerely, [signed] Duffer Slicker replied by mail the following day: I accept your offer, and promise to deliver the bike as you specified. Sincerely, [signed] Slicker This letter, although properly addressed, was misdirected by the postal service and not received by Duffer until November 10. Duffer had bought another Sujocki bike from Koolcat for $1,050 a few hours before. Koolcat saw Slicker at the Interurban Country Club on November 11 and said, "I sold my Sujocki to Duffer yesterday for $1,050. Would you consider selling me 46 yours for $950?" Slicker replied, "I'll let you know in a few days." On November 12, Slicker took his Sujocki to Duffer's residence; he arrived at 11:15 a.m. Duffer was asleep and did not answer Slicker's doorbell rings until 12:15 p.m. Duffer then rejected Slicker's bike on the ground that he had already bought Koolcat's"What is the probable legal effect of Koolcat's conversation with Slicker and report that he (Koolcat) had sold his Sujocki to Duffer on November 10? | [
"This report had no legal effect because Duffer's offer was irrevocable until November 12.",
"Unless a contract had already been formed between Slicker and Duffer, Koolcat's report to Slicker operated to terminate Slicker's power of accepting Duffer's offer. ",
"This report has no legal effect because the offer had been made by a prospective buyer (Duffer) rather than a prospective seller.",
"Koolcat's conversation with Slicker on November 11 terminated Duffer's original offer and operated as an offer by Koolcat to buy Slicker's Sujocki for $950."
] | 1 | professional_law |
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In a suit attacking the validity of a deed executed 15 years ago, Plaintiff alleges mental incompetency of Joe, the grantor, and offers in evidence a properly authenticated affidavit of Harry, Joe's brother. The affidavit, which was executed shortly after the deed, stated that Harry had observed Joe closely over a period of weeks, that Joe had engaged in instances of unusual behavior (which were described), and that Joe's appearance had changed from one of neatness and alertness to one of disorder and absentmindedness. The judge should rule Harry's affidavit | [
"inadmissible as opinion.",
"inadmissible as hearsay, not within any exception. ",
"admissible as an official document.",
"admissible as an ancient document"
] | 1 | professional_law |
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Oscar, the owner in fee simple, laid out a subdivision of 325 lots on 150 acres of land. He obtained governmental approval (as required by applicable ordinances) and, between 1968 and 1970, he sold 140 of the lots, inserting in each of the 140 deeds the following provision: "The Grantee, for himself and his heirs, assigns and successors, covenants and agrees that the premises conveyed herein shall have erected thereon one single-family dwelling and that no other structure (other than a detached garage, normally incident to a single-family dwelling) shall be erected or maintained; and, further, that no use shall ever be made or permitted to be made other than occupancy by a single family for residential purposes only." Because of difficulty encountered in selling the remaining lots for single-family use, in January 1971, Oscar advertised the remaining lots with prominent emphasis: "These lots are not subject to any restriction and purchasers will find them adaptable to a wide range of uses.""Payne had purchased one of the 140 lots and brought suit against Oscar to establish that the remaining 185 lots, as well as the 140 sold previously, can be used only for residential purposes by single families. Assuming that procedural requirements have been met to permit adjudication of the issue Payne has tendered, which of the following is the most appropriate comment? | [
"Oscar should win because the provision binds only the grantee.",
"The outcome turns on whether a common development scheme had been established for the entire subdivision.",
"The outcome turns on whether there are sufficient land areas devoted to multiplefamily uses within the municipality to afford reasonable opportunity for all economic classes to move into the area so as to satisfy the standards of equal protection of the law.",
"Payne should win under an application of the doctrine which requires construction of deeds to resolve any doubt against the grantor."
] | 1 | professional_law |
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Oscar, the owner in fee simple, laid out a subdivision of 325 lots on 150 acres of land. He obtained governmental approval (as required by applicable ordinances) and, between 1968 and 1970, he sold 140 of the lots, inserting in each of the 140 deeds the following provision: "The Grantee, for himself and his heirs, assigns and successors, covenants and agrees that the premises conveyed herein shall have erected thereon one single-family dwelling and that no other structure (other than a detached garage, normally incident to a single-family dwelling) shall be erected or maintained; and, further, that no use shall ever be made or permitted to be made other than occupancy by a single family for residential purposes only." Because of difficulty encountered in selling the remaining lots for single-family use, in January 1971, Oscar advertised the remaining lots with prominent emphasis: "These lots are not subject to any restriction and purchasers will find them adaptable to a wide range of uses.""Suppose that Oscar sold 50 lots during 1971 without inserting in the deeds any provisions relating to structures or uses. Doyle purchased one of the 50 lots and proposes to erect a service station and to conduct a retail business for the sale of gasoline, etc. Pringle purchased a lot from Boyer. Boyer had purchased from Oscar in 1968 and the deed had the provision that is quoted in the fact situation. Pringle brings suit to prevent Doyle from erecting the service station and from conducting a retail business. In the litigation between Pringle and Doyle, which of the following constitutes the best defense for Doyle? | [
"Oscar's difficulty in selling with provisions relating to use establishes a change in circumstances which renders any restrictions which may once have existed unenforceable.",
"Enforcement of the restriction, in view of the change of circumstances, would be an unreasonable restraint on alienation. ",
"Since the proof (as stated) does not establish a danger of monetary loss to Pringle, Pringle has failed to establish one of the necessary elements in a cause of action to prevent Doyle from using his lot for business purposes. ",
"The facts do not establish a common building or development scheme for the entire subdivision."
] | 3 | professional_law |
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Adam and Bailey, brothers, operated an illicit still. They customarily sold to anyone unless they suspected the person of being a revenue agent or an informant. One day when Adam was at the still alone, he was approached by Mitchell, who asked to buy a gallon of liquor. Mitchell was in fact a revenue officer. After Adam had sold him the liquor, Mitchell revealed his identity. Adam grabbed one of the rifles that the brothers kept handy in case of trouble with the law, and shot and wounded Mitchell. Other officers, hiding nearby, overpowered and arrested Adam. Shortly thereafter, Bailey came on the scene. The officers in hiding had been waiting for him. One of them approached him and asked to buy liquor. Bailey was suspicious and refused to sell. The officers nevertheless arrested him. Adam and Bailey were charged with conspiracy to violate revenue laws, illegal selling of liquor, and battery of the officer. On the charge of battery, which statement concerning Adam and Bailey is true? | [
"Neither is guilty.",
"Both are guilty.",
"Adam is guilty but Bailey is not, because the conspiracy had terminated with the arrest of Adam. ",
"Adam is guilty but Bailey is not, because Adam's act was outside the scope of the conspiracy"
] | 1 | jurisprudence |
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Odum owned Brightacre (a tract of land) in fee simple. He conveyed it "to Pike, his heirs and assigns; but if Farley shall be living 30 years from the date of this deed, then to Farley, his heirs and assigns." The limitation "to Farley, his heirs and assigns" is | [
"valid, because Farley's interest is a reversion ",
"valid, because the interest will vest, if at all, within a life in being. ",
"valid, because Farley's interest is vested subject to divestment. ",
"invalid."
] | 1 | jurisprudence |
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Defendant was driving his automobile at a legal speed in a residential zone. A child darted out in front of him and was run over and killed before Defendant could prevent it. Defendant's driver's license had expired three months previously; Defendant had neglected to check when it was due to expire. Driving without a valid license is a misdemeanor in the jurisdiction. On a charge of manslaughter, Defendant should be found | [
"guilty under the misdemeanor-manslaughter rule.",
"guilty, because the licensing requirements are to protect life, and failure to obey is negligence. ",
"not guilty, because the offense was not the proximate cause of the death. ",
"not guilty, because there was no criminal intent"
] | 2 | jurisprudence |
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Pauline, an unmarried female, was prominent in the women's liberation movement. She recently gave birth to a baby and publicly announced that she had no intention of marrying the father or disclosing his identity. The local newspaper, Journal, decided to do a series of articles on Pauline entitled "The Perils of Pauline." The first article about Pauline discussed her parents. The article correctly stated that Mary, her mother, had died recently and that Frank, her father, was still living. The article referred to the fact that at the time of Pauline's birth there were rumors that she had been born six months after the marriage of Mary and Frank, that Frank was not in fact her father, and that a person identified as Albert, who had played minor roles in two motion pictures, was her real father. Albert has lived in retirement for the last 10 years. If Pauline asserts a claim based on invasion of privacy against Journal for the statements in the first article about her birth, and it is established that the statements are true, the most likely result is that Pauline will | [
"not prevail, because truth is a complete defense. ",
"not prevail, because of her announcement concerning the birth of her own child. ",
"prevail, because the statements hold her up to ridicule and contempt. ",
"prevail, because the statements are embarrassing to her"
] | 1 | jurisprudence |
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Homer conveyed his home to his wife, Wanda, for life, remainder to his daughter, Dixie. There was a $20,000 mortgage on the home requiring monthly payments, each covering interest to date plus a portion of the principal. Which of the following statements about the monthly payment is correct? | [
"Wanda must pay the full monthly payment.",
"Wanda must pay a portion of the monthly payment based on an apportionment of the value between Wanda's life estate and Dixie's remainder.",
"Wanda must pay the portion of the monthly payment which represents interest.",
"Dixie must pay the full monthly payment"
] | 2 | college_mathematics |
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The police, answering a complaint about noise, arrived at Sam's apartment and found Sam's wife dead on the living room floor. One of the officers turned to Sam and asked, "What happened?" Sam replied, "She was a bitch and I took care of her." At Sam's trial, his statement should be ruled | [
"admissible, because the statement was part of the res gestae. ",
"admissible, because the statement was made at the scene, was essentially volunteered, and was not a product of a custodial interrogation. ",
"inadmissible, because the statement is ambiguous and not necessarily incriminatory. ",
"inadmissible, because Sam was effectively in police custody and should have been given the Miranda warnings"
] | 1 | jurisprudence |
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An ordinance of City makes it unlawful to park a motor vehicle on a City street within 10 feet of a fire hydrant. At 1:55 p.m., Parker, realizing that he must be in Bank before it closed at 2:00 p.m., and finding no other space available, parked his automobile in front of a fire hydrant on a City street. Parker then hurried into the bank, leaving his aged neighbor, Ned, as a passenger in the rear seat of the car. About five minutes later, and while Parker was still in Bank, Driver was driving down the street. Driver swerved to avoid what he mistakenly thought was a hole in the street and sideswiped Parker's car. Parker's car was turned over on top of the hydrant, breaking the hydrant and causing a small flood of water. Parker's car was severely damaged and Ned was badly injured. There is no applicable guest statute."If Ned asserts a claim against Parker, the most likely result is that Ned will | [
"recover, because Parker's action was negligence per se. ",
"recover, because Parker's action was a continuing wrong which contributed to Ned's injuries. ",
"not recover, because a reasonably prudent person could not foresee injury to Ned as a result of Parker's action. ",
"not recover, because a violation of a city ordinance does not give rise to a civil cause of action"
] | 2 | professional_law |