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Davis decided to kill Adams. He set out for Adams's house. Before he got there he saw Brooks, who resembled Adams. Thinking that Brooks was Adams, Davis shot at Brooks. The shot missed Brooks but wounded Case, who was some distance away. Davis had not seen Case. In a prosecution under a statute that proscribes any attempt to commit murder, the district attorney should indicate that the intended victim(s) was/were | [
"Adams only.",
"Brooks only.",
"Case only.",
"Adams and Brooks"
] | 1 | jurisprudence |
|
A state statute requires any person licensed to sell prescription drugs to file with the State Board of Health a report listing the types and amounts of such drugs sold if his or her sales of such drugs exceed $50,000 during a calendar year. The statute makes it a misdemeanor to "knowingly fail to file" such a report. Nelson, who is licensed to sell prescription drugs, sold $63,000 worth of prescription drugs during 1976 but did not file the report. Charged with committing the misdemeanor, Nelson testifies that he did a very poor job of keeping records and did not realize that his sales of prescription drugs had exceeded $50,000. If the jury believes Nelson, he should be found | [
"guilty, because this is a public welfare offense. ",
"guilty, because he cannot be excused on the basis of his own failure to keep proper records. ",
"not guilty, because the statute punishes omissions and he was not given fair warning of his duty to act. ",
"not guilty, because he was not aware of the value of the drugs he had sold"
] | 3 | jurisprudence |
|
Lender met Borrower on the street, demanded that Borrower pay a debt owed to Lender, and threatened to punch Borrower in the nose. A fight ensued between them. Mann came upon the scene just as Lender was about to kick Borrower in the head. Noting that Lender was getting the better of the fight, Mann pointed a gun at Lender and said, "Stop, or I'll shoot." If Lender asserts a claim against Mann based on assault, will Lender prevail? | [
"Yes, because Mann threatened to use deadly force. ",
"Yes, unless Mann was related to Borrower. ",
"No, if it was apparent that Lender was about to inflict serious bodily harm upon Borrower. ",
"No, because Lender was the original aggressor by threatening Borrower with a battery"
] | 2 | professional_law |
|
Peter sued Don for breach of contract. The court admitted testimony by Peter that Don and his wife quarreled frequently, a fact of no consequence to the lawsuit. Don seeks to testify in response that he and his wife never quarreled. The court | [
"must permit Don to answer if he had objected to Peter's testimony.",
"may permit Don to answer, whether or not he had objected to Peter's testimony. ",
"may permit Don to answer only if he had objected to Peter's testimony.",
"cannot permit Don to answer, whether or not he had objected to Peter's testimony"
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
Ames had painted Bell's house under a contract which called for payment of $2,000. Bell, contending in good faith that the porch had not been painted properly, refused to pay anything. On June 15, Ames mailed a letter to Bell stating, "I am in serious need of money. Please send the $2,000 to me before July 1." On June 18, Bell replied, "I will settle for $1,800 provided that you agree to repaint the porch." Ames did not reply to this letter. Thereafter Bell mailed a check for $1,800 marked "Payment in full on the Ames-Bell painting contract as per letter dated June 18." Ames received the check on June 30. Because he was badly in need of money, check on June 30. Because he was badly in need of money, Questions Ames cashed the check without objection and spent the proceeds but has refused to repaint the porch.Bell's refusal to pay anything to Ames when he finished painting was a | [
"partial breach of contract only if Ames had properly or substantially painted the porch.",
"partial breach of contract whether or not Ames had properly or substantially painted the porch.",
"total breach of contract only if Ames had properly or substantially painted the porch.",
"total breach of contract whether or not Ames had properly or substantially painted the porch"
] | 2 | professional_law |
|
Ames had painted Bell's house under a contract which called for payment of $2,000. Bell, contending in good faith that the porch had not been painted properly, refused to pay anything. On June 15, Ames mailed a letter to Bell stating, "I am in serious need of money. Please send the $2,000 to me before July 1." On June 18, Bell replied, "I will settle for $1,800 provided that you agree to repaint the porch." Ames did not reply to this letter. Thereafter Bell mailed a check for $1,800 marked "Payment in full on the Ames-Bell painting contract as per letter dated June 18." Ames received the check on June 30. Because he was badly in need of money, check on June 30. Because he was badly in need of money, Questions Ames cashed the check without objection and spent the proceeds but has refused to repaint the porch.After cashing the check Ames sued Bell for $200. Ames probably will | [
"succeed if he can prove that he had painted the porch according to specifications.",
"succeed, because he cashed the check under economic duress. ",
"not succeed, because he cashed the check without objection. ",
"not succeed, because he is entitled to recover only the reasonable value of his services"
] | 2 | professional_law |
|
Ames had painted Bell's house under a contract which called for payment of $2,000. Bell, contending in good faith that the porch had not been painted properly, refused to pay anything. On June 15, Ames mailed a letter to Bell stating, "I am in serious need of money. Please send the $2,000 to me before July 1." On June 18, Bell replied, "I will settle for $1,800 provided that you agree to repaint the porch." Ames did not reply to this letter. Thereafter Bell mailed a check for $1,800 marked "Payment in full on the Ames-Bell painting contract as per letter dated June 18." Ames received the check on June 30. Because he was badly in need of money, check on June 30. Because he was badly in need of money, Questions Ames cashed the check without objection and spent the proceeds but has refused to repaint the porch.In an action by Bell against Ames for any provable damages Bell sustained because the porch was not repainted, Bell probably will | [
"succeed, because by cashing the check Ames impliedly promised to repaint the porch. ",
"succeed, because Ames accepted Bell's offer by not replying to the letter of June 18. ",
"not succeed, because Bell's letter of June 18 was a counteroffer which Ames never accepted. ",
"not succeed, because there is no consideration to support Ames's promise, if any"
] | 0 | professional_law |
|
The State of Aurora requires licenses of persons "who are engaged in the trade of barbering." It will grant such licenses only to those who are graduates of barber schools located in Aurora, who have resided in the state for two years, and who are citizens of the United States. The requirement that candidates for license must be graduates of barber schools in Aurora is probably | [
"unconstitutional as an undue burden on interstate commerce.",
"unconstitutional as a violation of the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.",
"constitutional, because the state does not know the quality of out-of-state barber schools. ",
"constitutional, because barbering is a privilege and not a right"
] | 0 | professional_law |
|
The State of Aurora requires licenses of persons "who are engaged in the trade of barbering." It will grant such licenses only to those who are graduates of barber schools located in Aurora, who have resided in the state for two years, and who are citizens of the United States. The requirement that candidates for licenses must be citizens is | [
"constitutional as an effort to ensure that barbers speak English adequately.",
"constitutional as an exercise of the state police power.",
"unconstitutional as a bill of attainder.",
"unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection"
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
The State of Aurora requires licenses of persons "who are engaged in the trade of barbering." It will grant such licenses only to those who are graduates of barber schools located in Aurora, who have resided in the state for two years, and who are citizens of the United States. Assume that a resident of the state of Aurora was denied a license because she graduated from an out-of-state barber school. Her suit in federal court to enjoin denial of the license on this ground would be | [
"dismissed, because there is no diversity of citizenship. ",
"dismissed, because of the abstention doctrine. ",
"decided on the merits, because federal jurisdiction extends to controversies between two states. ",
"decided on the merits, because a federal question is involved"
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
The State of Aurora requires licenses of persons "who are engaged in the trade of barbering." It will grant such licenses only to those who are graduates of barber schools located in Aurora, who have resided in the state for two years, and who are citizens of the United States. Which of the following is the strongest ground on which to challenge the requirement that candidates for barber licenses must have been residents of the state for at least two years? | [
"The privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment",
"The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment",
"The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment",
"The obligation of contracts claus"
] | 2 | jurisprudence |
|
John was fired from his job. Too proud to apply for unemployment benefits, he used his savings to feed his family. When one of his children became ill, he did not seek medical attention for the child at a state clinic because he did not want to accept what he regarded as charity. Eventually, weakened by malnutrition, the child died as a result of the illness. John has committed | [
"murder.",
"involuntary manslaughter.",
"voluntary manslaughter.",
"no form of criminal homicide"
] | 1 | business_ethics |
|
Professor Merrill, in a lecture in her psychology course at a private university, described an experiment in which a group of college students in a neighboring city rushed out and washed cars stopped at traffic lights during the rush hour. She described how people reacted differently with shock, joy, and surprise. At the conclusion of her report, she said, "You understand, of course, that you are not to undertake this or any other experiment unless you first clear it with me." Four of Merrill's students decided to try the same experiment but did not clear it with Merrill. One subject of their experiment, Carr, said, "I was shocked. There were two people on each side of the car. At first I thought negatively. I thought they were going to attack me and thought of driving away. Then I quieted down and decided there were too many dirty cars in the city anyway." Charitable immunity has been abolished in the jurisdiction. "If Carr asserts a claim against the students who washed his car, his best theory is | [
"assault.",
"negligence.",
"invasion of privacy.",
"false imprisonment"
] | 0 | jurisprudence |
|
Professor Merrill, in a lecture in her psychology course at a private university, described an experiment in which a group of college students in a neighboring city rushed out and washed cars stopped at traffic lights during the rush hour. She described how people reacted differently with shock, joy, and surprise. At the conclusion of her report, she said, "You understand, of course, that you are not to undertake this or any other experiment unless you first clear it with me." Four of Merrill's students decided to try the same experiment but did not clear it with Merrill. One subject of their experiment, Carr, said, "I was shocked. There were two people on each side of the car. At first I thought negatively. I thought they were going to attack me and thought of driving away. Then I quieted down and decided there were too many dirty cars in the city anyway." Charitable immunity has been abolished in the jurisdiction. If Carr has a valid claim against the students, will he also prevail against the university? | [
"Yes, if the students would not have performed the experiment but for Merrill's lecture. ",
"Yes, if Carr's claim against the students is based on negligence. ",
"No, because the students were not Merrill's employees. ",
"No, because Merrill did not authorize the car wash as a class project"
] | 3 | jurisprudence |
|
Oxnard owned Goldacre, a tract of land, in fee simple. At a time when Goldacre was in the adverse possession of Amos, Eric obtained the oral permission of Oxnard to use a portion of Goldacre as a road or driveway to reach adjoining land, Twin Pines, which Eric owned in fee simple. Thereafter, during all times relevant to this problem, Eric used this road across Goldacre regularly for ingress and egress between Twin Pines and a public highway. Amos quit possession of Goldacre before acquiring title by adverse possession. Without any further communication between Oxnard and Eric, Eric continued to use the road for a total period, from the time he first began to use it, sufficient to acquire an easement by prescription. Oxnard then blocked the road and refused to permit its continued use. Eric brought suit to determine his right to continue use of the road. Eric should | [
"win, because his use was adverse to Amos and once adverse it continued adverse until some affirmative showing of a change. ",
"win, because Eric made no attempt to renew permission after Amos quit possession of Goldacre. ",
"lose, because his use was with permission. ",
"lose, because there is no evidence that he continued adverse use for the required period after Amos quit possession"
] | 2 | professional_law |
|
Mary Webb, a physician called as a witness by the defendant in the case of Parr v. Doan, was asked to testify to statements made by Michael Zadok, her patient, for the purpose of obtaining treatment from Dr. Webb. Which of the following is the best basis for excluding evidence of Zadok's statements in a jurisdiction with a doctor-patient privilege? | [
"An objection by Dr. Webb asserting her privilege against disclosure of confidential communications made by a patient.",
"An objection by Parr's attorney on the grounds of the doctor-patient privilege.",
"A finding by the trial judge that Zadok had left the office without actually receiving treatment.",
"The assertion of a privilege by Zadok's attorney, present at the trial as a spectator at Zadok's request, and allowed by the trial judge to speak."
] | 3 | jurisprudence |
|
A leading question is LEAST likely to be permitted over objection when | [
"asked on cross-examination of an expert witness.",
"asked on direct examination of a young child.",
"asked on direct examination of a disinterested eyewitness.",
"related to preliminary matters such as the name or occupation of the witness"
] | 2 | professional_law |
|
Roofer entered into a written contract with Orissa to repair the roof of Orissa's home, the repairs to be done "in a workmanlike manner." Roofer completed the repairs and took all of his equipment away, with the exception of a 20-foot extension ladder, which was left against the side of the house. He intended to come back and get the ladder the next morning. At that time, Orissa and her family were away on a trip. During the night, a thief, using the ladder to gain access to an upstairs window, entered the house and stole some valuable jewels. Orissa has asserted a claim against Roofer for damages for the loss of the jewels. In her claim against Roofer, Orissa will | [
"prevail, because by leaving the ladder, Roofer became a trespasser on Orissa's property. ",
"prevail, because by leaving the ladder, Roofer created the risk that a person might unlawfully enter the house. ",
"not prevail, because the act of the thief was a superseding cause. ",
"not prevail, because Orissa's claim is limited to damages for breach of contract"
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
Homer and Purcell entered into a valid, enforceable written contract by which Homer agreed to sell and Purcell agreed to purchase Blackacre, which was Homer's residence. One of the contract provisions was that after closing, Homer had the right to remain in residence at Blackacre for up to 30 days before delivering possession to Purcell. The closing took place as scheduled. Title passed to Purcell and Homer remained in possession. Within a few days after the closing, the new house next door which was being constructed for Homer was burned to the ground, and at the end of the 30-day period Homer refused to move out of Blackacre; instead, Homer tendered to Purcell a monthly rental payment in excess of the fair rental value of Blackacre. Purcell rejected the proposal and that day brought an appropriate action to gain immediate possession of Blackacre. The contract was silent as to the consequences of Homer's failure to give up possession within the 30-day period, and the jurisdiction in which Blackacre is located has no statute dealing directly with this situation, although the landlord-tenant law of the jurisdiction requires a landlord to give a tenant 30 days notice before a tenant may be evicted. Purcell did not give Homer any such 30-day statutory notice. Purcell's best legal argument in support of his action to gain immediate possession is that Homer is a | [
"trespasser ab initio.",
"licensee.",
"tenant at sufferance.",
"tenant from month to month"
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
Albert engaged Bertha, an inexperienced actress, to do a small role in a new Broadway play for a period of six months at a salary of $200 a week. Bertha turned down another role in order to accept this engagement. On the third day of the run, Bertha was hospitalized with influenza and Helen was hired to do the part. A week later, Bertha recovered, but Albert refused to accept her services for the remainder of the contract period. Bertha then brought an action against Albert for breach of contract.Which of the following is Bertha's best legal theory? | [
"Her acting contract with Albert was legally severable into weekly units.",
"Her performance of the literal terms of the contract was physically impossible.",
"Her reliance on the engagement with Albert by declining another acting role created an estoppel against Albert.",
"Her failure to perform for one week was not a material failure so as to discharge Albert's duty to perfor"
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
Albert engaged Bertha, an inexperienced actress, to do a small role in a new Broadway play for a period of six months at a salary of $200 a week. Bertha turned down another role in order to accept this engagement. On the third day of the run, Bertha was hospitalized with influenza and Helen was hired to do the part. A week later, Bertha recovered, but Albert refused to accept her services for the remainder of the contract period. Bertha then brought an action against Albert for breach of contract.Which of the following, if true, would adversely affect Bertha's rights in her action against Albert? | [
"Albert could not find any substitute except Helen, who demanded a contract for a minimum of six months if she was to perform at all. ",
"Helen, by general acclaim, was much better in the role than Bertha had been. 7 ",
"Albert had offered Bertha a position as Helen's understudy at a salary of $100 a week, which Bertha declined. ",
"Albert had offered Bertha a secretarial position at a salary of $300 a week, which Bertha declined"
] | 0 | professional_law |
|
Lawyers Abel and Baker are the members of the law partnership of Abel and Baker in a small town that has only one other lawyer in it. Abel and Baker do a substantial amount of personal injury work. Client was severely and permanently injured in an automobile collision when struck by an automobile driven by Motorist. Client employed the Abel and Baker firm to represent her in obtaining damages for her injuries. At the time Client employed Abel and Baker, the statute of limitations had six weeks to run on her claim. The complaint was prepared but not filed. Abel and Baker each thought that the other would file the complaint. The statute of limitations ran on Client's claim against Motorist. Client has filed suit against Abel and Baker for negligence. That case is on trial with a jury in a court of general jurisdiction.""In order to establish a breach of standard of care owed to her by Abel and Baker, Client | [
"must have a legal expert from the same locality testify that defendants' conduct was a breach.",
"must have a legal expert from the same state testify that defendants' conduct was a breach.",
"can rely on the application of the jurors' common knowledge as to whether there was a breach.",
"can rely on the judge, as an expert in the law, to advise the jury whether there was a breac"
] | 2 | professional_law |
|
Lawyers Abel and Baker are the members of the law partnership of Abel and Baker in a small town that has only one other lawyer in it. Abel and Baker do a substantial amount of personal injury work. Client was severely and permanently injured in an automobile collision when struck by an automobile driven by Motorist. Client employed the Abel and Baker firm to represent her in obtaining damages for her injuries. At the time Client employed Abel and Baker, the statute of limitations had six weeks to run on her claim. The complaint was prepared but not filed. Abel and Baker each thought that the other would file the complaint. The statute of limitations ran on Client's claim against Motorist. Client has filed suit against Abel and Baker for negligence. That case is on trial with a jury in a court of general jurisdiction."In addition to proving that Abel and Baker were negligent, Client must establish, as a minimum, that she | [
"would have, but for her lawyers' negligence, recovered from Motorist. ",
"had a good faith claim against Motorist that was lost by her lawyers' negligence.",
"was severely and permanently injured when struck by Motorist's automobile.",
"did not negligently contribute to the failure to have the complaint filed."
] | 0 | professional_law |
|
A state statute divides murder into degrees. First-degree murder is defined as murder with premeditation and deliberation or a homicide in the commission of arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or kidnapping. Second-degree murder is all other murder at common law. In which of the following situations is Defendant most likely to be guilty of first-degree murder? | [
"Immediately after being insulted by Robert, Defendant takes a knife and stabs and kills Robert. ",
"Angered over having been struck by Sam, Defendant buys rat poison and puts it into Sam's coffee. Sam drinks the coffee and dies as a result. ",
"Intending to injure Fred, Defendant lies in wait and, as Fred comes by, strikes him with a broom handle. As a result of the blow, Fred dies. ",
"Defendant, highly intoxicated, discovers a revolver on a table. He picks it up, points it at Alice, and pulls the trigger. The gun discharges, and Alice is killed. "
] | 1 | jurisprudence |
|
On a camping trip in a state park, Rose discovered, near a rubbish heap, metal signs reading, "Natural Wildlife Area No Hunting." She took two of the signs and used them to decorate her room at home. She is charged with violation of a state statute which provides, "Any person who appropriates to his own use property owned by the state shall be guilty of a crime and shall be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000, or by imprisonment for not more than five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment." At trial, Rose admits taking the signs but says she believed they had been thrown away. In fact, the signs had not been abandoned. Rose should be found | [
"guilty, because this is a public welfare offense. ",
"guilty, because she should have inquired whether the signs had been abandoned. ",
"not guilty if the jury finds that she honestly believed the signs had been abandoned.",
"not guilty unless the jury finds that the state had taken adequate steps to inform 8 the public that the signs had not been abandoned"
] | 2 | jurisprudence |
|
Ted frequently visited Janet, his next-door neighbor. Janet was separated from her husband, Howard. Howard resided with his mother but jointly owned the house in which Janet resided. Late one night, Ted and Janet were sitting on the bed in Janet's bedroom drinking when Howard burst through the door and told Ted, "Get out." When Ted refused, Howard challenged him to go outside and "fight it out." Ted again refused. Howard then pulled a knife from his pocket and lunged at Ted. Ted grabbed a lamp, struck Howard on the head, and killed him. Ted is charged with murder. On a charge of murder, Ted should be found | [
"not guilty, because Ted had as much right as Howard to be in the house. ",
"not guilty, because Howard attacked Ted with a deadly weapon. ",
"guilty, because Ted's presence in Janet's bedroom prompted Howard's attack. ",
"guilty, because Ted's failure to obey Howard's order to leave the house made him a trespasser"
] | 1 | jurisprudence |
|
In 1970, Oscar, owner of a 100-acre tract, prepared and duly recorded a subdivision plan called Happy Acres. The plan showed 90 one-acre lots and a tenacre tract in the center that was designated "Future Public School." Oscar published and distributed a brochure promoting Happy Acres which emphasized the proximity of the lots to the school property and indicated potential tax savings "because the school district will not have to expend tax money to acquire this property." There is no specific statute concerning the dedication of school sites. Oscar sold 50 of the lots to individual purchasers. Each deed referred to the recorded plan and also contained the following clause: "No mobile home shall be erected on any lot within Happy Acres." Sarah was one of the original purchasers from Oscar. In 1976, Oscar sold the remaining 40 lots and the 10-acre tract to Max by a deed which referred to the plan and contained the restriction relating to mobile homes. Max sold the 40 lots to individual purchasers and the 10-acre tract to Pete. None of the deeds from Max referred to the plan or contained any reference to mobile homes."Assume for this question only that Pete has announced his intention of erecting a fast-food restaurant on the 10-acre tract and that Sarah has filed an action to enjoin Pete. If Sarah wins, it will be because | [
"Sarah has an equitable servitude concerning the use of the tract.",
"Sarah, as a taxpayer, has legal interest in the use of the tract. ",
"Sarah is a creditor beneficiary of Oscar's promise with respect to the tract.",
"Pete is not a bona fide purchaser"
] | 0 | professional_law |
|
In 1970, Oscar, owner of a 100-acre tract, prepared and duly recorded a subdivision plan called Happy Acres. The plan showed 90 one-acre lots and a tenacre tract in the center that was designated "Future Public School." Oscar published and distributed a brochure promoting Happy Acres which emphasized the proximity of the lots to the school property and indicated potential tax savings "because the school district will not have to expend tax money to acquire this property." There is no specific statute concerning the dedication of school sites. Oscar sold 50 of the lots to individual purchasers. Each deed referred to the recorded plan and also contained the following clause: "No mobile home shall be erected on any lot within Happy Acres." Sarah was one of the original purchasers from Oscar. In 1976, Oscar sold the remaining 40 lots and the 10-acre tract to Max by a deed which referred to the plan and contained the restriction relating to mobile homes. Max sold the 40 lots to individual purchasers and the 10-acre tract to Pete. None of the deeds from Max referred to the plan or contained any reference to mobile homes.""Assume for this question only that Joe, who purchased his lot from Max, has placed a mobile home on it and that Sarah brings an action against Joe to force him to remove it. The result of this action will be in favor of | [
"Sarah, because the restrictive covenant in her deed runs with the land. ",
"Sarah, because the presence of the mobile home may adversely affect the market value of her land. ",
"Joe, because his deed did not contain the restrictive covenant. ",
"Joe, because he is not a direct but a remote grantee of Oscar"
] | 0 | professional_law |
|
In 1970, Oscar, owner of a 100-acre tract, prepared and duly recorded a subdivision plan called Happy Acres. The plan showed 90 one-acre lots and a tenacre tract in the center that was designated "Future Public School." Oscar published and distributed a brochure promoting Happy Acres which emphasized the proximity of the lots to the school property and indicated potential tax savings "because the school district will not have to expend tax money to acquire this property." There is no specific statute concerning the dedication of school sites. Oscar sold 50 of the lots to individual purchasers. Each deed referred to the recorded plan and also contained the following clause: "No mobile home shall be erected on any lot within Happy Acres." Sarah was one of the original purchasers from Oscar. In 1976, Oscar sold the remaining 40 lots and the 10-acre tract to Max by a deed which referred to the plan and contained the restriction relating to mobile homes. Max sold the 40 lots to individual purchasers and the 10-acre tract to Pete. None of the deeds from Max referred to the plan or contained any reference to mobile homes."Assume for this question only that in 1977 the school board of the district in which Happy Acres is situated has voted to erect a new school on the 10-acre tract. In an appropriate action between the school board and Pete to determine title, the result will be in favor of | [
"Pete, because the school board has been guilty of laches. ",
"Pete, because his deed did not refer to the subdivision plan. ",
"the school board, because Pete had constructive notice of the proposed use of the tract. ",
"the school board, because there has been a dedication and acceptance of the tract."
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
House owns his home in City. On the lawn in front of his home and within five feet of the public sidewalk there was a large tree. The roots of the tree caused the sidewalk to buckle severely and become dangerous. An ordinance of City requires adjacent landowners to keep sidewalks in safe condition. House engaged Contractor to repair the sidewalk, leaving it to Contractor to decide how the repair should be made. Contractor dug up the sidewalk, cut back the roots of the tree, and laid a new sidewalk. Two days after House had paid Contractor the agreed price of the repair, the tree fell over onto the street and damaged a parked car belonging to Driver. Driver has asserted claims against House and Contractor, and both defendants admit that cutting the roots caused the tree to fall.The theory on which Driver is most likely to prevail against House is that House is | [
"strictly liable, because the tree was on his property. ",
"liable for Contractor's negligence if, to House's knowledge, Contractor was engaged in hazardous activity. ",
"liable, because he assumed responsibility when he paid Contractor for the repair. ",
"liable on the basis of respondeat superior"
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
House owns his home in City. On the lawn in front of his home and within five feet of the public sidewalk there was a large tree. The roots of the tree caused the sidewalk to buckle severely and become dangerous. An ordinance of City requires adjacent landowners to keep sidewalks in safe condition. House engaged Contractor to repair the sidewalk, leaving it to Contractor to decide how the repair should be made. Contractor dug up the sidewalk, cut back the roots of the tree, and laid a new sidewalk. Two days after House had paid Contractor the agreed price of the repair, the tree fell over onto the street and damaged a parked car belonging to Driver. Driver has asserted claims against House and Contractor, and both defendants admit that cutting the roots caused the tree to fall.In the claim of Driver against Contractor, the best defense of Contractor is that | [
"the tree was on the property of House.",
"he repaired the sidewalk at the direction of House.",
"he could not reasonably foresee that the tree would fall.",
"he was relieved of liability when House paid for the repair"
] | 2 | professional_law |
|
House owns his home in City. On the lawn in front of his home and within five feet of the public sidewalk there was a large tree. The roots of the tree caused the sidewalk to buckle severely and become dangerous. An ordinance of City requires adjacent landowners to keep sidewalks in safe condition. House engaged Contractor to repair the sidewalk, leaving it to Contractor to decide how the repair should be made. Contractor dug up the sidewalk, cut back the roots of the tree, and laid a new sidewalk. Two days after House had paid Contractor the agreed price of the repair, the tree fell over onto the street and damaged a parked car belonging to Driver. Driver has asserted claims against House and Contractor, and both defendants admit that cutting the roots caused the tree to fall.If Driver recovers a judgment against House, does House have any recourse against Contractor? | [
"No, if payment by House was an acceptance of the work. ",
"No, because House selected Contractor to do the work. ",
"Yes, if the judgment against House was based on vicarious liability. ",
"Yes, because House's conduct was not a factual cause of the harm."
] | 2 | professional_law |
|
The State of Rio Grande entered into a contract with Roads, Inc., for construction of a fourlane turnpike. Prior to commencement of construction, the legislature, in order to provide funds for parks, repealed the statute authorizing the turnpike and cancelled the agreement with Roads, Inc. Roads, Inc., sued the state to enforce its original agreement. In ruling on this case, a court should hold that the state statute cancelling the agreement is | [
"valid, because constitutionally the sovereign is not liable except with its own consent. ",
"valid, because the legislature is vested with constitutional authority to repeal laws it has enacted. ",
"invalid, because a state is equitably estopped to disclaim a valid bid once accepted by it. ",
"invalid, because of the constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts."
] | 3 | jurisprudence |
|
The strongest constitutional basis for the enactment of a federal statute requiring colleges and universities receiving federal funds to offer student aid solely on the basis of need is the | [
"police power.",
"war and defense power.",
"power to tax and spend for the general welfare.",
"power to enforce the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
] | 2 | jurisprudence |
|
In 1930, Owens, the owner in fee simple of Barrenacres, a large, undeveloped tract of land, granted an easement to the Water District "to install, inspect, repair, maintain, and replace pipes" within a properly delineated strip of land 20 feet wide across Barrenacres. The easement permitted the Water District to enter Barrenacres for only the stated purposes. The Water District promptly and properly recorded the deed. In 1931, the Water District installed a water main which crossed Barrenacres within the described strip; the Water District has not since entered Barrenacres. In 1935, Owens sold Barrenacres to Peterson, but the deed, which was promptly and properly recorded, failed to refer to the Water District easement. Peterson built his home on Barrenacres in 1935, and since that time he has planted and maintained, at great expense in money, time, and effort, a formal garden area which covers, among other areas, the surface of the 20-foot easement strip. In 1976, the Water District proposed to excavate the entire length of its main in order to inspect, repair, and replace the main, to the extent necessary. At a public meeting, at which Peterson was present, the Water District announced its plans and declared its intent to do as little damage as possible to any property involved. Peterson objected to the Water District plans."Peterson asked his attorney to secure an injunction against the Water District and its proposed entry upon his property. The best advice that the attorney can give is that Peterson's attempt to secure injunctive relief will be likely to | [
"succeed, because Peterson's deed from Owens did not mention the easement. ",
"succeed, because more than 40 years have passed since the Water District last entered Barrenacres. ",
"fail, because the Water District's plan is within its rights. 11 ",
"fail, because the Water District's plan is fair and equitable"
] | 2 | professional_law |
|
In 1930, Owens, the owner in fee simple of Barrenacres, a large, undeveloped tract of land, granted an easement to the Water District "to install, inspect, repair, maintain, and replace pipes" within a properly delineated strip of land 20 feet wide across Barrenacres. The easement permitted the Water District to enter Barrenacres for only the stated purposes. The Water District promptly and properly recorded the deed. In 1931, the Water District installed a water main which crossed Barrenacres within the described strip; the Water District has not since entered Barrenacres. In 1935, Owens sold Barrenacres to Peterson, but the deed, which was promptly and properly recorded, failed to refer to the Water District easement. Peterson built his home on Barrenacres in 1935, and since that time he has planted and maintained, at great expense in money, time, and effort, a formal garden area which covers, among other areas, the surface of the 20-foot easement strip. In 1976, the Water District proposed to excavate the entire length of its main in order to inspect, repair, and replace the main, to the extent necessary. At a public meeting, at which Peterson was present, the Water District announced its plans and declared its intent to do as little damage as possible to any property involved. Peterson objected to the Water District plans."Assume that Peterson reserved his rights and after the Water District completed its work sued for the $5,000 in damages he suffered by reason of the Water District entry. Peterson's attempt to secure damages probably will | [
"succeed, because his deed from Owens did not mention the easement. ",
"succeed, because of an implied obligation imposed on the Water District to restore the surface to its condition prior to entry. ",
"fail, because of the public interest in maintaining a continuous water supply. ",
"fail, because the Water District acted within its rights"
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
In 1960, Omar, the owner in fee simple absolute, conveyed Stoneacre, a five-acre tract of land. The relevant, operative words of the deed conveyed to "Church [a duly organized religious body having power to hold property] for the life of my son, Carl, and from and after the death of my said son, Carl, to all of my grandchildren and their heirs and assigns in equal shares; provided that Church shall use the premises for church purposes only." In an existing building on Stoneacre, Church immediately began to conduct religious services and other activities normally associated with a church. In 1975, Church granted to Darin a right to remove sand and gravel from a one-half-acre portion of Stoneacre upon the payment of a royalty. Darin has regularly removed sand and gravel since 1975 and paid the royalty to Church. Church has continued to conduct religious services and other church activities on Stoneacre All four of the living grandchildren of Omar, joined by a guardian ad litem to represent unborn grandchildren, instituted suit against Church and Darin seeking damages for the removal of sand and gravel and an injunction preventing further acts of removal. There is no applicable statute. Which of the following best describes the likely disposition of this lawsuit? | [
"The plaintiffs should succeed, because the interest of Church terminated with the first removal of sand and gravel ",
"Church and Darin should be enjoined, and damages should be recovered but impounded for future distribution. ",
"The injunction should be granted, but damages should be denied, because Omar and Carl are not parties to the action. ",
"Damages should be awarded, but the injunction should be denied."
] | 1 | jurisprudence |
|
In which of the following cases is a conviction of the named defendant for robbery LEAST likely to be upheld? | [
"Johnson forced his way into a woman's home, bound her, and compelled her to tell him that her jewelry was in an adjoining room. Johnson went to the room, took the jewelry, and fled. ",
"A confederate of Brown pushed a man in order to cause him to lose his balance and drop his briefcase. Brown picked up the briefcase and ran off with it.",
"Having induced a woman to enter his hotel room, Ritter forced her to telephone her maid to tell the maid to bring certain jewelry to the hotel. Ritter locked the woman in the bathroom while he accepted the jewelry from the maid when she arrived. ",
"Hayes unbuttoned the vest of a man too drunk to notice and removed his wallet. A minute later, the victim missed his wallet and accused Hayes of taking it. Hayes pretended to be insulted, slapped the victim, and went off with the wallet."
] | 3 | jurisprudence |
|
Green is cited for contempt of the House of Representatives after she refuses to answer certain questions posed by a House Committee concerning her acts while serving as a United States Ambassador. A federal statute authorizes the Attorney General to prosecute contempts of Congress. Pursuant to this law, the House directs the Attorney General to begin criminal proceedings against Green. A federal grand jury indicts Green, but the Attorney General refuses to sign the indictment."Which of the following best describes the constitutionality of the Attorney General's action? | [
"Illegal, because the Attorney General must prosecute if the House of Representatives directs. ",
"Illegal, because the Attorney General must prosecute those who violate federal law. ",
"Legal, because ambassadors are immune from prosecution for acts committed in the course of their duties. ",
"Legal, because the decision to prosecute is an exclusively executive act"
] | 3 | jurisprudence |
|
Green is cited for contempt of the House of Representatives after she refuses to answer certain questions posed by a House Committee concerning her acts while serving as a United States Ambassador. A federal statute authorizes the Attorney General to prosecute contempts of Congress. Pursuant to this law, the House directs the Attorney General to begin criminal proceedings against Green. A federal grand jury indicts Green, but the Attorney General refuses to sign the indictment."If the Attorney General signs the indictment, the strongest argument Green could urge as a defense is that | [
"Green may refuse to answer the questions if she can demonstrate that they are unrelated to matters upon which Congress may legislate.",
"the House may question Green on matters pertaining to the expenditures of funds appropriated by Congress.",
"only the Senate may question Green on matters that relate to the performance of her duties.",
"Congress may not ask questions relating to the performance of duties executed by an officer of the executive branch"
] | 0 | jurisprudence |
|
Harry met Bill, who was known to him to be a burglar, in a bar. Harry told Bill that he needed money. He promised to pay Bill $500 if Bill would go to Harry's house the following night and take some silverware. Harry explained to Bill that, although the silverware was legally his, his wife would object to his selling it. Harry pointed out his home, one of a group of similar tract houses. He drew a floor plan of the house that showed the location of the silverware. Harry said that his wife usually took several sleeping pills before retiring, and that he would make sure that she took them the next night. He promised to leave a window unlocked. Everything went according to the plan except that Bill, deceived by the similarity of the tract houses, went to the wrong house. He found a window unlocked, climbed in, and found silver where Harry had indicated. He took the silver to the cocktail lounge where the payoff was to take place. At that point police arrested the two men."If Harry were charged with burglary, his best argument for acquittal would be that | [
"there was no breaking",
"he consented to the entry.",
"no overt act was committed by him.",
"there was no intent to commit a felony."
] | 3 | jurisprudence |
|
Harry met Bill, who was known to him to be a burglar, in a bar. Harry told Bill that he needed money. He promised to pay Bill $500 if Bill would go to Harry's house the following night and take some silverware. Harry explained to Bill that, although the silverware was legally his, his wife would object to his selling it. Harry pointed out his home, one of a group of similar tract houses. He drew a floor plan of the house that showed the location of the silverware. Harry said that his wife usually took several sleeping pills before retiring, and that he would make sure that she took them the next night. He promised to leave a window unlocked. Everything went according to the plan except that Bill, deceived by the similarity of the tract houses, went to the wrong house. He found a window unlocked, climbed in, and found silver where Harry had indicated. He took the silver to the cocktail lounge where the payoff was to take place. At that point police arrested the two men."Bill's best argument for acquittal of burglary is that he | [
"acted under a mistake of law.",
"had the consent of the owner.",
"reasonably thought he was in Harry's house.",
"found the window unlocked"
] | 2 | jurisprudence |
|
Harry met Bill, who was known to him to be a burglar, in a bar. Harry told Bill that he needed money. He promised to pay Bill $500 if Bill would go to Harry's house the following night and take some silverware. Harry explained to Bill that, although the silverware was legally his, his wife would object to his selling it. Harry pointed out his home, one of a group of similar tract houses. He drew a floor plan of the house that showed the location of the silverware. Harry said that his wife usually took several sleeping pills before retiring, and that he would make sure that she took them the next night. He promised to leave a window unlocked. Everything went according to the plan except that Bill, deceived by the similarity of the tract houses, went to the wrong house. He found a window unlocked, climbed in, and found silver where Harry had indicated. He took the silver to the cocktail lounge where the payoff was to take place. At that point police arrested the two men."If Harry and Bill are charged with a conspiracy to commit burglary, their best argument for acquittal is that | [
"Bill was the alter ego of Harry.",
"they did not intend to commit burglary.",
"there was no overt act.",
"there was no agreemen"
] | 1 | jurisprudence |
|
Penn sued Duke's Bar for injuries suffered in an automobile accident caused by Chase, who had been a patron of Duke's Bar. Penn claimed that Chase was permitted to drink too much liquor at Duke's Bar before the accidentWood, a patron of Duke's Bar, testified that on the night of the accident Chase was drunk. Wood then proposed to testify that he remarked to his companion, "Chase is so drunk he can't even stand up." Wood's remark to his companion is | [
"admissible as an excited utterance.",
"admissible as a prior consistent statement.",
"admissible as a statement by Wood regarding a condition he observed, made while he was observing it. ",
"inadmissible if there was no evidence that Wood had expertise in determining drunkenness."
] | 2 | professional_law |
|
Penn sued Duke's Bar for injuries suffered in an automobile accident caused by Chase, who had been a patron of Duke's Bar. Penn claimed that Chase was permitted to drink too much liquor at Duke's Bar before the accidentDuke's Bar called Chase to testify and expected him to say that he was sober when he left Duke's Bar; however, on direct examination Chase testified that he may have had a little too much to drink at Duke's Bar. Duke's Bar now seeks to confront Chase with his statement made on deposition that he was sober when he left Duke's Bar. Which of the following is true concerning this statement? | [
"It may be used only to refresh Chase's recollection.",
"It is admissible for impeachment and as substantive evidence that Chase was sober.",
"It is inadmissible, because Duke's Bar cannot impeach its own witness. ",
"It is inadmissible, because it is hearsay, not within any exception"
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
Penn sued Duke's Bar for injuries suffered in an automobile accident caused by Chase, who had been a patron of Duke's Bar. Penn claimed that Chase was permitted to drink too much liquor at Duke's Bar before the accidentPenn offered evidence that, after the accident, the manager of Duke's Bar established house rules limiting all customers to two drinks per hour, with a maximum limit of four drinks per night. This evidence is | [
"admissible to show that the prior conduct of Duke's Bar was negligent.",
"admissible to show that Duke's Bar was aware of the need for taking precautionary measures.",
"inadmissible, because subsequent measures by an employee are not binding on Duke's Bar. ",
"inadmissible, because its admission would discourage the taking of such remedial measures"
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
Penn sued Duke's Bar for injuries suffered in an automobile accident caused by Chase, who had been a patron of Duke's Bar. Penn claimed that Chase was permitted to drink too much liquor at Duke's Bar before the accidentPenn offered evidence that, after the accident, the owner of Duke's Bar visited him at the hospital and, offering to pay all of Penn's medical expenses, said, "That's the least I can do after letting Chase leave the bar so drunk last night." The statement that Chase was drunk when he left the bar on the night of the accident is | [
"admissible as an admission by the owner of Duke's Bar that Chase was drunk when he left the bar.",
"admissible as a factual admission made in connection with an offer of compromise.",
"inadmissible as hearsay, not within any exception ",
"inadmissible as a statement made in connection with an offer to pay medical expenses."
] | 0 | professional_law |
|
In a narcotics conspiracy prosecution against Daly, the prosecutor offers in evidence a tape recording of a telephone call allegedly made by Daly. A lay witness is called to testify that the voice on the recording is Daly's. Her testimony to which of the following would be the LEAST sufficient basis for admitting the recording? | [
"She had heard the same voice on a similar tape recording identified to her by Daly's brother.",
"She had heard Daly speak many times, but never over the telephone. ",
"She had, specifically for the purpose of preparing to testify, talked with Daly over the telephone at a time after the recording was made. ",
"She had been present with Daly when he engaged in the conversation in question but had heard only Daly's side of the conversation"
] | 0 | jurisprudence |
|
Devlin was the owner of a large subdivision. Parnell became interested in purchasing a lot but could not decide between Lot 40 and Lot 41. The price and fair market value of each of those two lots was $5,000. Parnell paid Devlin $5,000, which Devlin accepted, and Devlin delivered to Parnell a deed which was properly executed, complete, and ready for recording in every detail except that the space in the deed for the lot number was left blank. Devlin told Parnell to fill in either Lot 40 or Lot 41 according to his decision and then to record the deed. Parnell visited the development the next day and completely changed his mind, selecting Lot 25. He filled in Lot 25 and duly recorded the deed. The price of Lot 25 and its fair market value was $7,500.Immediately upon learning what Parnell had done, Devlin brought an appropriate action against Parnell to rescind the transaction. If Devlin loses, the most likely basis for the judgment is that | [
"Devlin's casual business practices created his loss.",
"the need for certainty in land title records controls.",
"the agency implied to complete the deed cannot be restricted by the oral understanding.",
"the recording of the deed precludes any questioning of its provisions in its recorded form."
] | 2 | professional_law |
|
Devlin was the owner of a large subdivision. Parnell became interested in purchasing a lot but could not decide between Lot 40 and Lot 41. The price and fair market value of each of those two lots was $5,000. Parnell paid Devlin $5,000, which Devlin accepted, and Devlin delivered to Parnell a deed which was properly executed, complete, and ready for recording in every detail except that the space in the deed for the lot number was left blank. Devlin told Parnell to fill in either Lot 40 or Lot 41 according to his decision and then to record the deed. Parnell visited the development the next day and completely changed his mind, selecting Lot 25. He filled in Lot 25 and duly recorded the deed. The price of Lot 25 and its fair market value was $7,500.Assume the following facts for this question only. Before Devlin had time to learn of Parnell's actions, Parnell sold Lot 25 to Caruso for $6,000 by a duly and properly executed, delivered, and recorded warranty deed. Caruso knew that Devlin had put a price of $7,500 on 14 Lot 25, but he knew no other facts regarding the Devlin-Parnell transaction. Caruso's attorney accurately reported Parnell's record title to be good, marketable, and free of encumbrances. Neither Caruso nor his attorney made any further investigation outside the record. Devlin brought an appropriate action against Caruso to recover title to Lot 25. If Devlin loses, the most likely basis for the judgment is that | [
"the Statute of Frauds prevents the introduction of any evidence of Devlin's and Parnell's agreement",
"recording of the deed from Devlin to Parnell precludes any question of its genuineness.",
"as between Devlin and a bona fide purchaser, Devlin is estopped. ",
"the clean hands doctrine bars Devlin from relief"
] | 2 | professional_law |
|
Ohner owns the Acme Hotel. When the International Order of Badgers came to town for its convention, its members rented 400 of the 500 rooms, and the hotel opened its convention facilities to them. Badgers are a rowdy group, and during their convention they littered both the inside and the outside of the hotel with debris and bottles. The hotel manager knew that objects were being thrown out of the hotel windows. At his direction, hotel employees patrolled the hallways telling the guests to refrain from such conduct. Ohner was out of town and was not aware of the problems which were occurring. During the convention, as Smith walked past the Acme Hotel on the sidewalk, he was hit and injured by an ashtray thrown out of a window in the hotel. Smith sued Ohner for damages for his injuries. Will Smith prevail in his claim against Ohner? | [
"Yes, because a property owner is strictly liable for acts on his premises if such acts cause harm to persons using the adjacent public sidewalks. ",
"Yes, if the person who threw the ashtray cannot be identified. ",
"No, because Ohner had no personal knowledge of the conduct of the hotel guests. ",
"No, if the trier of fact determines that the hotel employees had taken reasonable precautions to prevent such an injur"
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
While negligently driving his father's uninsured automobile, 25-year-old Arthur crashed into an automobile driven by Betty. Both Arthur and Betty were injured. Charles, Arthur's father, erroneously believing that he was liable because he owned the automobile, said to Betty, "I will see to it that you are reimbursed for any losses you incur as a result of the accident." Charles also called Physician and told him to take care of Betty, and that he, Charles, would pay the bill. Arthur, having no assets, died as a result of his injuries. Dodge, one of Arthur's creditors, wrote to Charles stating that Arthur owed him a clothing bill of $200 and that he was going to file a claim against Arthur's estate. Charles replied, "If you don't file a claim against Arthur's estate, I will pay what he owed you.""In an action by Betty against Charles for wages lost while she was incapacitated as a result of the accident, which of the following would be Charles's best defense? | [
"Lack of consideration",
"Mistake of fact as to basic assumption",
"Statute of Frauds",
"Indefiniteness of Charles's promis"
] | 0 | professional_law |
|
While negligently driving his father's uninsured automobile, 25-year-old Arthur crashed into an automobile driven by Betty. Both Arthur and Betty were injured. Charles, Arthur's father, erroneously believing that he was liable because he owned the automobile, said to Betty, "I will see to it that you are reimbursed for any losses you incur as a result of the accident." Charles also called Physician and told him to take care of Betty, and that he, Charles, would pay the bill. Arthur, having no assets, died as a result of his injuries. Dodge, one of Arthur's creditors, wrote to Charles stating that Arthur owed him a clothing bill of $200 and that he was going to file a claim against Arthur's estate. Charles replied, "If you don't file a claim against Arthur's estate, I will pay what he owed you.""Which of the following, if true, would be significant in determining whether or not there was bargained-for consideration to support Charles's promise to Physician? I. Physician had not begun treating Betty before Charles called him. II. Charles had a contract with Betty. | [
"I only",
"II only",
"Both I and II",
"Neither I nor I"
] | 2 | professional_law |
|
While negligently driving his father's uninsured automobile, 25-year-old Arthur crashed into an automobile driven by Betty. Both Arthur and Betty were injured. Charles, Arthur's father, erroneously believing that he was liable because he owned the automobile, said to Betty, "I will see to it that you are reimbursed for any losses you incur as a result of the accident." Charles also called Physician and told him to take care of Betty, and that he, Charles, would pay the bill. Arthur, having no assets, died as a result of his injuries. Dodge, one of Arthur's creditors, wrote to Charles stating that Arthur owed him a clothing bill of $200 and that he was going to file a claim against Arthur's estate. Charles replied, "If you don't file a claim against Arthur's estate, I will pay what he owed you.""If Physician discontinued treating Betty before she had fully recovered and Betty brought an action against Physician for breach of contract, which of the following arguments, if any, by Physician would probably be effective in defense? I. Betty furnished no consideration, either express or implied. II. Physician's contract was with Charles and not with Betty. 15 III. Whatever contract Physician may have had with Betty was discharged by novation on account of the agreement with Charles. | [
"I only",
"I and II only",
"II and III only",
"Neither I nor II nor II"
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
While negligently driving his father's uninsured automobile, 25-year-old Arthur crashed into an automobile driven by Betty. Both Arthur and Betty were injured. Charles, Arthur's father, erroneously believing that he was liable because he owned the automobile, said to Betty, "I will see to it that you are reimbursed for any losses you incur as a result of the accident." Charles also called Physician and told him to take care of Betty, and that he, Charles, would pay the bill. Arthur, having no assets, died as a result of his injuries. Dodge, one of Arthur's creditors, wrote to Charles stating that Arthur owed him a clothing bill of $200 and that he was going to file a claim against Arthur's estate. Charles replied, "If you don't file a claim against Arthur's estate, I will pay what he owed you.""If Dodge did not file action against Arthur's estate, would Dodge succeed in an action against Charles for $200? | [
"Yes, because Dodge had detrimentally relied on Charles's promise. ",
"Yes, because Charles's promise was supported by a bargained-for exchange. ",
"No, because Dodge's claim against Arthur's estate was worthless. ",
"No, because Charles at most had only a moral obligation to pay Arthur's debts"
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
While negligently driving his father's uninsured automobile, 25-year-old Arthur crashed into an automobile driven by Betty. Both Arthur and Betty were injured. Charles, Arthur's father, erroneously believing that he was liable because he owned the automobile, said to Betty, "I will see to it that you are reimbursed for any losses you incur as a result of the accident." Charles also called Physician and told him to take care of Betty, and that he, Charles, would pay the bill. Arthur, having no assets, died as a result of his injuries. Dodge, one of Arthur's creditors, wrote to Charles stating that Arthur owed him a clothing bill of $200 and that he was going to file a claim against Arthur's estate. Charles replied, "If you don't file a claim against Arthur's estate, I will pay what he owed you.""Assume that Charles, honestly believing that he owed Dodge nothing, refused to pay anything to Dodge, who honestly believed that Charles owed him $200. If Dodge then accepts $150 from Charles in settlement of the claim, will Dodge succeed in an action against Charles for the remaining $50? | [
"Yes, because Arthur's debt of $200 was liquidated and undisputed. ",
"Yes, because Dodge honestly believed that he had a legal right against Charles for the full $200. ",
"No, because Charles honestly believed that Dodge did not have a legal right against him for the $200. ",
"No, because Charles was not contractually obligated to pay Dodge $200 in the first plac"
] | 2 | jurisprudence |
|
Until 1954, the state of New Atlantic required segregation in all public and private schools, but all public schools are now desegregated. Other state laws, enacted before 1954 and continuing to the present, provide for free distribution of the same textbooks on secular subjects to students in all public and private schools. In addition, the state accredits schools and certifies teachers. Little White School, a private school that offers elementary and secondary education in the state denies admission to all non-Caucasians. Stone School is a private school that offers religious instruction."Which of the following is the strongest argument against the constitutionality of free distribution of textbooks to the students at the Little White School? | [
"No legitimate educational function is served by the free distribution of textbooks.",
"The state may not in any way aid private schools.",
"The Constitution forbids private bias of any kind.",
"Segregation is furthered by the distribution of textbooks to these students."
] | 3 | jurisprudence |
|
Until 1954, the state of New Atlantic required segregation in all public and private schools, but all public schools are now desegregated. Other state laws, enacted before 1954 and continuing to the present, provide for free distribution of the same textbooks on secular subjects to students in all public and private schools. In addition, the state accredits schools and certifies teachers. Little White School, a private school that offers elementary and secondary education in the state denies admission to all non-Caucasians. Stone School is a private school that offers religious instruction."Which of the following is the strongest argument in favor of the constitutionality of free distribution of textbooks to the students at Stone School? | [
"Private religious schools, like public nonsectarian schools, fulfill an important educational function. ",
"Religious instruction in private schools is not constitutionally objectionable.",
"The purpose and effect of the free distribution of these textbooks is secular and does not entangle church and state.",
"The free exercise clause requires identical treatment by the state of students in public and private school"
] | 2 | jurisprudence |
|
Defendant is charged with assault and battery. The state's evidence shows that Victim was struck in the face by Defendant's fist. In which of the following situations is Defendant most likely to be not guilty of assault and battery? | [
"Defendant had been hypnotized at a party and ordered by the hypnotist to strike the person he disliked the most.",
"Defendant was suffering from an epileptic seizure and had no control over his motions.",
"Defendant was heavily intoxicated and was shadowboxing without realizing that Victim was near him.",
"Defendant, who had just awakened from a deep sleep, was not fully aware of what was happening and mistakenly thought Victim was attacking him"
] | 1 | jurisprudence |
|
Leader is a labor leader in Metropolis. Ten years ago he was divorced. Both he and his first wife 16 have since married other persons. Recently, News, a newspaper in another city, ran a feature article on improper influences it asserted had been used by labor officials to secure favorable rulings from government officials. The story said that in 1960 Leader's first wife, with Leader's knowledge and concurrence, gave sexual favors to the mayor of Metropolis and then persuaded him to grant concessions to Leader's union, with which Metropolis was then negotiating a labor contract. The story named Leader and identified his first wife by her former and current surnames. The reporter for News believed the story to be true, since it had been related to him by two very reliable sources. Leader's first wife suffered emotional distress and became very depressed. If she asserts a claim based on defamation against News, she will | [
"prevail, because the story concerned her personal, private life. ",
"prevail if the story was false.",
"not prevail, because News did not print the story with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity. ",
"not prevail if News exercised ordinary care in determining if the story was true or false"
] | 3 | jurisprudence |
|
In 1976, Utility constructed a new plant for the generation of electricity. The plant burns lignite, a low-grade fuel which is available in large quantities. Although the plant was constructed in accordance with the best practicable technology, the plant emits a substantial quantity of invisible fumes. The only way Utility can reduce the fumes is by the use of scrubbing equipment that would cost $50,000,000 to install and would increase the retail price of generated electricity by 50 percent while reducing the volume of fumes by only 20 percent. Because of the expense of such equipment and its relative ineffectiveness, no other generating plants burning lignite use such equipment. The plant is located in a sparsely settled rural area, remote from the large city served by Utility. Farmer owned a farm adjacent to the plant. He had farmed the land for 40 years and had lived on the premises. The prevailing winds carry fumes from the new plant over Farmer's land. His 1976 crop was less than half the average size of this crop over the five years immediately preceding the construction of the plant. It can be established that the fumes caused the crop reduction. Farmer's hay fever, from which he had long suffered, became worse in 1976. Physicians advised him that the lignite fumes were affecting it and that serious lung disease would soon result unless he moved away from the plant. He did so, selling his farm at its reasonable market value, which was then $10,000 less than before the construction of the plant."If Farmer asserts a claim based on nuisance against Utility for damages for personal injuries, will Farmer prevail? | [
"No, because there is no practicable way for Utility to reduce the fumes. ",
"No, because Utility's acts constituted a public nuisance. ",
"Yes, because Farmer's personal injuries were within the scope of the liability imposed on Utility. ",
"Yes, because the generation of electricity is an ultrahazardous activit"
] | 2 | professional_law |
|
In 1976, Utility constructed a new plant for the generation of electricity. The plant burns lignite, a low-grade fuel which is available in large quantities. Although the plant was constructed in accordance with the best practicable technology, the plant emits a substantial quantity of invisible fumes. The only way Utility can reduce the fumes is by the use of scrubbing equipment that would cost $50,000,000 to install and would increase the retail price of generated electricity by 50 percent while reducing the volume of fumes by only 20 percent. Because of the expense of such equipment and its relative ineffectiveness, no other generating plants burning lignite use such equipment. The plant is located in a sparsely settled rural area, remote from the large city served by Utility. Farmer owned a farm adjacent to the plant. He had farmed the land for 40 years and had lived on the premises. The prevailing winds carry fumes from the new plant over Farmer's land. His 1976 crop was less than half the average size of this crop over the five years immediately preceding the construction of the plant. It can be established that the fumes caused the crop reduction. Farmer's hay fever, from which he had long suffered, became worse in 1976. Physicians advised him that the lignite fumes were affecting it and that serious lung disease would soon result unless he moved away from the plant. He did so, selling his farm at its reasonable market value, which was then $10,000 less than before the construction of the plant."If Farmer asserts a claim based on negligence against Utility for crop damages, will Farmer prevail? | [
"No, because Utility was not negligent. ",
"No as to 1976 crop damage, because Farmer did not mitigate damages by selling his farm in 1975. ",
"Yes as to 20 percent of his crop damage, because use of available equipment would have reduced the fumes by 20 percent. ",
"Yes, because operation of the plant constitutes a nuisance"
] | 0 | professional_law |
|
On March 1, Computer Programs, Inc. (CP) orally agreed with Holiday Department Store (HDS) to write a set of programs for HDS's computer and to coordinate the programs with HDS's billing methods. A subsequent memo, signed by both parties, provided in its entirety: HDS will pay CP $20,000 in two equal installments within one month of completion if CP is successful in shortening by one-half the 17 processing time for the financial transactions now handled on HDS's Zenon 747 computer; CP to complete by July 1. This agreement may be amended only by a signed writing. On June 6, CP demanded $10,000, saying the job was one-half done. After HDS denied liability, the parties orally agreed that HDS should deposit $20,000 in escrow, pending completion to the satisfaction of HDS's computer systems manager. The escrow deposit was thereupon made. On July 5, CP completed the programs, having used an amount of time in which it could have earned $18,000 had it devoted that time to other jobs. Tests by CP and HDS's computer systems manager then showed that the computer programs, not being perfectly coordinated with HDS's billing methods, cut processing time by only 47 percent. They would, however, save HDS $12,000 a year. Further, if HDS would spend $5,000 to change its invoice preparation methods, as recommended by CP, the programs would cut processing time by a total of 58 percent, saving HDS another $8,000 a year. HDS's computer systems manager refused in good faith to certify satisfactory completion. HDS asked the escrow agent to return the $20,000 and asserted that nothing was owed to CP even though HDS continued to use the programs"If HDS denies liability on the ground that CP had orally agreed to coordinate with HDS's methods of accounting, and CP seeks in litigation to bar introduction of that agreement because of the parol evidence rule, HDS's most effective argument is that | [
"the parol evidence rule does not bar the introduction of evidence for the purpose of interpreting a written agreement.",
"the memorandum was not a completely integrated agreement.",
"HDS detrimentally relied on the oral promise of coordination in signing the memorandum",
"the memorandum was not a partially integrated agreement."
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
On March 1, Computer Programs, Inc. (CP) orally agreed with Holiday Department Store (HDS) to write a set of programs for HDS's computer and to coordinate the programs with HDS's billing methods. A subsequent memo, signed by both parties, provided in its entirety: HDS will pay CP $20,000 in two equal installments within one month of completion if CP is successful in shortening by one-half the 17 processing time for the financial transactions now handled on HDS's Zenon 747 computer; CP to complete by July 1. This agreement may be amended only by a signed writing. On June 6, CP demanded $10,000, saying the job was one-half done. After HDS denied liability, the parties orally agreed that HDS should deposit $20,000 in escrow, pending completion to the satisfaction of HDS's computer systems manager. The escrow deposit was thereupon made. On July 5, CP completed the programs, having used an amount of time in which it could have earned $18,000 had it devoted that time to other jobs. Tests by CP and HDS's computer systems manager then showed that the computer programs, not being perfectly coordinated with HDS's billing methods, cut processing time by only 47 percent. They would, however, save HDS $12,000 a year. Further, if HDS would spend $5,000 to change its invoice preparation methods, as recommended by CP, the programs would cut processing time by a total of 58 percent, saving HDS another $8,000 a year. HDS's computer systems manager refused in good faith to certify satisfactory completion. HDS asked the escrow agent to return the $20,000 and asserted that nothing was owed to CP even though HDS continued to use the programs"If CP in fact had half-completed the job on June 6, would it then have been entitled to $10,000? | [
"Yes, because June 6 was within one month of completion. ",
"Yes, because CP had done one-half the job. ",
"No, because of a constructive condition precedent requiring at least substantial completion of the work before HDS would have a duty to pay ",
"No, because \"within one month of completion\" would, in these circumstances, be interpreted to mean \"within one month after completion.\""
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
On March 1, Computer Programs, Inc. (CP) orally agreed with Holiday Department Store (HDS) to write a set of programs for HDS's computer and to coordinate the programs with HDS's billing methods. A subsequent memo, signed by both parties, provided in its entirety: HDS will pay CP $20,000 in two equal installments within one month of completion if CP is successful in shortening by one-half the 17 processing time for the financial transactions now handled on HDS's Zenon 747 computer; CP to complete by July 1. This agreement may be amended only by a signed writing. On June 6, CP demanded $10,000, saying the job was one-half done. After HDS denied liability, the parties orally agreed that HDS should deposit $20,000 in escrow, pending completion to the satisfaction of HDS's computer systems manager. The escrow deposit was thereupon made. On July 5, CP completed the programs, having used an amount of time in which it could have earned $18,000 had it devoted that time to other jobs. Tests by CP and HDS's computer systems manager then showed that the computer programs, not being perfectly coordinated with HDS's billing methods, cut processing time by only 47 percent. They would, however, save HDS $12,000 a year. Further, if HDS would spend $5,000 to change its invoice preparation methods, as recommended by CP, the programs would cut processing time by a total of 58 percent, saving HDS another $8,000 a year. HDS's computer systems manager refused in good faith to certify satisfactory completion. HDS asked the escrow agent to return the $20,000 and asserted that nothing was owed to CP even though HDS continued to use the programs"Was the escrow agreement a valid modification? | [
"Yes, because it was the compromise of an honest dispute. ",
"Yes, because the Statute of Frauds does not apply to subsequent oral modifications. ",
"No, because it was oral ",
"No, because it was not supported by consideration."
] | 0 | professional_law |
|
On March 1, Computer Programs, Inc. (CP) orally agreed with Holiday Department Store (HDS) to write a set of programs for HDS's computer and to coordinate the programs with HDS's billing methods. A subsequent memo, signed by both parties, provided in its entirety: HDS will pay CP $20,000 in two equal installments within one month of completion if CP is successful in shortening by one-half the 17 processing time for the financial transactions now handled on HDS's Zenon 747 computer; CP to complete by July 1. This agreement may be amended only by a signed writing. On June 6, CP demanded $10,000, saying the job was one-half done. After HDS denied liability, the parties orally agreed that HDS should deposit $20,000 in escrow, pending completion to the satisfaction of HDS's computer systems manager. The escrow deposit was thereupon made. On July 5, CP completed the programs, having used an amount of time in which it could have earned $18,000 had it devoted that time to other jobs. Tests by CP and HDS's computer systems manager then showed that the computer programs, not being perfectly coordinated with HDS's billing methods, cut processing time by only 47 percent. They would, however, save HDS $12,000 a year. Further, if HDS would spend $5,000 to change its invoice preparation methods, as recommended by CP, the programs would cut processing time by a total of 58 percent, saving HDS another $8,000 a year. HDS's computer systems manager refused in good faith to certify satisfactory completion. HDS asked the escrow agent to return the $20,000 and asserted that nothing was owed to CP even though HDS continued to use the programs"Assume for this question only that the programs completed on July 5 had cut processing time by one-half for all of HDS's financial transactions. Is HDS entitled to renounce the contract because of CP's delay in completion? | [
"Yes, because \"CP to complete by July 1\" is an express condition. ",
"Yes, because the doctrine of substantial performance does not apply to commercial contracts. ",
"No, because both parties manifested an understanding that time was not of the essence. ",
"No, because the contract did not contain a liquidated damages clause dealing with delay in completion"
] | 2 | professional_law |
|
On March 1, Computer Programs, Inc. (CP) orally agreed with Holiday Department Store (HDS) to write a set of programs for HDS's computer and to coordinate the programs with HDS's billing methods. A subsequent memo, signed by both parties, provided in its entirety: HDS will pay CP $20,000 in two equal installments within one month of completion if CP is successful in shortening by one-half the 17 processing time for the financial transactions now handled on HDS's Zenon 747 computer; CP to complete by July 1. This agreement may be amended only by a signed writing. On June 6, CP demanded $10,000, saying the job was one-half done. After HDS denied liability, the parties orally agreed that HDS should deposit $20,000 in escrow, pending completion to the satisfaction of HDS's computer systems manager. The escrow deposit was thereupon made. On July 5, CP completed the programs, having used an amount of time in which it could have earned $18,000 had it devoted that time to other jobs. Tests by CP and HDS's computer systems manager then showed that the computer programs, not being perfectly coordinated with HDS's billing methods, cut processing time by only 47 percent. They would, however, save HDS $12,000 a year. Further, if HDS would spend $5,000 to change its invoice preparation methods, as recommended by CP, the programs would cut processing time by a total of 58 percent, saving HDS another $8,000 a year. HDS's computer systems manager refused in good faith to certify satisfactory completion. HDS asked the escrow agent to return the $20,000 and asserted that nothing was owed to CP even though HDS continued to use the programs"Assume for this question only that CP's delay in completion did not give HDS the right to renounce the contract and that the parties' escrow agreement was enforceable. Is CP entitled to recover damages for breach of the contract? | [
"Yes, because CP had substantially performed. ",
"Yes, because the program would save HDS $12,000 a year. ",
"No, because shortening the processing time by one-half was an express condition subsequent. ",
"No, because HDS's computer systems manager did not certify satisfactory completion of the programs"
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
On March 1, Computer Programs, Inc. (CP) orally agreed with Holiday Department Store (HDS) to write a set of programs for HDS's computer and to coordinate the programs with HDS's billing methods. A subsequent memo, signed by both parties, provided in its entirety: HDS will pay CP $20,000 in two equal installments within one month of completion if CP is successful in shortening by one-half the 17 processing time for the financial transactions now handled on HDS's Zenon 747 computer; CP to complete by July 1. This agreement may be amended only by a signed writing. On June 6, CP demanded $10,000, saying the job was one-half done. After HDS denied liability, the parties orally agreed that HDS should deposit $20,000 in escrow, pending completion to the satisfaction of HDS's computer systems manager. The escrow deposit was thereupon made. On July 5, CP completed the programs, having used an amount of time in which it could have earned $18,000 had it devoted that time to other jobs. Tests by CP and HDS's computer systems manager then showed that the computer programs, not being perfectly coordinated with HDS's billing methods, cut processing time by only 47 percent. They would, however, save HDS $12,000 a year. Further, if HDS would spend $5,000 to change its invoice preparation methods, as recommended by CP, the programs would cut processing time by a total of 58 percent, saving HDS another $8,000 a year. HDS's computer systems manager refused in good faith to certify satisfactory completion. HDS asked the escrow agent to return the $20,000 and asserted that nothing was owed to CP even though HDS continued to use the programs"Assume for this question only that CP was in breach of contract because of its four-day delay in completion and that an express condition precedent to HDS's duty to pay the contract 18 price has failed. Can CP nevertheless recover the reasonable value of its service? | [
"Yes, because continued use of the programs by HDS would save at least $12,000 a year. ",
"Yes, because HDS was continuing to use programs created by CP for which, as HDS knew, CP expected to be paid. ",
"No, because failure of an express condition precedent excused HDS from any duty to compensate CP. ",
"No, because such a recovery by CP would be inconsistent with a claim by HDS against CP for breach of contract"
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
Police Officer stopped Dexter for speeding late one night. Noting that Dexter was nervous, Police Officer ordered him from the car and placed him under arrest for speeding. By state law, Police Officer was empowered to arrest Dexter and take him to the nearest police station for booking. Police Officer searched Dexter's person and discovered a package of heroin in his jacket pocket. Dexter is charged with possession of heroin. At trial, Dexter's motion to prevent introduction of the heroin into evidence, on the ground that the search violated his federal constitutional rights, will most probably be | [
"denied, because the search was incident to a valid custodial arrest. ",
"denied, because Police Officer acted under a reasonable suspicion and legitimate concern for his own personal safety. ",
"granted, because there was no reasonable or proper basis upon which to justify conducting the search. ",
"granted if Police Officer was not in fear and had no suspicion that Dexter was transporting narcotics"
] | 0 | jurisprudence |
|
Donna was arrested and taken to police headquarters, where she was given her Miranda warnings. Donna indicated that she wished to telephone her lawyer and was told that she could do so after her fingerprints had been taken. While being fingerprinted, however, Donna blurted out, "Paying a lawyer is a waste of money because I know you have me." At trial, Donna's motion to prevent the introduction of the statement she made while being fingerprinted will most probably be | [
"granted, because Donna's request to contact her attorney by telephone was reasonable and should have been granted immediately. ",
"granted, because of the \"fruit of the poisonous tree\" doctrine. ",
"denied, because the statements were volunteered and not the result of interrogation. ",
"denied, because fingerprinting is not a critical stage of the proceeding requiring the assistance of counsel."
] | 2 | jurisprudence |
|
Barnes was hired as an assistant professor of mathematics at Reardon State College and is now in his third consecutive one-year contract. Under state law, he cannot acquire tenure until after five consecutive annual contracts. In his third year, Barnes was notified that he was not being rehired for the following year. Applicable state law and college rules did not require either a statement of reasons or a hearing, and in fact neither was offered to BarnesWhich of the following, if established, sets forth the strongest constitutional argument Barnes could make to compel the college to furnish him a statement of reasons for the failure to rehire him and an opportunity for a hearing? | [
"There is no evidence that tenured teachers are any more qualified than he is.",
"He leased a home in reliance on an oral promise of reemployment by the college president.",
"He was the only teacher at the college whose contract was not renewed that year.",
"In the expectation of remaining at the college, he had just moved his elderly parents to the town in which the college is located."
] | 1 | jurisprudence |
|
Barnes was hired as an assistant professor of mathematics at Reardon State College and is now in his third consecutive one-year contract. Under state law, he cannot acquire tenure until after five consecutive annual contracts. In his third year, Barnes was notified that he was not being rehired for the following year. Applicable state law and college rules did not require either a statement of reasons or a hearing, and in fact neither was offered to BarnesWhich of the following, if established, most strongly supports the college in refusing to give Barnes a statement of reasons or an opportunity for a hearing? | [
"Barnes' academic performance had been substandard. 19",
"A speech he made that was critical of administration policies violated a college regulation concerning teacher behavior.",
"Barnes worked at the college for less than five years.",
"Barnes could be replaced with a more competent teacher"
] | 2 | jurisprudence |
|
National regulation of predatory wild animals on federal lands is most likely | [
"constitutional, because the protection of wild animals is important to the general welfare. ",
"constitutional, because Congress has authority to make regulations respecting federal property. ",
"unconstitutional, because wild animals as defined by state common law are not federal property. ",
"unconstitutional, because regulation and control of wild animals is retained by the states under the Tenth Amendment."
] | 1 | international_law |
|
By her validly executed will, Sallie devised a certain tract of land to her son, Ben, for his life with remainder to such of Ben's children as should be living at his death, "Provided, however, that no such child of Ben shall mortgage or sell, or attempt to mortgage or sell, his or her interest in the property prior to attaining 25 years of age; and, if any such child of Ben shall violate this provision, then upon such violation his or her interest shall pass to and become the property of the remaining children of Ben then living, share and share alike." Sallie's will included an identical provision for each of her four other children concerning four other tracts of land. The residuary clause of the will gave the residuary estate to Sallie's five children equally. Sallie died and was survived by the five children named in her will and by 11 grandchildren. Several additional grandchildren have since been born. In an action for a declaration of rights, it was claimed that the attempted gifts to Sallie's grandchildren were entirely void and that the interests following the life estates to Sallie's children passed to the children absolutely by the residuary clause. Assuming that the action was properly brought with all necessary parties and with a guardian ad litem appointed to represent the interests of unborn and infant grandchildren, the decision should be that | [
"the attempted gifts to grandchildren are void under the Rule Against Perpetuities.",
"the attempted gifts to grandchildren are void as unlawful restraints on alienation.",
"the provisions concerning grandchildren are valid and will be upheld according to their terms.",
"even if the provisions against sale or mortgage by the grandchildren are void, the remainders to grandchildren are otherwise valid and will be given effect."
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
Seth was an elderly widower who lived alone on a small farm which he owned. Except for the farm, including the house and its furnishings, and the usual items of personal clothing and similar things, Seth owned substantially no property. Under proper management, the farm was capable of producing an adequate family income. Because of the usual deterioration accompanying old age, Seth was unable to do farm work or even to provide for his own personal needs. Seth entered into an oral contract with his nephew, Jim, by which Seth agreed to convey the farm to Jim and Jim agreed to move into the house with Seth, operate the farm, and take care of Seth for the rest of his life. The oral contract was silent as to when the land was to be conveyed. Jim, who lived about 50 miles away where he was operating a small business of his own, terminated his business and moved in with Seth. With the assistance of his wife, Jim gave Seth excellent care until Seth died intestate about five years after the date of the contract. In his final years Seth was confined to his bed and required much personal service of an intimate and arduous sort. Seth was survived by his only son, Sol, who was also Seth's sole heir and next of kin. Sol resided in a distant city and gave his father no attention in his father's final years. Sol showed up for Seth's funeral and demanded that Jim vacate the farm immediately. Upon Jim's refusal to do so, Sol brought an appropriate action for possession. Jim answered by way of a counterclaim to establish Jim's right to possession and title to the farm. 20 If the court's decision is in favor of Jim, it will be because | [
"the land is located in a state where the Statute of Frauds will not be applied if there has been such part performance as will result in an irreparable hardship if the contract is not performed.",
"the land is located in a state where the Statute of Frauds will not be applied if there has been part performance that is by its very nature unequivocally referable to the contract.",
"Sol is precluded by the \"clean hands\" doctrine from enforcing his claim against Jim ",
"the blood relationship of uncle-nephew is sufficient to remove the necessity for any writing to satisfy the Statute of Frauds."
] | 0 | professional_law |
|
The following events took place in a state that does not recognize common law marriage. The state does recognize the common law estate of tenancy by the entirety and has no statute on the subject. Wade Sloan and Mary Isaacs, who were never formally married, lived together over a sevenyear period. During this time Mary identified herself as "Mrs. Sloan" with the knowledge and consent of Wade. Wade and Mary maintained several charge accounts at retail stores under the names "Mr. and Mrs. Wade Sloan," and they filed joint income tax returns as Mr. and Mrs. Sloan. Within this period Wade decided to buy a home. The deed was in proper form and identified the grantees as "Wade Sloan and Mary Sloan his wife, and their heirs and assigns forever as tenants by the entirety." Wade made a down payment of $10,000 and gave a note and mortgage for the unpaid balance. Both Wade and Mary signed the note and mortgage for the unpaid balance. Both Wade and Mary signed the note and mortgage as husband and wife. Wade made the monthly payments as they became due until he and Mary had a disagreement and he abandoned her and the house. Mary then made the payments for three months. She then brought an action against Wade for partition of the land in question. The prayer for partition should be | [
"denied, because a tenant by the entirety has no right to partition ",
"denied, because Wade has absolute title to the property. ",
"granted, because the tenancy by the entirety that was created by the deed was severed when Wade abandoned Mary. ",
"granted, because the estate created by the deed was not a tenancy by the entirety."
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
Sand Company operated an installation for distributing sand and gravel. The installation was adjacent to a residential area. On Sand's grounds there was a chute with polished metal sides for loading sand and gravel into trucks. The trucks being loaded stopped on the public street below the chute. After closing hours, a plywood screen was placed in the chute and the ladder used for inspection was removed to another section of the installation. For several months, however, a number of children, eight to ten years of age, had been playing on Sand's property and the adjoining street after closing hours. The children found the ladder and also discovered that they could remove the plywood screen from the chute and slide down to the street below. Sand knew of this activity. One evening, the children were using the chute as a play device. As an automobile driven by Commuter approached the chute, Ladd, an eight-year-old boy, slid down just in front of the automobile. Commuter applied her brakes, but they suddenly failed, and she hit and injured Ladd. Commuter saw the child in time to have avoided hitting him if her brakes had worked properly. Two days previously, Commuter had taken her car to Garage to have her brakes inspected. Garage inspected the brakes and told her that the brakes were in perfect working order. Claims were asserted on behalf of Ladd by his proper legal representative against Sand, Commuter, and Garage."On Ladd's claim against Sand, will Ladd prevail? | [
"Yes, if Sand could have effectively secured the chute at moderate cost. ",
"Yes, because Sand is strictly liable for harm resulting from an artificial condition on its property. ",
"No, if Commuter had the last clear chance to avoid the injury. ",
"No, because Ladd was a trespasser"
] | 0 | professional_law |
|
Sand Company operated an installation for distributing sand and gravel. The installation was adjacent to a residential area. On Sand's grounds there was a chute with polished metal sides for loading sand and gravel into trucks. The trucks being loaded stopped on the public street below the chute. After closing hours, a plywood screen was placed in the chute and the ladder used for inspection was removed to another section of the installation. For several months, however, a number of children, eight to ten years of age, had been playing on Sand's property and the adjoining street after closing hours. The children found the ladder and also discovered that they could remove the plywood screen from the chute and slide down to the street below. Sand knew of this activity. One evening, the children were using the chute as a play device. As an automobile driven by Commuter approached the chute, Ladd, an eight-year-old boy, slid down just in front of the automobile. Commuter applied her brakes, but they suddenly failed, and she hit and injured Ladd. Commuter saw the child in time to have avoided hitting him if her brakes had worked properly. Two days previously, Commuter had taken her car to Garage to have her brakes inspected. Garage inspected the brakes and told her that the brakes were in perfect working order. Claims were asserted on behalf of Ladd by his proper legal representative against Sand, Commuter, and Garage."On Ladd's claim against Commuter, Commuter's best defense is that | [
"her conduct was not the cause in fact of the harm.",
"she used reasonable care in the maintenance of her brakes.",
"she could not reasonably foresee Ladd's presence in the street.",
"she did not act willfully and wantonl"
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
Driving down a dark road, Defendant accidentally ran over a man. Defendant stopped and found that the victim was dead. Defendant, fearing that he might be held responsible, took the victim's wallet, which contained a substantial amount of money. He removed the identification papers and put the wallet and money back into the victim's pocket. Defendant is not guilty of | [
"larceny, because he took the papers only to prevent identification and not for his own use. ",
"larceny, because he did not take anything from a living victim. ",
"robbery, because he did not take the papers by means of force or putting in fear. ",
"robbery, because he did not take anything of monetary valu"
] | 2 | jurisprudence |
|
Al and Bill are identical twins. Al, angry at David, said, "You'd better stay out of my way. The next time I find you around here, I'll beat you up." Two days later, while in the neighborhood, David saw Bill coming toward him. As Bill came up to David, Bill raised his hand. Thinking Bill was Al and fearing bodily harm, David struck Bill. If Bill asserts a claim against David and David relies on the privilege of self-defense, David will | [
"not prevail, because Bill was not an aggressor. ",
"not prevail unless Bill intended his gesture as a threat.",
"prevail if David honestly believed that Bill would attack him.",
"prevail only if a reasonable person under the circumstances would have believed that Bill would attack him"
] | 3 | jurisprudence |
|
Section 1 of the Vehicle Code of State makes it illegal to cross a street in a central business district other than at a designated crosswalk. Section 2 of the Code prohibits parking any motor vehicle so that it blocks any part of a designated crosswalk. Ped wanted to cross Main Street in the central business district of City, located in State, but a truck parked by Trucker was blocking the designated crosswalk. Ped stepped out into Main Street and carefully walked around the back of the truck. Ped was struck by a motor vehicle negligently operated by Driver."If Ped asserts a claim against Driver, Ped's failure to be in the crosswalk will have which of the following effects? | [
"It is not relevant in determining the right of Ped.",
"It may be considered by the trier of fact on the issue of Driver's liability.",
"It will bar Ped's recovery unless Driver saw Ped in time to avoid the impact.",
"It will bar Ped's recovery as a matter of law"
] | 1 | jurisprudence |
|
Section 1 of the Vehicle Code of State makes it illegal to cross a street in a central business district other than at a designated crosswalk. Section 2 of the Code prohibits parking any motor vehicle so that it blocks any part of a designated crosswalk. Ped wanted to cross Main Street in the central business district of City, located in State, but a truck parked by Trucker was blocking the designated crosswalk. Ped stepped out into Main Street and carefully walked around the back of the truck. Ped was struck by a motor vehicle negligently operated by Driver."If Ped asserts a claim against Trucker, the most likely result is that Ped will | [
"prevail, because Trucker's violation of a state statute makes him strictly liable for all injuries caused thereby. ",
"prevail, because the probable purpose of Section 2 of the Vehicle Code of State was to safeguard pedestrians in using crosswalks. ",
"not prevail, because Ped assumed the risk of injury when he crossed the street outside the crosswalk. ",
"not prevail, because Driver's conduct was the actual cause of Ped's harm"
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
Suspecting that students were using narcotics, the president of a private college arranged for local police to place concealed microphones in several suites of the dormitory. Using these microphones, the college security officers recorded a conversation in which Green, a student, offered to sell marijuana to another student. The tape was turned over to the local police, who played it for a local judge. The judge issued a warrant to search Green's room. The room was searched by police, and marijuana was discovered. Green is charged with unlawful possession of narcotics. At trial, Green's motion to prevent the introduction of the marijuana into evidence will most probably be | [
"denied, because the college president, in loco parentis, had the responsibility of preventing unlawful activity by students under the president's supervision. ",
"denied, because there was probable cause to make the search and police obtained a warrant before commencing the search. ",
"granted, because Green's privacy was unreasonably invaded. ",
"granted, because the electronic surveillance was \"fundamentally unfair."
] | 2 | jurisprudence |
|
Tom had a heart ailment so serious that his doctors had concluded that only a heart transplant could save his life. They therefore arranged to have him flown to Big City to have the operation performed. Dan, Tom's nephew, who stood to inherit from him, poisoned him. The poison produced a reaction which required postponing the journey. The plane on which Tom was to have flown crashed, and all aboard were killed. By the following day, Tom's heart was so weakened by the effects of the poison that he suffered a heart attack and died. If charged with criminal homicide, Dan should be found | [
"guilty.",
"not guilty, because his act did not hasten the deceased's death, but instead prolonged it by one day. ",
"not guilty, because the deceased was already suffering from a fatal illness. ",
"not guilty, because the poison was not the sole cause of deat"
] | 0 | jurisprudence |
|
In which of the following situations is Defendant most likely to be not guilty of the charge made? | [
"Police arrested Thief and recovered goods he had stolen. At the direction of the police, Thief took the goods to Defendant. Defendant, believing the goods to be stolen, purchased them. Defendant is charged with attempting to receive stolen property. ",
"Defendant misrepresented his identity to secure a loan from a bank. The banker was not deceived and refused to grant the loan. Defendant is charged with attempting to obtain property by false pretenses.",
"Believing that state law made it a crime to purchase codeine without a prescription, Defendant purchased, without a prescription, cough syrup containing codeine. Unknown to Defendant, the statute had been repealed and codeine could be legally purchased without a prescription. Defendant is charged with attempting to purchase codeine without a prescription. ",
"Defendant, intending to kill Selma, shot at Selma. Unknown to Defendant, Selma had died of a heart attack minutes before Defendant shot at her. Defendant is charged with attempted murder."
] | 2 | jurisprudence |
|
Potts sued Dobbs on a product liability claim. Louis testified for Potts. On cross-examination, which of the following questions is the trial judge most likely to rule improper? | [
"\"Isn't it a fact that you are Potts' close friend?\" ",
"\"Isn't it true that you are known in the community as Louie the Lush' because of your addiction to alcohol?\" ",
"\"Didn't you fail to report some income on your tax return last year?\" ",
"\"Weren't you convicted, seven years ago in this court, of obtaining money under false pretenses?\""
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
In an action to recover for personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident, Plaintiff calls Bystander to testify. Claiming the privilege against self-incrimination, Bystander refuses to answer a question as to whether she was at the scene of the accident. Plaintiff moves that Bystander be ordered to answer the question. The judge should allow Bystander to remain silent only if | [
"the judge is convinced that she will incriminate herself.",
"there is clear and convincing evidence that she will incriminate herself.",
"there is a preponderance of evidence that she will incriminate herself.",
"the judge believes that there is some reasonable possibility that she will incriminate herself"
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
Blackacre is a three-acre tract of land with a small residence. Olga, the owner of Blackacre, rented it to Terrence at a monthly rental of $200. After Terrence had been in possession of Blackacre for several years, Terrence and Olga orally agreed that Terrence would purchase Blackacre from Olga for the sum of $24,000, payable at the rate of $200 a month for 10 years, and also would pay the real estate taxes and the expenses of insuring and maintaining Blackacre. Olga agreed to give Terrence a deed to Blackacre after five years had passed and $12,000 had been paid on account and to accept from Terrence a note secured by a mortgage for the balance. Terrence continued in possession of Blackacre and performed his obligations as orally agreed. Terrence, without consulting Olga, made improvements for which he paid $1,000. When Terrence had paid $12,000, he tendered a proper note and mortgage to Olga and demanded the delivery of the deed as agreed. Olga did not deny the oral agreement but told Terrence that she had changed her mind and refused to complete the transaction. Terrence then brought an action for specific performance. Olga pleaded the Statute of Frauds as her defense. If Olga wins, it will be because | [
"nothing Terrence could have done would have overcome the original absence of a written agreement.",
"the actions and payments of Terrence are as consistent with his being a tenant as with an oral contract.",
"Terrence did not secure Olga's approval for the improvements that he made.",
"Olga has not received any unconscionable benefit, and therefore Terrence is not entitled to equitable relief."
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
During 1976 a series of arsons, one of which damaged the Humongous Store, occurred in the City of Swelter. In early 1977 Swelter's City Council adopted this resolution: The City will pay $10,000 for the arrest and conviction of anyone guilty of any of the 1976 arsons committed here. The foregoing was telecast by the city's sole television station once daily for one week. Subsequently, Humongous, by a written memorandum to Gimlet, a private detective, proposed to pay Gimlet $200 "for each day's work you actually perform in investigating our fire." Thereafter, in August 1977, the Swelter City Council by resolution repealed its reward offer and caused this resolution to be broadcast once daily for a week over two local radio stations, the local television station having meanwhile ceased operations. In September 1977, a Humongous employee voluntarily confessed to Gimlet to having committed all of the 1976 arsons. Humongous's president thereupon paid Gimlet at the proposed daily rate for his investigation and suggested that Gimlet also claim the city's reward, of which Gimlet had been previously unaware. Gimlet immediately made the claim. In December 1977, as a result of Gimlet's investigation, the Humongous employee was convicted of burning the store. The city, which has no immunity to suit, has since refused to pay Gimlet anything, although he swears that he never heard of the city's repealer before claiming its reward"In which of the following ways could the city reward offer be effectively accepted? | [
"Only by an offeree's return promise to make a reasonable effort to bring about the arrest and conviction of an arsonist within the scope of the offer.",
"Only by an offeree's making the arrest and assisting in the successful conviction of an arsonist within the scope of the offer.",
"By an offeree's supplying information leading to arrest and conviction of an arsonist within the scope of the offer.",
"By an offeree's communication of assent through the same medium (television) used by the city in making its offer."
] | 2 | jurisprudence |
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During 1976 a series of arsons, one of which damaged the Humongous Store, occurred in the City of Swelter. In early 1977 Swelter's City Council adopted this resolution: The City will pay $10,000 for the arrest and conviction of anyone guilty of any of the 1976 arsons committed here. The foregoing was telecast by the city's sole television station once daily for one week. Subsequently, Humongous, by a written memorandum to Gimlet, a private detective, proposed to pay Gimlet $200 "for each day's work you actually perform in investigating our fire." Thereafter, in August 1977, the Swelter City Council by resolution repealed its reward offer and caused this resolution to be broadcast once daily for a week over two local radio stations, the local television station having meanwhile ceased operations. In September 1977, a Humongous employee voluntarily confessed to Gimlet to having committed all of the 1976 arsons. Humongous's president thereupon paid Gimlet at the proposed daily rate for his investigation and suggested that Gimlet also claim the city's reward, of which Gimlet had been previously unaware. Gimlet immediately made the claim. In December 1977, as a result of Gimlet's investigation, the Humongous employee was convicted of burning the store. The city, which has no immunity to suit, has since refused to pay Gimlet anything, although he swears that he never heard of the city's repealer before claiming its reward"With respect to duration, the city's reward offer was terminable | [
"by lapse of time, on December 31 of the year in which it was made. ",
"not by lapse of time, but only by effective revocation. ",
"not by revocation, but only by lapse of a reasonable time. ",
"either by lapse of a reasonable time or earlier by effective revocatio"
] | 3 | jurisprudence |
|
During 1976 a series of arsons, one of which damaged the Humongous Store, occurred in the City of Swelter. In early 1977 Swelter's City Council adopted this resolution: The City will pay $10,000 for the arrest and conviction of anyone guilty of any of the 1976 arsons committed here. The foregoing was telecast by the city's sole television station once daily for one week. Subsequently, Humongous, by a written memorandum to Gimlet, a private detective, proposed to pay Gimlet $200 "for each day's work you actually perform in investigating our fire." Thereafter, in August 1977, the Swelter City Council by resolution repealed its reward offer and caused this resolution to be broadcast once daily for a week over two local radio stations, the local television station having meanwhile ceased operations. In September 1977, a Humongous employee voluntarily confessed to Gimlet to having committed all of the 1976 arsons. Humongous's president thereupon paid Gimlet at the proposed daily rate for his investigation and suggested that Gimlet also claim the city's reward, of which Gimlet had been previously unaware. Gimlet immediately made the claim. In December 1977, as a result of Gimlet's investigation, the Humongous employee was convicted of burning the store. The city, which has no immunity to suit, has since refused to pay Gimlet anything, although he swears that he never heard of the city's repealer before claiming its reward"If the city's reward offer was revocable, revocation could be effectively accomplished only | [
"by publication in the legal notices of a local newspaper.",
"in the same manner as made, i.e., by local telecast at least once daily for one week. ",
"in the same manner as made or by a comparable medium and frequency of publicity.",
"by notice mailed to all residents of the city and all other reasonably identifiable potential offerees"
] | 2 | jurisprudence |
|
During 1976 a series of arsons, one of which damaged the Humongous Store, occurred in the City of Swelter. In early 1977 Swelter's City Council adopted this resolution: The City will pay $10,000 for the arrest and conviction of anyone guilty of any of the 1976 arsons committed here. The foregoing was telecast by the city's sole television station once daily for one week. Subsequently, Humongous, by a written memorandum to Gimlet, a private detective, proposed to pay Gimlet $200 "for each day's work you actually perform in investigating our fire." Thereafter, in August 1977, the Swelter City Council by resolution repealed its reward offer and caused this resolution to be broadcast once daily for a week over two local radio stations, the local television station having meanwhile ceased operations. In September 1977, a Humongous employee voluntarily confessed to Gimlet to having committed all of the 1976 arsons. Humongous's president thereupon paid Gimlet at the proposed daily rate for his investigation and suggested that Gimlet also claim the city's reward, of which Gimlet had been previously unaware. Gimlet immediately made the claim. In December 1977, as a result of Gimlet's investigation, the Humongous employee was convicted of burning the store. The city, which has no immunity to suit, has since refused to pay Gimlet anything, although he swears that he never heard of the city's repealer before claiming its reward"Which of the following best characterizes the relationship between Humongous and Gimlet? | [
"A unilateral offer of employment by Humongous which became irrevocable for a reasonable number of days after Gimlet commenced his investigation of the store's arson.",
"An employment for compensation subject to a condition precedent that Gimlet succeed in his investigation.",
"A series of daily bilateral contracts, Humongous exchanging an express promise to pay the daily rate for Gimlet's implied promise to pursue his investigation with reasonable diligence. ",
"A series of daily unilateral contracts, Humongous exchanging an express promise to pay the daily rate for Gimlet's daily activity of investigating the store's arson"
] | 3 | professional_law |
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During 1976 a series of arsons, one of which damaged the Humongous Store, occurred in the City of Swelter. In early 1977 Swelter's City Council adopted this resolution: The City will pay $10,000 for the arrest and conviction of anyone guilty of any of the 1976 arsons committed here. The foregoing was telecast by the city's sole television station once daily for one week. Subsequently, Humongous, by a written memorandum to Gimlet, a private detective, proposed to pay Gimlet $200 "for each day's work you actually perform in investigating our fire." Thereafter, in August 1977, the Swelter City Council by resolution repealed its reward offer and caused this resolution to be broadcast once daily for a week over two local radio stations, the local television station having meanwhile ceased operations. In September 1977, a Humongous employee voluntarily confessed to Gimlet to having committed all of the 1976 arsons. Humongous's president thereupon paid Gimlet at the proposed daily rate for his investigation and suggested that Gimlet also claim the city's reward, of which Gimlet had been previously unaware. Gimlet immediately made the claim. In December 1977, as a result of Gimlet's investigation, the Humongous employee was convicted of burning the store. The city, which has no immunity to suit, has since refused to pay Gimlet anything, although he swears that he never heard of the city's repealer before claiming its reward"In a suit by Gimlet against the city to recover the $10,000 reward, which of the following, in light of the facts given, most usefully supports Gimlet's claim? | [
"The city was benefited as a result of Gimlet's services.",
"The city's offer was in the nature of a bounty, so that the elements of contract are not essential to the city's liability. ",
"The fact that the city attempted to revoke its offer only a few months after making it demonstrated that the attempted revocation was in bad faith.",
"Although there was no bargained-for exchange between Gimlet and the city, Gimlet's claim for the reward is supported by a moral obligation on the part of the city"
] | 1 | jurisprudence |
|
Husband and Wife, walking on a country road, were frightened by a bull running loose on the road. They climbed over a fence to get onto the adjacent property, owned by Grower. After climbing over the fence, Husband and Wife damaged some of Grower's plants which were near the fence. The fence was posted with a large sign, "No Trespassing." Grower saw Husband and Wife and came toward them with his large watchdog on a long leash. The dog rushed at Wife. Grower had intended only to frighten Husband and Wife, but the leash broke, and before Grower could restrain the dog, the dog bit Wife."If Wife asserts a claim based on battery against Grower, will Wife prevail? | [
"Yes, because Grower intended that the dog frighten Wife. ",
"Yes, because the breaking of the leash establishes liability under res ipsa loquitur. ",
"No, because Wife made an unauthorized entry on Grower's land. ",
"No, because Grower did not intend to cause any harmful contact with Wife"
] | 0 | professional_law |
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Husband and Wife, walking on a country road, were frightened by a bull running loose on the road. They climbed over a fence to get onto the adjacent property, owned by Grower. After climbing over the fence, Husband and Wife damaged some of Grower's plants which were near the fence. The fence was posted with a large sign, "No Trespassing." Grower saw Husband and Wife and came toward them with his large watchdog on a long leash. The dog rushed at Wife. Grower had intended only to frighten Husband and Wife, but the leash broke, and before Grower could restrain the dog, the dog bit Wife.". If Husband asserts a claim based on assault against Grower, will Husband prevail? | [
"Yes, because the landowner did not have a privilege to use excessive force. ",
"Yes, if Husband reasonably believed that the dog might bite him. ",
"No, if the dog did not come in contact with him. ",
"No, if Grower was trying to protect his"
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
Husband and Wife, walking on a country road, were frightened by a bull running loose on the road. They climbed over a fence to get onto the adjacent property, owned by Grower. After climbing over the fence, Husband and Wife damaged some of Grower's plants which were near the fence. The fence was posted with a large sign, "No Trespassing." Grower saw Husband and Wife and came toward them with his large watchdog on a long leash. The dog rushed at Wife. Grower had intended only to frighten Husband and Wife, but the leash broke, and before Grower could restrain the dog, the dog bit Wife."If Grower asserts a claim against Wife and Husband for damage to his plants, will Grower prevail? | [
"Yes, because Wife and Husband entered on his land without permission. ",
"Yes, because Grower had posted his property with a \"No Trespassing\" sign. ",
"No, because Wife and Husband were confronted by an emergency situation. ",
"No, because Grower used excessive force toward Wife and Husban"
] | 0 | professional_law |
|
Ben was the illegitimate, unacknowledged child of Fred. Fred died intestate, leaving neither spouse nor any children other than Ben. The state's law of intestate succession provides that an unacknowledged illegitimate child may not inherit his father's property. The spouse, all other blood relations, and the state are preferred as heirs over the unacknowledged illegitimate child. Ben filed suit in an appropriate court alleging that the state statute barring an illegitimate child from sharing in a parent's estate is invalid, and that he should be declared lawful heir to his father's estate"In challenging the validity of the state statute, Ben's strongest argument would be that | [
"there is no rational basis for preferring as heirs collateral relatives and even the state over unacknowledged children, and therefore the law violates the equal protection clause. ",
"he has been deprived of property without due process because his fundamental right to inherit has been compromised without a compelling state need.",
"it violates the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.",
"it is a denial of procedural due process because it does not give the unacknowledged illegitimate child an opportunity to prove paternity"
] | 0 | jurisprudence |
|
Ben was the illegitimate, unacknowledged child of Fred. Fred died intestate, leaving neither spouse nor any children other than Ben. The state's law of intestate succession provides that an unacknowledged illegitimate child may not inherit his father's property. The spouse, all other blood relations, and the state are preferred as heirs over the unacknowledged illegitimate child. Ben filed suit in an appropriate court alleging that the state statute barring an illegitimate child from sharing in a parent's estate is invalid, and that he should be declared lawful heir to his father's estate"The state's strongest defense of the statute would be that | [
"the authority of a state over the disposition of decedents' property located in the state is not affected by the Constitution of the United States",
"a statute prescribing the means of disposing of the property of intestate decedents does not constitute invidious discrimination.",
"inheritance under intestate succession laws is a privilege, not a right, and therefore is not protected as property under the due process clause. ",
"its interest in promoting family life and in encouraging the formal acknowledgment of paternity gives the law a rational basis."
] | 3 | jurisprudence |
|
Alice conveyed Twinoaks Farm "to Barbara, her heirs and assigns, so long as the premises are used for residential and farm purposes, then to Charles and his heirs and assigns." The jurisdiction in which Twinoaks Farm is located has adopted the common law Rule Against Perpetuities unmodified by statute. As a consequence of the conveyance, Alice's interest in Twinoaks Farm is | [
"nothing.",
"a possibility of reverter.",
"a right of entry for condition broken.",
"a reversion in fee simple absolute"
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
Lawnacre was conveyed to Celeste and Donald by a deed which, in the jurisdiction in which Lawnacre is situated, created a cotenancy in equal shares and with the right of survivorship. The jurisdiction has no statute directly applicable to any of the problems posed. Celeste, by deed, conveyed "my undivided onehalf interest in Lawnacre" to Paul. Celeste has since died. In an appropriate action between Paul and Donald in which title to Lawnacre is at issue, Donald will | [
"prevail, because he is the sole owner of Lawnacre. ",
"prevail if, but only if, the cotenancy created in Celeste and Donald was a tenancy by the entirety. ",
"not prevail if he had knowledge of the conveyance prior to Celeste's death.",
"not prevail, because Paul and Donald own Lawnacre as tenants in common. 26 105. If Grower asserts a claim against Wife and Husband for damage to his plants, will Grower prevail? (A) Yes, because Wife and Husband entered on his land without permission. (B) Yes, because Grower had posted his property with a \"No Trespassing\" sign. (C) No, because Wife and Husband were confronted by an emergency situation. (D) No, because Grower used excessive force toward Wife and Husband. Questions 106 107 are based on the following fact situation. Ben was the illegitimate, unacknowledged child of Fred. Fred died intestate, leaving neither spouse nor any children other than Ben. The state's law of intestate succession provides that an unacknowledged illegitimate child may not inherit his father's property. The spouse, all other blood relations, and the state are preferred as heirs over the unacknowledged illegitimate child. Ben filed suit in an appropriate court alleging that the state statute barring an illegitimate child from sharing in a parent's estate is invalid, and that he should be declared lawful heir to his father's estate. 106. In challenging the validity of the state statute, Ben's strongest argument would be that (A) there is no rational basis for preferring as heirs collateral relatives and even the state over unacknowledged children, and therefore the law violates the equal protection clause. (B) he has been deprived of property without due process because his fundamental right to inherit has been compromised without a compelling state need. (C) it violates the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (D) it is a denial of procedural due process because it does not give the unacknowledged illegitimate child an opportunity to prove paternity. 107. The state's strongest defense of the statute would be that (A) the authority of a state over the disposition of decedents' property located in the state is not affected by the Constitution of the United States. (B) a statute prescribing the means of disposing of the property of intestate decedents does not constitute invidious discrimination. (C) inheritance under intestate succession laws is a privilege, not a right, and therefore is not protected as property under the due process clause. (D) its interest in promoting family life and in encouraging the formal acknowledgment of paternity gives the law a rational basis. 108. Alice conveyed Twinoaks Farm \"to Barbara, her heirs and assigns, so long as the premises are used for residential and farm purposes, then to Charles and his heirs and assigns.\" The jurisdiction in which Twinoaks Farm is located has adopted the common law Rule Against Perpetuities unmodified by statute. As a consequence of the conveyance, Alice's interest in Twinoaks Farm is (A) nothing. (B) a possibility of reverter. (C) a right of entry for condition broken. (D) a reversion in fee simple absolute. 109. Lawnacre was conveyed to Celeste and Donald by a deed which, in the jurisdiction in which Lawnacre is situated, created a cotenancy in equal shares and with the right of survivorship. The jurisdiction has no statute directly applicable to any of the problems posed. Celeste, by deed, conveyed \"my undivided onehalf interest in Lawnacre\" to Paul. Celeste has since died. In an appropriate action between Paul and Donald in which title to Lawnacre is at issue, Donald will (A) prevail, because he is the sole owner of Lawnacre. (B) prevail if, but only if, the cotenancy created in Celeste and Donald was a tenancy by the entirety. (C) not prevail if he had knowledge of the conveyance prior to Celeste's death. (D) not prevail, because Paul and Donald own Lawnacre as tenants in commo"
] | 1 | professional_law |
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Dataset Card for MMLU Auxiliary Trained Set Labelled by e5-mistral-7b-instruct
Dataset Description
Dataset Summary
This dataset, named "MMLU Auxiliary Trained Set Labelled by e5-mistral-7b-instruct," consists of 99,842 examples spanning various subjects. Each instance includes a question, multiple choice options, a subject category, and an answer. The unique aspect of this dataset is the task label for each question, generated by a zero-shot classifier constructed from the intfloat/e5-mistral-7b-instruct model and trained on the auxiliary set of the Massive Multitask Language Understanding (MMLU).
Supported Tasks and Leaderboards
This dataset supports text-generation tasks. It is particularly useful for training and evaluating models on a wide range of subjects using the task labels generated by the zero-shot classifier.
Languages
The dataset is predominantly in English.
Dataset Structure
Data Instances
A typical data instance in this dataset comprises:
question: A textual question or prompt.subject: The subject category of the question.choices: A list of possible answers.answer: The correct answer's index from the choices.task: The task label assigned by the zero-shot classifier.
Data Fields
question: stringsubject: stringchoices: sequence of stringsanswer: int64task: string
Data Splits
- Train Split: 99,842 examples
Dataset Creation
Curation Rationale
The dataset was curated to enhance the diversity and scope of language models in understanding and generating responses across a wide range of subjects. The use of a zero-shot classifier for task labelling introduces a novel approach to categorizing and understanding textual data.
Source Data
The data was sourced from the auxiliary-train set of MMLU and processed to include task labels generated by the intfloat/e5-mistral-7b-instruct model.
Annotations
Annotation process
The task labels were generated automatically by a zero-shot classifier model, specifically intfloat/e5-mistral-7b-instruct.
Who are the annotators?
There were no human annotators; the process was entirely automated using the zero-shot classifier.
Personal and Sensitive Information
The dataset does not contain personal or sensitive information as it is focused on general knowledge questions and subjects.
Considerations for Using the Data
Social Impact of Dataset
This dataset can aid in developing more versatile and knowledgeable language models, potentially impacting various domains like education, research, and AI development.
Discussion of Biases
Given the automated nature of task label generation and diverse subject matter, biases may be minimal but could still exist based on the underlying training data of the zero-shot classifier.
Other Known Limitations
The primary limitation is the reliance on the zero-shot classifier's accuracy for task labeling, which may not always align with human judgment.
Additional Information
Dataset Curators
The dataset was curated by the team involved in the development of mmlu.
Licensing Information
The dataset is available under the Apache-2.0 License.
Citation Information
@misc{mmlu_auxiliary_trained_set, title = {{MMLU Auxiliary Trained Set Labelled by e5-mistral-7b-instruct}}, author = {Kaizhao Liang}, year = {2024}, howpublished = {https://huggingface.co./datasets/kz919/mmlu-auxiliary-train-e5-mistral-7b-instruct}, note = {Accessed: Date of Access}, description = {A dataset of 99,842 examples across various subjects, each including a question, multiple choice options, a subject category, an answer, and a task label generated by a zero-shot classifier constructed from the intfloat/e5-mistral-7b-instruct model.}, license = {Apache-2.0} }
Contact Information
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