elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports · Datasets at Hugging Face

1686438

201909

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Other Load Planning

Hangar / Base

Other Exterior Preflight

Air Carrier

Other / Unknown

1686438

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Ground Personnel; Person Other Person

Pre-flight; Routine Inspection

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Work Refused

Human Factors

Flight from ZZZ-ZZZ1 needs to come [taxi] back because they don't have 15 bags on board that will go around the Hazmat. Did advise my Shift Manager and Dispatch. Ramp had to off load the Hazmat from the flight.

Airline Ground Agent reported advising Shift Manager and Load Planning of configuration error. Ground return to gate; Hazmat removed from flight.

1038187

201209

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Taxi

Helicopter

1.0

Part 135

VFR

Ambulance

Cruise

Class C ZZZ

Tail Rotor Drive Gearbox

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1038187

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Airspace Violation All Types

Y

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Declared Emergency; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action; General Police / Security Involved

Aircraft; Airport

Aircraft

I was flying a patient to the hospital with our base Nurse and a Medic on board. The Tower had cleared me across the large airport located on the direct route to the hospital. While I was over the military portion of the airport ramp; the Tail Rotor Gear Box Chip Light illuminated. I declared an emergency with Tower and requested to land on the ramp immediately under the aircraft; which happened to be a restricted area on the ramp. They gave me permission to land and asked if I needed any assistance. I landed the aircraft without further incident. CFR and Security Forces responded after we landed. We coordinated with a surface Ambulance Company to pick up the patient and they did so with half an hour. I coordinated with the Security Forces for the arrival of our Maintenance crew to repair the aircraft.

The Captain of an air ambulance helicopter flight; overflying a military installation; received a Tail Rotor Gearbox Chip Detector warning; declared an emergency and successfully requested and completed an emergency landing on the military ramp directly beneath them.

1743350

202005

SEA.Airport

WA

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

Part 121

Takeoff / Launch

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion

1743350

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Chart Or Publication

On some of the SEA SID pages there is a 'TAKEOFF OBSTACLE NOTES' line that references a NOTES page we do not have in our Jeppesen documents. MOUNTAIN 1 (MONTN1.SEA) - 'See TAKEOFF OBSTACLE NOTES page (10-3OB1).' We do not have page 10-3OB1; nor are the '10-xxxx' pages for KSEA; which has '20-xxxx' pages.SEATTLE 7 (SEA7.SEA) - 'See TAKEOFF OBSTACLE NOTES page (20-3OB1).' We do not have page 20-3OB1.SUMMA 2 (SUMMA2.SUMMA) - 'See TAKEOFF OBSTACLE NOTES page (10-3OB1).' We do not have page 10-3OB1; nor are the '10-xxxx' pages for KSEA; which has '20-xxxx' pages.Maybe I missed these pages; and if so; where can I find them? Please ammend these TAKEOFF OBSTACLE NOTES or provide the appropriate Jeppesen pages.

Air carrier First Officer could not locate the Obstacle Takeoff Notes for 3 departure procedures from SEA.

1493356

201711

1201-1800

SLC.Airport

UT

1000.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON S56; Tower SLC

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Takeoff / Launch; Initial Climb

SID WEVIC6

Class B SLC

FMS/FMC

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

1493356

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1493357.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft

The phase of flight was just after lift off from runway 16L in KSLC during the WEVIC6 RNAV departure before acceleration altitude (1000 FT AGL). The Pilot Flying; the First Officer; initiated a left turn as the command bars of the Flight Director suggested to do. We both felt immediately that something was wrong because it was not what we had briefed on the ground about the SID. We both glanced at the plate and as we were correcting the heading back to the initial; SLC Tower gave us a heading of 170 with a climb altitude of 10;000 feet to maintain to rejoin the SID after querying if we were proceeding to the HOPTO fix as cleared. In the meantime I did notice on the MFD that a 360 degree loop was present which was linked to the SID with a turn to the left which was not there earlier nor was it showing in the departure page review of the MCDU. After the event and the recovery; we continued on the SID to our filed altitude. When transferred to departure a telephone number was provided to call SLC. I spoke to a gentleman who told me that a similar event had occurred previously and I emphasized the fact that the MCDU (FMS) does not show the 360 loop after takeoff until we were airborne. It seems that this is a recurring event.

During the taxi; the departure was reviewed again [and] everything still looked normal. The takeoff from Runway 16L was normal (NAV was armed before the pushback from the gate). Once airborne everything was still normal; reaching 400 feet NAV was captured. At approximately 900 feet AGL; the flight director showed a left turn. I looked down at the MFD and it was showing a left 360 then to continue the departure.

EMB-175 flight crew reported that the FMS presented incorrect navigation data on the WEVIC6 RNAV departure from KSLC after takeoff.

1156295

201403

0601-1200

LEBL.Airport

FO

500.0

TRACON LEBL

Air Carrier

B757-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Takeoff / Launch

SID GRAUS 3Q

Autoflight System

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface

1156295

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Aircraft; Procedure

Ambiguous

Apparently LEBL ATC called up and wanted to know why we started our turn late on the GRAUS 3Q departure from LEBL. The SID requires a turn at 500 AGL. Unfortunately we are required to turn the autopilot on at 500 AGL per the company's airport operations tailored page so after the autopilot is turned on it takes the jet awhile to figure out where it is and where its going and you're through 1;000 feet AGL before it starts turning. A better way to do this is to hand fly the initial 164 heading THEN turn the autopilot On. Until the company's autopilot requirement is removed we will continue to have problems with this Departure.

A B757 Captain advised that his air carrier's requirement to engage the autopilot/ at 500 AGL is incompatible with the need to comply with restrictions on the GRAUS 3Q RNAV SID out of LEBL.

997790

201203

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Fatigue

997790

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

We ferried an aircraft to a Maintenance Base where Maintenance was to replace the windshield overnight and at 0800 local; we were scheduled to fly the fixed airplane back. I got up at 0530 and started getting ready. Thinking the Maintenance may not be finished I contacted Scheduling. They did say the job was not completed and there was going to be an update at 0800. I called back at 0800 and was told there was now an update at 1000. I called Scheduling several times all day getting the same answer; airplane not finished. During one of my phone calls in the late afternoon; I asked Scheduling if the fixing of the airplane goes well into the night and morning; when do I get my rest? They said I have been on rest all day and do not require rest. I told them I am not getting rest as I am being told to check back with them on one or two hour increments to check the status of the airplane. They then reiterated I was indeed on legal FAA rest. After that conversation; time drove on and I did get the phone call at 2216 that the plane is ready and departure time was to be 2300. The First Officer and I went to the airport and got to the gate at 2310. The airplane was not ready. We stood on the jetway until Maintenance finished and pushed after 0100. At that point I had been awake for almost 20 hours. During the flight I realized I was indeed over tired and should have called in fatigued.

A319 Captain is scheduled to ferry an aircraft at 0800 and plans rest accordingly. The aircraft is not completed on schedule and the Captain is required to keep checking on updates during the day. The crew is finally sent to the airport at 2200 and does not depart until after 0100. Fatigue is reported.

1687959

201909

1801-2400

LGA.Airport

NY

0.0

Night

Ramp LGA

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Class B LGA

Taxiing Light

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 127

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1687959

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Person Ground Personnel; Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Chart Or Publication; Airport

Chart Or Publication

After landing on Runway 04 in night VFR conditions at LGA with an MEL for Taxi light inop; we were cleared to eventually taxi via Bravo to Lane 9 to enter ramp. As we approached Lane 8; there was an aircraft among a line of aircraft departing on [Runway] 31 with it's tail protruding onto Bravo enough to make us stop on Bravo. After a few minutes wait; the Captain decided he might be able to taxi around the tail of the aircraft by using part of Lima. After attempting to do this; we saw that there was not enough room to get back on to Bravo after the aircraft tail; and we were now forced to turn right at Lima on to the ramp. The Taxi light being inoperative; we could not see that in making this turn not only put us on to the ramp early; but it also forced us to taxi across the painted 'island' that physically exists; but is not depicted on the Jeppesen 10-9B chart. The combination of no Taxi light and an improperly marked reference chart; caused us to taxi over the painted 'island'; which after we had done so; was chastised for by the Ramp Controller as he also 'reminded' us that we had been cleared to enter at Lane 9 vice 8. Fortunately; the scolding was all we received and the rest of the taxiing went uneventfully.

Air carrier Non Flying First Officer reported a near taxiway incursion due to Jeppsen 10-9B chart not depicting the island at spot as is depicted on 10-9.

1129965

201311

1201-1800

FWA.Airport

IN

IMC

Thunderstorm; Turbulence

Daylight

Tower FWA

Air Carrier

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

GPS

Final Approach

Class C FWA

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Workload

1129965

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Declared Emergency

Weather

We performed a normal GPS Approach to Runway 23 into FWA. We continued to the missed approach point and went missed. Tower assigned us runway heading and 3;000 FT. Shortly after arriving at the assigned altitude the turbulence increased from moderate chop to extreme turbulence. I called windshear and quickly declared an emergency to Tower. I informed Tower that we were experiencing extreme turbulence and we are unable to maintain altitude. We then requested 5;000 FT when able and advised that a right turn toward west looked like our best option. Tower agreed that west to southwest would place us in better weather. We were then able to exit IMC and discuss our diversion alternatives.

An Air Carrier executed a missed approach on the FWA Runway 23 GPS approach and entered extreme turbulence so an emergency was declared because altitude could not be maintained as the flight turned to exit the embedded cell.

1866854

202201

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Icing; Rain

Temperature - Extreme

Ground ZZZ

Air Carrier

B767-300 and 300 ER

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Other

1866854

Company

Air Carrier

Dispatcher

Dispatch Dispatcher

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Dispatch; Party2 Flight Crew

1867058.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Ground Excursion Taxiway

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Weather

Weather

XA:30 engine start. Taxi instructions [Taxiway] XX; cross Runway XX; left on [Taxiway] XY. I performed a brake check while taxiing on [Taxiway] XX. Brakes were good. Crossed runway and turned left on [Taxiway] XY. Advanced power to accelerate a bit in order to do another brake check on Taxiway XY. I applied the brakes and could feel pressure; but had poor braking action which was very alarming because we just had good action not 5 minutes beforehand. I was left literally speechless...at that point I realized I had left the power up and immediately brought power to idle; released brakes fully and then rapidly applied brakes; to good effect....and then the brakes gave way again to poor braking action. By this time the bend in the taxiway was approaching; I released brakes and reapplied brakes; again to good effect initially; and then nothing....I brought the tiller around to try and make the turn; no effect; Immediately centered the tiller; rev thrust; and accepted the 'off'. I was able to steer with the tiller and gently brought the plane back up onto the taxiway fully. Set the parking brake. Called for help. Towed back to the line.Rapidly deteriorating conditions at the airfield due to a sudden drop in temperatures coupled with freezing precipitation. Taxiways were only chemically treated and the sand truck had not been down Taxiway XY yet; I did not know this at the time we were taxiing. Obviously I was taxiing too fast for conditions.Obviously a slower taxi speed was warranted. Conditions were deteriorating rapidly; I should have confirmed with Ground about the status of ground efforts to treat the runways and taxiways. Slowing down the tempo of operations would have also helped. My FO (First Officer)and I talked about everything that we were doing and we both felt comfortable as we were proceeding. It wasn't until we were on Taxiway XY that things went badly; and quickly.

Aircraft Incident: Flight departed the ramp eastbound on Taxiway XX crossing Runway XX and turned north onto Taxiway XY and proceeded down Taxiway XY to depart from Runway XX just after crossing Taxiway XZ. On [Taxiway] XY the a/c (aircraft) started to slide and the left main gear and nose wheel went off the taxiway into the grass. The crew was able to regain control of the a/c and return it to the taxiway. The a/c was towed back to the gate and MX performed an inspection and found damage to the left wing leading edge slat. Per the Flight Crew: Rapidly deteriorating taxiway conditions due [to] light freezing rain.

B767 flight crew and Dispatcher reported a taxiway excursion due to freezing rain and worsening weather conditions.

1761674

202008

1201-1800

DWH.Airport

TX

VMC

Daylight

Tower DWH

Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Part 91

Other Demo Flight

Initial Approach

Class D DWH

6.0

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Class B DWH

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness

1761674

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Horizontal 300

Y

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

We had just fully configured for landing; crossed the FAF and began our final descent on the RNAV RWY 17R approach into DWH. I was the pilot flying and had a customer pilot in the right seat for a demo flight. Tower called out traffic at our 1 o'clock and 2 miles unknown altitude that was apparently on final then began to turn north 'possibly NORDO'. We called visual and were instructed to continue the approach. Both of us in the cockpit saw Aircraft Y turning what looked to be base to final converging on our path. I broke off the final approach course to the left keeping Aircraft Y in sight and let tower know. Aircraft Y appeared to notice us as it made an abrupt climbing right turn away from us. Once I felt we had enough separation I elected to resume the approach; notified tower; received landing clearance and landed uneventfully. If I had to guess; we came within about 200-300 ft. of Aircraft Y. There is a lot of student traffic and flight schools at DWH. Aircraft Y was most likely a student training flight. Tower was transmitting in the blind to Aircraft Y repeatedly and told them not to circle on final and to look for light gun signals.Exercise heightened awareness when flying to/from airports where there is a lot of student training.

Pilot reported NMAC with another aircraft on approach.

1502361

201712

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 362

Workload; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1502361

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

General None Reported / Taken

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Airport

Procedure

We pushed off the gate the other day and the ATIS was showing 30L for takeoff. Ground gave us a clearance to taxi to Runway 29; since they had closed 30L for maintenance. The First Officer went heads down to get the performance weight and balance for Runway 29 while I taxied following a company plane; and there was also one behind us. We switched to Tower as we approached the runway and told ATC we would need one minute to run a checklist. He then issued us some crazy taxi clearance to basically get out of the way; but the Company behind us keyed in saying they would need a minute for the checklist as well. So Tower said to just hold short and advise ready. We started running the Checklist and Tower started calling us to see if we were ready. I told the First Officer to ignore him and finish reading the checklist. The Tower must have tried to call us four to five times since we were not responding; and it was super distracting. We finally called ready and we felt he was rushing us for no good reason; but I said nothing to him. As we took off; I heard the Company behind us try and explain that there are new procedures that require us to run a checklist stopped when there is a runway change. Tower said the Company plane that took off first didn't have to stop.I see no reason for ATC to have pressured us and rushed us to takeoff; we only needed one minute. But in fact; I ran into the same thing the week before in ZZZ. We taxied to Runway 25 and there was windshear; so we went over to Runway 34 and told the Tower we needed a minute to run the checklist holding short. He did the same thing as [this] Tower did. He kept calling us and making it very difficult to not be distracted.

Boeing 737-800 Captain reported that ATC attempted to rush the takeoff; not giving them enough time to complete their checklist.

1807398

202105

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

VMC

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Turbine Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 218; Flight Crew Total 7448; Flight Crew Type 4535

1807398

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 102; Flight Crew Total 2990; Flight Crew Type 2990

1807399.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft

FL340 approximately 160 nm east northeast of ZZZ the right engine OIL FILTER BYPASS caution annunciation flashed for 3-5 seconds then remained illuminated. We advised ATC with clearance to descend as requested to FL200 (FL223 max single engine altitude capability). Drift down profile initiated while concurrently performing required checklists; balancing fuel as needed as checklist directed engine shutdown. Declared ZZZ as the nearest suitable divert at point in time. Notified dispatch of intent for ZZZ; as well as coordinating communications with the Purser and making a PA to the passengers. Obtained ZZZ ATIS which stated winds variable at 6 kts landing Runway XX. Requested Runway XY for additional runway length. Transitioned from drift down profile to a descent profile when a 3:1 profile attained. As we approached within 15 nm of the field; we were informed that winds were gusting in excess of 20 kts from the south. We coordinated a runway change to XXL and at approximately 10-12 nm north of the field executed a left 360 degree turn descending to the sector MVA as to scrub altitude due to the much shortened landing distance to Runway XXL.Approach and landing was uneventful as was the taxi evolution to the gate for parking. Fire crash and rescue followed and informed that there was no threat heat signature emanating from the landing gear/brake assemblies. Normal passenger deplaning ensued.ATC throughout the evolution was perfect in every respect in aiding the successful uneventful outcome. A discrete frequency was assigned and that was immeasurably valuable.

We were in Cruise and the 'OIL FILTER BYPASS' light illuminated for engine number two. The Captain took the flight controls while I ran the checklist. We ran the checklist which led us to shut down engine number two as the light did not extinguish. We advised ATC and requested a diversion to ZZZ; which was the closest suitable airport. We drifted down to FL 200 while preparing for the 1 engine approach. The Captain notified the flight attendants to prepare the cabin; he also made a calming PA; and we notified dispatch. ATIS for ZZZ winds were variable at six knots so we requested Runway XXL as it is the longest runway. We were less than 10;000 feet and approximately 20 miles out when the tower reported strong gusting winds from the south so [Runway] XYL was the safest option; but we were too high and had to do a left 360 degree [turn] while we prepared for the new approach. We flew a normal single engine approach and landed normally. Fire trucks escorted us to the gate as a precaution. Brake temperatures were normal and not excessive. Passengers deplaned in a normal manner. The Captain and I debriefed each other and then the flight attendants.

B737 flight crew reported an engine inflight shutdown in cruise due to an oil filter bypass issue.

1188223

201407

ZZZ.Airport

US

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

Company

Air Carrier

Dispatcher

Dispatch Dispatcher

Confusion; Training / Qualification

1188223

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Person Dispatch

Routine Inspection

Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors

Company Policy

With the arrival of the new 900s; fuel has been calculated wrong. When I thought numbers were off at first I was brushed aside and was told because the engines are more efficient the numbers would be different. Then another Dispatcher thought the numbers were way off; so he and I started discussing a different release; he involved the 900 Coordinator. Eventually the conclusion was that reserve was incorrect; as it was only calculating one engine versus two. I have dispatched a couple different flights with; at least incorrect reserve numbers and burn numbers for the last week. The 900 Coordinator concluded that it was 'fine' because there has been extra fuel and the engines performance is better than what is planned and the fuel is ok. I feel this was a safety issue as the required takeoff fuel has been wrong this whole time. Basically I thought I was planning for 45 minutes in reserve; but really was off. Due to another Dispatcher's persistence; the 900 Coordinator looked more closely at planning numbers. Calculation errors on IT and or management. Also; a way to manually check computer information is not available. Better training on the 900s might have helped this situation.

CRJ-900 Dispatcher believes that he has been dispatching aircraft with inaccurate FAR fuel loads due to inaccurate burn numbers provided by the company.

1727150

202002

0001-0600

A90.TRACON

NH

4000.0

VMC

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Climb

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

1.0

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1727150

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft RA

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

Had an RA and turned and descended 400 ft. to avoided traffic. Controller sent us on a heading and altitude to fly close to a light twin. [We] banked hard to the left and lost 400 ft.

B737 Captain reported a NMAC with a light twin during climb.

1684226

201909

1201-1800

PVR.Airport

FO

0.0

Temperature - Extreme

Daylight

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

APU

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness

1684226

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

General Maintenance Action

Airport; Aircraft

Aircraft

I was dispatched to PVR with an inoperative APU. I was assured the PVR station would have electric and air available. Dispatch had ZZZ alternate and specifically states do NOT send aircraft to ZZZ without APU so I had amended release for ZZZ1 alternate. The ground power in PVR failed multiple times and ground air was marginally warm. The last time the electric failed was during the boarding process. The ground crew decided to get another power cart. This left us with a dark cabin and running on battery power for several minutes. Do we need to relearn our mistakes from the past? This aircraft NEVER should have been sent to a hot climate with an inoperative APU! I'm very disappointed in Flight Operations for allowing this to happen! DO NOT DISPATCH AIRCRAFT WITH INOPERATIVE APU to HOT AND HUMID climate service!

737 Captain reported aircraft with an inoperative APU was dispatched to a destination that was hot and humid and did not have auxiliary air or electric available.

1323329

201601

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

33000.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

Large Transport

2.0

Part 91

VFR

Test Flight / Demonstration

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Engine Air Indications

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 1000

1323329

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown

Aircraft

Both engines were removed and re-installed during this visit. L ENG had some extra work done on it after discovering leaking fuel pump. On test flight profile at FL300 we got ENG OVHT L EICAS and light. Also L STRUT OH DET 1 and 2 maintenance messages were active.Following [QRH] after EICAS remained active with thrust lever at idle; secured engine; declared emergency; and performed single engine approach and landing. Cleared runway and taxied unassisted back to the ramp. Post flight inspection did not show any signs of external damage.

During test flight left engine EICAS indicated overheats. Engine secured and flight landed single engine.

1430108

201703

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Fuel Distribution System

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 10968; Flight Crew Type 1513

Troubleshooting; Workload; Confusion; Distraction

1430108

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 13215; Flight Crew Type 9223

Workload; Troubleshooting; Distraction; Confusion

1430119.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Procedure; Aircraft

Procedure

Our aircraft was fueled prior to the aircraft being powered by Battery or GPU. After powering up the aircraft and when verifying the fuel load it was noted that all the outer tank fuel had transferred to the inner wing tanks and the wing tank transfer valves had closed properly. This is the incorrect sequence for fueling and due to all the fuel in the inner wing tank; Load Plan (LP) was notified. Load plan issued new CG setting based on the valves being open which we corrected to show valves closed but outer tanks empty and a second LP calculation was sent. The third LP calculation sent had an incorrect passenger count; so a 4th correction was sent and confirmed to be correct. We departed with a delay.

We arrived at the jet in the morning to find no power on the aircraft but fueling had already taken place. All fuel was in the inner tanks (12000 lbs/side); no fuel in the outer tanks; the transfer valves were closed. The Flight Manual (FM) indicates that fueling on battery power only may result in fueling with transfer valves in the open position; however they close when normal power is established. At this point we were debating if we could depart with no fuel in the outer wing tanks. The FM only addresses an imbalance in the outer wing tanks not both empty. However; a section indicates if the fuel transfer valves are open then Load Planning needs to know. We determined that there were no restrictions advised dispatch and load planning. Load planning first sent weight for operating with transfer valves open; then resent weights with transfer valves closed. Each had a different CG. It seems to me that it is not the position of the valve but the quantity of fuel in the outer wing tank that should be the determining factor. Also; after engine start the outer wing tanks began filling and they were both full within approximately 1 hour after takeoff.

A319 flight crew reported a fuel distribution irregularity due to improper fueling procedures. After determining that center of gravity limits were satisfied; the aircraft was dispatched.

1765278

202010

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Distraction

1765278

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Other Person

Taxi

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Human Factors

After a successful CAT III landing; we had crossed the two inboard runways and were taxiing north on taxiway towards gate. The FO; who was on the first trip back after one month off; did the after landing flow and confirmed our gate with operations. I thought we were cleared into the gate via spot; but this was not the case.As we were rounding the corner for spot and passing Aircraft Y that was on the line just south of spot; I confirmed with the FO that we were indeed cleared in as I had been distracted switching from low vis taxi diagrams to normal taxi diagrams as the vis was very good; shutting down the Number 2 engine; in addition to the fact that the FO was a soft spoken person. I only mention this as I wasn't surprised I hadn't heard them confirm our clearance to taxi into the gate as I was busy concentrating on the other threats just discussed.As rampers were visible from spot and were marshaling us into the gate; we pulled into the gate normally. Approximately 20 feet short of our final parking spot ground reminded us to contact ramp. We immediately contacted ramp; who was understandably very unhappy with us and we apologized for our error.Needless to say; I take complete responsibility for this incident and am embarrassed I allowed it to happen. I have learned a couple of things from this incident- first; that I need to be extra vigilant when some crew members don't have a lot of recent experience; secondly; when we had discussed that the ground ops were our biggest threat for this CAT III approach; I need to truly take it to heart and be extra cautious to help mitigate the threats present during this segment of our flight.

Air carrier Captain reported being distracted and not contacting the ramp before taxiing to the gate.

1584038

201810

0601-1200

SFO.Airport

CA

1800.0

Marginal

Daylight

TRACON NCT

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

GPS; FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 28L

Final Approach

Visual Approach; STAR SERFR

Class B SFO

TRACON NCT

Air Carrier

Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

Part 121

IFR

Final Approach

Class B SFO

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 170; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 2628

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1584038

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Weather; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

NOTAMs: Indicate that ILS 28L SFO [unusable]. ATIS indicated ILS 28R approach to Visual 28L and Visual 28R. NORCAL indicated (but never cleared) we should expect TIPTOE 28L. We inquired about the LOC 28L and were told it was operational again. As a back-up to the visual 28L we initially loaded the RNAV (GPS) 28L. We modified the RNAV 28L fixes outside DUYET (FAF) by adding CHERA after SIDBY (we were on the SERFR3 STAR); removed HEMAN from the RNAV 28L and placing a discontinuity between CHERA and DUYET (FAF). The TIPTOE would have us fly heading 310 and before the discontinuity was added the course indicated 305 on the FMC. Throughout the arrival with NORCAL and before NARWL on the SERFR3 we received and complied with four separate descents; 8;000 feet; 6;000 feet and 5;000 feet and finally 3;000 feet. We queried NORCAL before EDDYY of our clearance and were cleared to fly heading 330. We believed we heard at least two aircraft cleared for the ILS 28L and queried NORCAL about the ILS 28L status--we were told it was operational again with re-opening the runway. We backed up the approach with the ILS 28L in the radios and FMC and re-briefed the most pertinent info; especially the go-around procedure if 'push came to shove' as we had heard other aircraft flying the ILS 28L. NORCAL next asked us if we had 'the bridge' and the field in sight; which we did; though truthfully there appeared to be a cloud bank on final. We were cleared visual approach runway 28L.My initial thought was it must be the cloud bank was not obscuring visibility on final or that it was south of the final approach course if NORCAL is clearing aircraft to fly visual approaches as well. Also an A319/320 was cleared for the visual 28R coming in from the east; they had us in sight and were told to maintain visual separation; we also saw the A-319/320 though never called it as he was slightly behind us and generally we fly faster but more importantly did not want to further congest the radio frequency. At about the same time as we were switched to tower; not sure which freq; NORCAL or Tower; we heard a PIREP for tops at 1;700 ft; bases at 700 ft; later it seems pretty apparent that was down final in the cloud bank; as that is pretty much what we experienced. On the tower we stated we had lost sight of the airfield and were on the ILS 28L. We were told to standby. Tower made several instructional calls to other aircraft. The last was a query to the A319/320 maintaining visual separation on us just as we entered the cloud bank. The A319/320 said he had lost us upon entering the cloud bank and tower instructed him to go around with altitude and heading instructions.Here is our quandary; we advised tower we could not see the airfield - and by extension I know the tower could not see us. We informed tower we were on the ILS 28L. I've got another aircraft in very close proximity. Tower has not given us explicit clearance to fly the ILS 28L but is aware. I elected to continue with tower's tacit understanding. I should have pressed the tower for unequivocal clearance. Period. If there was no clearance; given the proximity of other aircraft I should have pressed tower for go-around instructions.

B737 Captain reported losing sight of the airport on a Visual Approach and continued on the ILS Approach without clearance.

1339182

201603

0601-1200

IAH.Airport

TX

2000.0

VMC

Tower IAH

Air Carrier

Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Final Approach

Class B IAH

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Type 1615

Situational Awareness; Confusion

1339182

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

We were set up for 8L; visual conditions. Just before turning base leg we were told to expect 8R. We set up the radios and FMS; ATC vectored us to about 2 miles outside MATON (FAF) we descended to 2;000 feet; which is the crossing altitude at MATON. We were cleared for the visual approach to 8R; it was in sight. Everything was normal; the approach mode was armed. Because we were intercepting both the LOC and GS at the same time very close to MATON; we didn't expect to see the GS signal immediately. At MATON the airplane pitched up rather dramatically to around 15 degrees and the autothrottles pushed up the power and pulled it back; it was very confused. I clicked off the autopilot immediately and pushed the nose over; and then remembered hearing ATC tell someone else much earlier; when we were still planning for 8L; that the GS was out of service on 8R. We recovered the situation but in the process gained almost 500 feet at MATON. Whether it was the right thing to do or not we recovered it and landed. We were certainly configured per the stabilized approach criteria; but our speed was a bit fast; maybe 15 kts fast most of the way down. The landing was in the touchdown zone. So we may not have met stabilized approach criteria; and we definitely gained close to 500 feet coming over the FAF. It is; of course; my job to know that the GS was Out of Service (OTS); but the runway change happened fast. Either way; I've never seen an autopilot behave that way to a lack of GS signal. I did not write it up as I really wasn't sure WHAT to write up; it was just responding to erroneous signals. I rather felt this was my fault as I never should have engaged the GS; but this is our standard procedure for any approach with an ILS; visual or not. It isn't necessarily the responsibility of ATC to remind every single pilot that the GS is OTS either.

Air carrier Captain reported a late runway change resulted in an unstabilized approach to a landing.

1348828

201604

0601-1200

EWR.Airport

NJ

VMC

Daylight

TRACON N90

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Initial Approach

Vectors

Class E N90

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Part 91

Cruise

Class E N90

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1348828

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 0; Vertical 300

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure

Ambiguous

We were being vectored to a visual approach to 22L at EWR. We were just north of the SWEET intersection headed NE. ATC advised us of VFR traffic 500 above us headed SE. We had additional traffic 1000 below about 1 mile off our right side just ahead going NE also. We spotted the traffic and the TCAS showed them only 300 above us. We were given a frequency change. Before checking in with the new controller the TCAS issued an RA with a 'monitor vertical speed' command. The VSI directive was to maintain our VS or descend. The captain held level and we continued to monitor the traffic. I advised the new controller with the check in. The RA cleared and the captain reconnected the autopilot. The minimum distance between us and the traffic was 300 feet. We continued to a visual approach with no further issues.

CRJ900 First Officer reported a TCAS event during vectors to EWR with VFR traffic 500 feet above. TCAS showed the altitude difference to be 300 feet and commanded; 'Monitor Vertical Speed' possibly due to IFR traffic 1000 feet below.

1097488

201306

1201-1800

SEA.Airport

WA

0.0

VMC

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

APU

X

Company

Air Carrier

Dispatcher

Dispatch Dispatcher

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Party1 Dispatch; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

1097488

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

N

Person Dispatch

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Aircraft; MEL

Human Factors

Maintenance deferred the IDG [Integrated Drive Generator] on the aircraft. There was a previous MEL that stated operations could not be dependant on the APU. Looking over the MEL's at the time of deferral I discussed it with the PIC and we did not realize both MEL's would render the plane unairworthy. We amended the release with the IDG deferral and the flight departed. Maintenance did not call to advise us of the deferral of the IDG or discuss the issues having both MEL's on the aircraft at the same time. Looking over the previous MEL it was not clear to me that the APU could not be depended on for operations. The Captain also did not realize that plane should not depart with the deferrals.We need better communication between Maintenance and Dispatch regarding airworthiness. I need to understand clearly what the MEL's are indicating and the performance issues that will arise when more than one deferral is on the aircraft. The MEL should be clearer with possible notes indicating that the IDG's must be operative.

When neither the Dispatcher nor the Captain noted the MELed IDG; combined with a previously noted APU MEL declaring it unable to provide electrical system redundancy; the flight was released with only a single source of electrical AC power.

1598280

201811

0001-0600

PDX.Tower

OR

1300.0

Tower PDX

Air Carrier

Boeing Company Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Other Instrument Approach

Class C PDX

Tower PDX

Personal

Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Other VFR traffic pattern

None

Class E ZSE

Facility PDX.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3.4

Situational Awareness; Distraction

1598280

Conflict Airborne Conflict

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Airport

Airport

Aircraft X was on the RWY 10L ILS at 013 [heading]; and Aircraft Y was indicating 010 [heading] in the left downwind for RWY 08 at VUO which is underneath about a 3 mile final for RWY 10L. I called traffic to both pilots; but Aircraft X got a TCAS RA and started to climb. The pilot of Aircraft X advised that he was going around because he got an RA and was too close to Aircraft Y. On Aircraft X's 2nd approach to the airport; Aircraft Y was in a similar location as Aircraft X approached VUO airport; but was able to land. This all happened because of the close proximity of VUO airport to the final for RWY 10L at PDX. Our arrivals and traffic at VUO are at very similar altitudes in the vicinity of UAO.Three things I would recommend are to:A. Put a control tower at VUO airport.B. Restrict pattern work at VUO airport.C. Close VUO airport.

Portland Tower Controller reported an unsafe situation related to an aircraft inbound to Portland and one inbound to Pearson Field that resulted in an RA and a go around.

1700839

201911

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Night

Air Carrier

A321

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Other Post flight unload

Company

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1700839

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Maintenance

Routine Inspection

General Maintenance Action

Human Factors

We were aircraft on ground in ZZZ for a slide. [Tracking system] spreadsheet this unit was not Hazmat. When told unit had Hazmat stickers on it. When off other units that was have waivers to be able ship. All the information I had to go off stated the unit was not Hazmat. Even the documentation for the unit didn't state it was Hazmat. Asked planning about their list of slides deemed non-Hazmat and they were unable to find. We do have several parts were the interchangeable part is not Hazmat. As the system told me that the slide was not Hazmat it was faster to send our unit then to get a unit from ZZZ1 by several hours. Cause: Due to incorrect info in system items was shipped on [passenger] flight when it should not have been.Suggestions: Always have copy of pick list from [software] with no Hazmat statement.

Maintenance Technician reported Hazmat aircraft part was incorrectly shipped as Non-Hazmat.

1227968

201412

1801-2400

ZAB.ARTCC

NM

37000.0

Center ZAB

Air Carrier

Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZAB

Facility ZAB.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 14

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1227968

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

Aircraft X was southbound from CYLW to MMPR. The aircraft was level at FL370. As per the procedure entering Mazatlan (MMZT) Center; the flight plan was verified; radar services were terminated; and the aircraft was shipped to MMZT Center approximately 15 miles north of Mexican airspace. A couple minutes later I noticed the aircraft still in my airspace climbing without prior coordination. There were no other aircraft in the vicinity so separation was never lost. There has been an increasing problem of MMZT Center climbing or descending aircraft without coordination prior to entering their airspace.A better understanding of procedures and rules between the two nation's air traffic systems would be helpful. There is no way to prevent deviations with MMZT Center. We have tried supervisor to supervisor conversations and the occurrences keep happening more frequently. A formal way to discuss issues and consequences needs to be set up.

ZAB Controller describes transferring communications of one aircraft to Mazatlan Center; and then sees the aircraft climb without coordination from MMZT ARTCC. No separation problems were noted. Controller states there is an increase of these problems with MMZT ARTCC.

1180431

201406

1801-2400

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

IMC

Thunderstorm; Turbulence

Night

Center ZZZ; TRACON ZZZ; Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Hangar / Base

Air Carrier

Dispatcher

Dispatch Dispatcher

Other / Unknown

1180431

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Dispatch; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Procedure; Weather; Human Factors

Human Factors

Flight pushed with 9;000 pounds of fuel on board for OKC. Lift off occurred [almost an hour later]. The planned route was to depart on course southbound to OKC at FL300. The first time I realized there was a problem was when the pilot called me after departure on the ground Maintenance radio. He stated that he was approximately 80 [NM] northwest on the west side of a solid line of thunderstorms and that ATC had vectored him up there. He requested an assessment of his proposed route and the fuel required to fly down the west side of the solid line of thunderstorms and crossing that line near the Nebraska/Kansas border then direct OKC. I told him that I would look at it and get back to him.Following is a series of ACARS messages that continued the conversation: Your current route will take you through thunderstorms over Nebraska about 200 [NM] south of where you are now. I don't like it; so let's figure out how to go around it via PNH near Amarillo. I'll get back to you on fuel quickly. After calculating the required fuel and consulting with the Duty Manager; I sent the following ACARS: YOU DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH FUEL TO GO AROUND THE SOUTH. YOU MAY BE ABLE TO FIND A HOLE ABEAM FSD AND GO EAST TO FOD. After making a brief attempt to get through; the pilot sent me the following ACARS: OKAY...HERES THE PLAN SINCE WERE STUCK ON THE WEST OF THE WEATHER... WE ARE PLANNING PRSNT POS DIR ONL OBH DIR OKC... MAY HAVE TO GO WEST OF OBH A BIT FOR WEATHER. After reviewing his plan I sent the following: I SEE YOUR PLAN BUT THE TOPS ALONG YOUR ROUTE BETWEEN OBH AND OKC ARE FL500 TO FL600. YOU WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO GO VIA LBL TO GET AROUND THE SOUTH END. DO YOU HAVE FUEL FOR THAT? The pilot then replied: WE ARE GOING AROUND THE WEATHER OVER OBH AND PLANNING DIR OKC FROM THERE. I consulted again with Duty Manager and sent the following: CURRENTLY THERE ARE NO VISIBLE HOLES BETWEEN OBH AND OKC. CELL TOPS ARE CURRENTLY FL 450 TO FL600. YOU WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO CONTINUE SW TO LBL THEN DIRCT OKC. DO YOU HAVE ENOUGH FUEL TO GO VIA LBL IF YOU CANNOT GET THROUGH THE CELLS FROM YOUR PRESENT POSITION? The pilot then replied: CURRENTLY IT IS MOSTLY SMOOTH...WE ARE DIRECT OKC AND ARE PLANNING ON DEVIATING TO THE WEST OF SLN THEN BACK DIR OKC EFOA 1.7 It was now apparent that the crew was not accepting reality. Their position at this time was just north of abeam DEN. I sent the following: OK. WHAT IS YOUR CURRENT FOB? 3.3 COPY. I recommended to the Duty Manager that we consider diverting the flight immediately to DEN or COS. Shortly after this last ACARS; the pilot contacted me via radio. He admitted that he would have to go to OKC via LBL and estimated that he would arrive at OKC with minimum fuel of 800 to 1000 pounds. I suggested diverting to DEN or COS but the connection was soon lost. I sent the following: DOES DIRECT COS WORK FOR FUEL? IT IS ALSO CLOSER THAN OKC VIA LBL. They were now approximately 210 NM directly east of COS and 320 NM from OKC via LBL. The operator was still on the line with me and there was no response so I sent the following directive: GO DIRECT COS. REPEAT GO DIRECT COS. PLEASE CONFIRM. Still no response on either the radio or ACARS so the operator suggested that I send the following: PL[EASE] SWITCH FREQUENCY. The pilot then replied: WE ARE NOW GOING DIR LIB DIR OKC WE ARE MIN FUEL. It was now obvious that the pilot was making decisions by ignoring input from me. It was also obvious that I had completely lost operational control of the flight. I resigned myself to change to a supporting role exclusively in an attempt to prevent harm to the passengers on board. I also discussed with Duty Manager the possibility of declaring an emergency for him. I called OKC Tower and advised that the flight was approximately 100 to the northwest with a very low fuel situation. I requested that he expeditiously clear them for a straight-in for the most suitable runway; no unnecessary turns. I also asked him to inform TRACON and Center of the situation. I then sent the following: What is your current FOB? 2.2 ESTIMATED 1.2 ON ARRIVAL TO OKC. WE HAVE THE SPEED PULLED BACK TO .60 Copy. Sounds like a good move to conserve fuel. Thank you.I confirmed with OKC Operations today that early this morning they pumped 1;306 gallons of jet fuel at 6.7 pounds per gallon into the aircraft before departure for a 9;800 pound fuel load. This means that the flight blocked in with approximately 1;050 pounds of fuel; no more than 21 minutes to flame-out. The Captain; called me after arriving at OKC. He was audibly shook up. I asked him to tell me about the flight. He admitted that he allowed ATC to vector him the wrong way to the northwest because he couldn't get a word in edgewise. He also said he decided against COS because when he plugged it into his FMS; it showed him landing with no fuel as opposed to OKC with about 800 to 1;000. This makes no sense because he was over 100 NM closer to direct COS than OKC via LBL at the time I gave him the directive to go direct COS. I chose not to press [the Captain] on why he was so unresponsive to me during the flight. The passengers probably view the crew as heroes. After all; they flew them to OKC safely as they see it. However; the passengers are completely unaware of the mortal danger that the crew put them in. I am grateful that no-one died. It became apparent that the crew was not accepting my input or directives resulting in a complete loss of operational control. 1. The crew failed to assert their priorities with TRACON and haplessly ended up 80 NM in the wrong direction and on the wrong side of the thunderstorm line. 2. The crew failed to come to grips with the reality I was telling them early on about having to go around the south end of the thunderstorms. 3. Operations failed to open a station along the flight's route on the west side of the storms to drop in for a gas-and-go.4. The crew failed to follow my directive to divert to COS. Had they followed my directive; they probably would have landed with just under 2;000 lbs of fuel. A much larger margin for error. I kept the Duty Manager in the loop as well as eliciting input from them about the events and decisions being made. Change the flight operations and Operations culture so that the Company Safety Management System (SMS) is an integral part of everything we do. It should be seamlessly and invisibly systemic in everything we do. Right now; it is the 'other'; something we need to remember to read and do or integrate on an individual basis. It is not yet systemic. Further; choices of safe behavior should be prominently rewarded.

CRJ-200 Dispatcher describes a flight he is controlling that is vectored away from the planned destination (OKC); and winds up on the west side of a line of thunderstorms in a low fuel situation. Despite his best efforts to get the Captain to divert for fuel the flight continues to destination; landing with just 21 minutes of fuel on board.

1562809

201807

1201-1800

ZDV.ARTCC

CO

41000.0

Center ZDV

Citation Latitude (C680A)

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Descent

Center ZDV

Air Carrier

MD-90 Series (DC-9-90) Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Facility ZDV.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 12

Workload; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1562809

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1563224.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Staffing; Procedure; Human Factors

Procedure

I think Sector X was red - or close to it - during our noon push. I was also handling multiple deviations for weather. Our staffing is low; so we did not have a D side at the time to offer me and our supervisor was in recurrent training so we had a CIC on the desk; taking one more controller away from the floor. I felt busy - I descended Aircraft X from FL410 to FL390 to start stepping him down through all my traffic. I think I was busy enough that I don't remember the read back. I continued working on other things and saw conflict alert go off as the Aircraft X pilot asked me if he had traffic. I said yes - and told him I thought I had cleared him to FL390 - he said he answered with FL290. He was a few miles - maybe 3.5 miles lateral from Aircraft Y at FL380. I saw more traffic for him at FL360 so I reissued his clearance to descend to FL370. He repeated FL370.We need better staffing. We shouldn't be allowing controllers or supervisors to attend classes when we are 1 below the minimum safe number of controllers at the start of the shift. If I had a second pair of eyes or ears; maybe they would have caught it. I haven't listened to the FALCON; but I probably did miss his read back. I don't know.

Just north of Moab; Denver Center cleared [our flight] to descend to FL290. We read back FL290. We descended from FL410 and approx. FL378; I noticed traffic on TCAS around FL370. I stopped descent and told ATC we have traffic on TCAS. [There was] no TA/RA. Controller replied 'say altitude'. I replied 'descending thru FL378 for FL290'. Controller replied 'I thought I gave you FL390'. I said 'no you gave us FL290'. Controller replied 'descend and maintain FL370'. I listened to our onboard playback of ATC transmissions and Controller clearly said descend and maintain FL290. When this event occurred; we were within 6 miles and 700 ft of traffic. No RA occurred. Additionally; I stopped the descent when I realized we were descending on the traffic's altitude.

Denver Center Controller and corporate pilot reported a loss of separation due to communication error with pilot and ATC.

1760754

202009

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

21000.0

VMC

Daylight

CLR

Center ZZZ

Embraer Phenom 100

2.0

IFR

Passenger

GPS; FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Hydraulic System

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

First Officer

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 1050; Flight Crew Type 100

1760754

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Speed All Types

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft

My captain and I were enroute on our IFR flight plan when we experienced a total hydraulic failure. It started when we began to lose pressure in the hydraulic system; and then ran the required QRH procedure. This fixed the problem for only a few moments before a 0 psi indication was observed. Our landing gear deployed because the hydraulic pressure could not keep it up in the gear wells. It was after this that we could not maintain our cruise speed; and our fuel required us to divert as well [as] look for the longest runway possible to stop the aircraft because of severely limited braking. Our expectation was to have only 6 brake applications from the emergency brake accumulator per the manufacturer and our training. We told Center that we needed to divert for both braking and fuel reasons; and they asked if we [would need assistance] because we might be shutting down the runway due to limited braking and might need to be towed off. We then [requested priority handling] and diverted to ZZZ and landed. Upon landing; we cleared the runway under our own power and the brakes had some pressure left. We stopped on the taxiway and were inspected and chocked by ZZZ operations.After no damage was observed to the aircraft and all individuals were deemed safe and not in need of medical attention; we were able to taxi under our own power. We then talked to our company operations and grounded the aircraft for maintenance. My captain and I debriefed the situation.Always be learning and applying the SOP's; and take your time. My Captain and I did all those things and conferred with one another on the best course of action; and determined because of limited fuel and range (even though we took off with well over the legal minimum); as a result of the gear deploying; we made the best and the SAFEST decision possible in the moment; and had the best outcome. Safety is ALWAYS the only priority.A good pilot is always learning!

EMB-500 First Officer reported a total hydraulic failure.

1029058

201208

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Night

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Physiological - Other

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch

1029058

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Y

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy

Company Policy

Inbound aircraft to make up our flight had a companion dog that vomited and defecated multiple times. Stench quickly traveled throughout aircraft. Dog defecated in jetway as it was deplaning. Cleaners attempted to disinfect and cleanup the problem. When my crew boarded the aircraft; the fumes from the cleaning fluid were very intense. Flight Attendant thought she was getting a headache from the odors. My evaluation of the situation was that the fumes were way too strong to allow passenger operations. The cleaners had used a cleaning product called 'Aero Clean X-200.' The label on the bottle says in part; 'Vapors may cause central nervous system depression; headache; and dizziness...' I had to refuse the airplane for passenger operations. While all along the company kept lying to me saying there were no other aircraft available in a maintenance base and major hub; at night with multiple overnight airplanes. When I refused the airplane; amazingly there was another airplane available. Unnecessary 2 hour delay.

A Companion Dog on an A320 became ill and loose boweled; requiring a potentially toxic cleaning agent to clean up. The crew refused aircraft for flight because of fumes.

993210

201202

1801-2400

KOA.Airport

HI

0.0

TRACON HCF

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Initial Climb

None

Class E HCF

Facility HCF.TRACON

Government

Approach; Departure

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

993210

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

General None Reported / Taken

Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

KOA Tower called me for a release on a B737. I issued a departure clearance of 'Depart heading 350 until joining V11; released your discretion Air Carrier...'. The Air Carrier aircraft was inbound on the ILS17 Approach. The KOA Tower Controller then questioned this clearance by asking if I really wanted to send the departing aircraft at the inbound aircraft. I replied that 'released your discretion' meant that they needed to provide visual separation or the pilots had to provide visual separation between the aircraft or else don't release the departure until the arriving aircraft has landed. The heading of 350 insured IFR separation would be provided after the use of visual separation to protect for the missed approach. The LOA with KOA allows KOA Tower to provide visual separation between referenced aircraft; in this case the B737 and the other Air Carrier. When the B737 checked in on my frequency the aircraft was about six miles south of the airport out of 3;500 FT. When I asked the pilot why he was so far south he replied that the Tower had issued him Runway (17) heading and then; just before being switched; was issued a heading of 350 leaving 3;000 FT to join V11. By this time the aircraft was already past the point where it could join the airway and had now become a factor with another aircraft inbound to KOA from the northwest as well as was crossing over the missed approach fix for the ILS 17 Approach. KOA Tower must be staffed with competent controllers. I would recommend that the FAA take over the Tower and make the airspace surrounding the Tower Class Charlie airspace. This airport handles way too many air carriers and passengers; as well as a mix of military and general aviation aircraft; to remain a Contract VFR Tower

HCF Controller expressed concern regarding the competance of the 'Contract ATC Controllers' at KOA Tower; citing a recent example of a clearance issued that was not understood.

1775552

202012

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

230.0

18.0

7000.0

VMC

10

Daylight

12000

Personal

Bonanza 33

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Descent

Direct; Visual Approach

Class E ZZZ

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Other ATP

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 24000; Flight Crew Type 500

1775552

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 100; Vertical 0

Automation Aircraft TA

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Human Factors

In descent while returning to land at ZZZ from west of the airport and north of the Denver Class B airspace; I received a TCAS warning very close to our aircraft. I made a rapid and aggressive descending turn away from the threat aircraft in the direction of the Class B airspace (the only way that I could turn). We were near; but below the ceiling of the Class B segment and did not enter it. We never did see the other aircraft. The remainder of approach and landing were normal.

GA pilot reported taking evasive action in response to a TCAS warning near DEN Class B airspace.

1646868

201905

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

6000.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

FBO

Duchess 76

2.0

Part 91

Training

Class D ZZZ

Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Pilot Not Flying; Instructor

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Situational Awareness

1646868

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown

Aircraft

I was flying with my student in [a] BE-76 for a check ride review flight. We were doing the usual flight training in [the] training area at 6000 feet; and after all maneuvers we started to do single engine operations - Single engine failure in air and restart. But after the single engine failure; when we tried to restart the left engine we were unable to restart the left engine using the appropriate methods - using [both with] accumulator and without accumulator methods as per checklist. So we landed [at a nearby airport]. When we were [on the] ground after [the] safe landing we tried to start the left engine and it started after couple of tries.

BE76 Instructor Pilot reported diverting to an alternate airport after the left engine failed to restart following an inflight shut down for training.

1275371

201507

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

800.0

VMC

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb; Takeoff / Launch

Class B ZZZ

Electrical Power

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1275371

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 17000; Flight Crew Type 8000

1275376.0

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Aircraft

Shortly after takeoff on Runway XXR in ZZZ we (CA/FO/JS) smelled a strong odor; presumably an electrical odor. The FA called the flight deck and told the CA that the smell was in the cabin as well. The CA immediately [contacted ATC] and we were given immediate vectors to return to Runway XYR in ZZZ. As the pilot flying; I was vectored to a right downwind for Runway XYR and we leveled off at 3000 FT. FA's were briefed; a PA was made to the passengers and ATC was notified. The QRH was referenced and were back on the ground within 10 minutes. After landing we taxied off of Runway XYR and came to a stop so fire rescue could examine the aircraft. No discrepancies were noticed by ARF and we proceeded to the gate without further incident.

In the high speed portion of the takeoff roll I began to notice a distinct odor unlike any of the typical odors normally encountered. At 500 FT the FO and JS rider also mentioned a strong odor. At about 1000 FT; the FA called the cockpit and informed me that they had a very strong 'electrical' odor throughout the cabin. At that point I [contacted] tower and we received vectors back to ZZZ for a visual approach and landing on Runway XYR. The FO continued to fly the A/C and also handled ATC communications. I communicated with the FA's and made a PA announcement to the passengers informing them of our situation. We conducted the QRH procedure for SMOKE; FIRE; OR FUMES. (We elected to not don the O2 masks but to take them out of the box as the fumes seemed to be manageable in the cockpit and visibility was not impaired.) After landing the CFR conducted a visual inspection of the aircraft; no issues were noted so we taxied to E3. Maintenance requested that we deplane the aircraft so that they could troubleshoot the problem.

B737 crew noticed an electrical burning smell immediately after takeoff. Cabin crew also detected the fumes. Crew returned to departure airport.

1753200

202007

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

1000.0

VMC

Daylight

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Initial Climb

Class G ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 14; Flight Crew Total 1520; Flight Crew Type 230

Confusion

1753200

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

ZZZ airport is currently undergoing major construction; with numerous runway and taxiway closures. ZZZ has multiple intersecting runways and a high historical instance of runway incursions. Additionally; Tower hours of operation and staffing are reduced due to COVID-19. Tower closes at XA:00 local time; fairly early for summer operations. With tower closed airspace reverts from Class D to Class G. ZZZ has 4 runways XXL/R; YYL/R; ZZL/R and AAL/R. Runways XX which are the prevailing wind runways are right pattern for XXR and left pattern for XXL. There is a note in the Chart Supplement that closes all runways except YYL / XXR when Tower closed and changes the pattern direction from right traffic to left traffic for Runway XXR.On the day of the flight I spent extra time reviewing NOTAMs for the airport given the construction and Tower closure (Class G operations were in effect during my flight a little after XA00). I was planning a short flight; but spent a good bit of time familiarizing myself with alternative taxi routes; self announce procedures; no-tower operations; etc. The startup; taxi; runup and takeoff from XXR were normal. Unfortunately I had missed the note about the change of pattern direction and planned a right downwind departure more in line with my departure direction (vs. left pattern operations prescribed after Tower closure). There were no other aircraft in the pattern and the departure was normal otherwise. Upon return for landing; there was one additional aircraft in the pattern using left traffic for XXR. I queried them about the pattern direction and they mentioned the left traffic for XXR after Tower closure. I made several landings in the pattern using left traffic on XXR and the remainder of the flight; landing and taxi back was normal.After shut down; I pulled out the chart supplement and found the note about the left traffic after Tower closure. Contributing to my error were the following:*Complacency with home airport. I have been flying out of this airport and instructing for XY+years and thus felt familiar with all the notes about the airport.*Lack of recency with non-towered operations at the home airport. It had been probably X+ years since conducting night operations at the field when the Tower was closed and the single runway and revised traffic pattern were in effect. *Delays in my arrival to the airport before the flight and aircraft departure created an expectation bias that I was going to conduct the flight during tower operating hours and thus prevented me from thinking through all the implications of non-towered operations in the middle of the day. Lessons learned.*Conduct a periodic review of home airport chart supplement for any possible changes over the years or just as a refresher. This goes for airports that I often visit and feel comfortable.*Add a thorough review of the chart supplement notes in addition to NOTAMS when operations are 'out of the ordinary' *Include chart supplement in the loop with foreflight review. The change of pattern direction note is either not in foreflight or not easily found.

Pilot reported flying the approach traffic pattern in the wrong direction after Tower had closed.

1059611

201301

1201-1800

IAH.Airport

TX

400.0

TRACON I90

Personal

Bonanza 35

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Descent

Class B IAH

Facility I90.TRACON

Government

Approach; Departure

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Situational Awareness

1059611

ATC Issue All Types

Person Air Traffic Control

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

Low IFR conditions in the area with a reported ceiling of 400 FT OVC at IAH and we were running simultaneous operations to Runways 8L and 8R. A BE35 was cleared for an ILS approach to Runway 8L and was talking to the Local North Controller. Traffic Management had coordinated an airport flow change and we were to begin landing to the west (26R/26L.) When the BE35 was very short final and leaving 400 FT the Tower Controller 'swung' the localizer creating for a potentially deadly situation. The Bonanza lost all points of reference for navigation at a very critical phase of flight. The aircraft was IMC at the time and had to abandon the approach. This is like throwing a blindfold on the pilot. The pilot then began to drift right of course in the direction of an air carrier departure off of Runway 9. There were also incredibly strong winds in the area associated with convective activity. Provide re-training.

I90 Controller described an unsafe event when; prior to an anticipated runway configuration change; the Tower changed the localizer with an aircraft on the ILS; on short final and in IMC conditions.

1001364

201203

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

10000.0

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

Climb

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1001364

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1001367.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

On climb out; passing thru 10;000 FT flight attendants informed us that there was smoke in the aft cabin; advised ATC and returned to departure airport. The Captain secured the galley power and was in constant communication with the flight attendants. On down wind he informed me that the flight attendants were reporting that the smoke was dissipating. We set up for an overweight landing; (132;200 LBS). Proceeded uneventfully to the gate and were met by the Medics (asthma patient) and Fire/Rescue.

Flight attendant's reported smoke in cabin about 10 minutes into climbout; we chose to get turned back and did so with ATC clearance. Immediately shut off galley power and smoke was reported as clearing and now the new problem was a passenger having an asthma attack and being administered oxygen. Our guess was breathing problems from the smoke/fumes. Got right into the airport First Officer flew a perfect approach to a very smooth landing. Medics; Maintenance; and Fire Team at gate right away; everyone was fine and we got a new plane and headed back out. Overweight landing by about 2;000 LBS but did not choose to loiter with a passenger in need of medical attention.

MD80 flight crew is informed of smoke in the aft cabin passing 10;000 FT and requests a return to the departure airport. Galley power is secured and smoke begins dissipating quickly. Crew is able to quickly land and taxi to the gate where paramedics are waiting to aid a passenger in distress.

1458728

201706

0601-1200

MMID.ARTCC

FO

36000.0

IMC

Turbulence

Daylight

Center MMID

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Type 2857

1458728

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Type 10193

1458729.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Weather

Before leaving the hotel; I tried to download the flight plan and route. I was unsuccessful as there was no paperwork loaded in Sabre. The CA was also trying on the way to the airport but could not get a data/internet connection on his iPad. We discussed this on the van and decided we would ask ops to print a copy. At some point; he was locked out of his iPad and needed to have it reset by IT. The CA requested a printed copy of the paperwork from ops personnel. I tried unsuccessfully to download the flight plan. I also was unable to obtain a data connection through any of the carriers available to my iPad in MPTO. Once on the airplane; the CA used a phone from our maintenance technician to have his iPad unlocked and was able to download the flight plan and Jeppesen Pro route. I continued to set up the cockpit for our departure as the CA spoke with the flight attendants. I was still not getting any data connection so the CA air dropped the flight plan and paperwork as well as the Jeppesen pro data/route to my iPad. At some point prior to this; station personnel delivered one copy of the flight paperwork to the aircraft. I used this to enter into the FMC and obtain preliminary takeoff data. The CA briefed the departure and we ran the appropriate checklists. The next hour of the flight was ops normal with just some light chop on the climb. Once at cruise for 20-30 mins; we turned off the seat belt sign and I made an announcement about our time enroute; keeping the aisles clear for the flight attendants and keeping your seatbelt on at cruise even when the sign is off in the event we encounter any unforecasted turbulence. A short time later; we encountered some light chop so we turned the seatbelt sign back on and an announcement was made. We began deviations to the east just prior to SIGMA. We were in mostly clear air with some high thin cirrus and very light chop at this point. I had my radar on 160 miles and the CA was on 80 miles. We could see weather on both sides of us about 20-30 or so miles either side. No red; mostly green and a few yellow returns. At some point; Merida Center cleared us direct KELHI once we were done deviating. The weather was turning further east as we progressed north and looked like it may be closing so we decided to head back towards KELHI. There appeared to be an opening in the weather on both the radar and visually out the window as we saw blue sky. We decided this would be the safest route to pass by the weather so we proceeded in that direction. We called the flight attendants and asked them to be seated and made a PA to the passengers to remain seated. I also heard the FA's making an announcement which I assume was in Spanish asking the passengers to remain seated. Although we asked the flight attendants to remain seated; I heard noises from the galley and what sounded like the bathroom door opening and closing. I almost said something to the Captain but their noncompliance with us asking them to remain seated happens so often that I didn't. As we continued our left turn; there was nothing on the radar and although we were IMC; it was very thin and it appeared visually that there were no storms in front or to the sides of us. A short time into this; we encountered severe turbulence. The aircraft rolled right and we lost approximately 400 feet of altitude. The autopilot turned off; there was some buffeting and the aural autopilot disconnect warning sounded as well as the 'bank angle' warning and altitude chime. The Captain took manual control of the aircraft and rolled the wings level and stopped the descent. We stabilized the aircraft; turned both ignitors on and reengaged the autopilot. I made a PA to the flight attendants to be seated immediately. After the CA and I talked about the current aircraft state; autopilot on; roll and vertical mode selected on the MCP and he called back to check on the flight attendants. We asked them to check on the passengers and report back to us. At this point; we were heading direct to KELHI. The FAs told us there were 3 passengers and one FA with suspected injuries. There was a Doctor on board who assisted in assessing the passengers. I sent an ACARS to dispatch advising them of the turbulence encounter. I took PF duties and ATC communication and the CA attempted to get a phone patch to dispatch and medlink. I advised Merida center of the turbulence. I relayed some additional info to dispatch through ACARS. The CA was having a difficult time communicating on ARINC. The Doctor on board and the one on Medlink didn't indicate a diversion was needed. The Captain and I discussed and proceeded on. Once past KELHI and in contact with Houston Center; I advised them of the turbulence encounter and asked for priority handling into ZZZ. They immediately cleared us direct and we continued. The CA and I discussed and complied with all the items listed in the QRH Turbulence guide and entered the pertinent codes into ACARS for a Maintenance write up. We landed in ZZZ and taxied to the gate where we were met by CFR and representatives from [company].

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737 flight crew reported severe turbulence with injuries 80 NM east of MMUN at FL360.

1448770

201705

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

4000.0

VMC

Windshear; Turbulence; 10

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Corporate

Gulfstream IV / G350 / G450

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

GPS

Initial Approach

Vectors

Class B ZZZ

Flight Director

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 10750; Flight Crew Type 2000

1448770

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 7200; Flight Crew Type 4000

1448783.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft; Weather

Aircraft

We encountered moderate turbulence and subsequent loss of the flight director; auto-throttles; autopilot; and yaw damp as well as electric trim. Additionally; we lost the use of both display controllers; and the flight guidance panel which prevented us from inputting data in the altitude select window; heading window and the speed window. We were unable to select our assigned heading or altitudes for our PFDs; and we could not input any data to perform an ILS approach. The aircraft was being flown on autopilot at the time of the encounter with the moderate turbulence. By the time we realized we had lost the autopilot and electric trim; we had descended 500 ft. below our assigned altitude. We reverted to manual trim; and returned to our assigned altitude. At the same time this was happening; we alerted ATC to our problem and requested priority assistance since we were unsure of the nature of the failures at that time; and were concerned we could possibly experience a total loss of flight instrumentation. After a few minutes; we were able to get all systems back online and advised ATC we were back to normal flight operations. We completed the flight without further incident.This appeared to be a mechanical failure possibly induced by moderate turbulence.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Gulfstream 400 flight crew reported the loss and recovery of the autopilot and multiple systems during moderate turbulence.

1162469

201404

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Other / Unknown; Time Pressure

1162469

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Company Policy; Human Factors

Human Factors

As we were pulling into the gate; the ground crew displayed the stop signal. I was going; honestly; too fast as I was anxious about the flight blocking-in on time and there was about 1 minute until we were going to be late. I was comfortable to at least cross the service road and then stop as our gate area appeared to be clear. There was a catering box truck to our left in the adjacent gate area. Suddenly; a [catering] car came around the front of the truck and was an immediate threat for a collision. I hit the brakes quite hard. I made an erroneous PA announcement to the passengers to please remain seated as the ramp agents weren't ready to accept the aircraft. What I should have said was that a car had pulled out in front of us; and was the reason for the abrupt stop. I was quite bothered by this and when we were marshalled to continue; I pushed the sole running engine's thrust lever up to the stop. First Officer immediately reached over and pulled the thrust lever back toward idle. No injuries or complaints were reported by the flight attendants or the gate agent after all of the passengers had de-planed. I suggest following the marshaller's instructions; limiting taxi speed; and not over-reacting to conflicts. Kudos to the First Officer for helping to keep things in check in a moment of frustration.

CRJ-900 Captain reports a near collision with a vehicle while taxiing rapidly to his gate for an on time arrival. Hard braking is required to avoid the vehicle and when cleared to taxi in by the marshall full thrust is used momentarily; but quickly retarded by the First Officer.

1455864

201706

DAL.Tower

TX

3000.0

VMC

Tower DAL

Air Carrier

Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class B DAL

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Captain

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 256

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1455864

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors; Aircraft; Procedure

Procedure

We were on downwind at 3000 feet when ATC cleared us for the Visual Approach. We replied ''Aircraft X cleared for the Visual 13L.' ATC then came back and said 'Aircraft X; are you still at 3000 feet'? We said 'No; you cleared us for the visual.' She said 'that was for Aircraft Y'. Well; I heard Aircraft X; my First Officer heard Aircraft X; and Aircraft Y didn't respond when ATC cleared us for the approach! So ATC said 'I'm sorry for the confusion; Aircraft Y is cleared for the visual.' Right after that ATC RECLEARED us for the Visual Approach behind Company aircraft. ATC again apologized and we made an uneventful landing.

Air carrier flight crew reported ATC issued a clearance for the Visual Approach but then indicated it was intended for an aircraft with similar callsign.

1094768

201306

1801-2400

LFPG.TRACON

FO

12000.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON LFPG

Air Carrier

MD-11

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Climb

Other OPALE 3A

FMS/FMC

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion

1094768

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion

1095362.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Chart Or Publication; Aircraft; Human Factors

Ambiguous

We were issued a clearance thru ACARS 'RWY 27L VIA OPALE 3A...' As PF I loaded Runway 27L and the OPALE 3A departure into the FMS. I verified the waypoints in the FMS comparing the data to the OPALE 3A SID chart. I also verified the waypoints against the Dispatch Release just as an additional back-up. I then briefed the ACARS CLNC with the First Officer and finally did a complete briefing of the departure procedure reading from the FMS while the First Officer verified all fixes and data looking at the chart. At no time was any error noted at all. After engine start I engaged NAV and verified the FCP was still in NAV Mode in conjunction with the Before Takeoff Checklist once cleared onto the runway for takeoff. When LFPG Tower cleared us for takeoff on 27L they asked to verify that we had loaded the OPALE 3A departure. I looked at the FMS and saw - again - that the OPALE 3A was in fact loaded in the FMS and the First Officer acknowledged this fact. Takeoff was normal - NADP 1 using NAV MODE from the start of takeoff. As I approached PG270 (the first fix) I selected IAS HOLD so as to achieve a better turn radius for the turn at that fix; staying around 180 KIAS. After switching to Departure Control; the Controller told us to climb to FL140 (I think) and asked us to expedite thru FL120. Once past PG270 and as we were approaching PG276 (the next waypoint) the Controller asked us again to verify the departure we were flying. I again looked at the FMS and verified that we were still on the OPALE 3A and re-verified that I was in NAV. At this point the Controller told us that we were 1.5 miles from our course! He quoted a radial that we weren't tracking and we advised him of the waypoints we were using for the RNAV departure (again exactly what the OPALE 3A called for). At NO TIME were we more that .2 miles from the magenta line according to our data tag on the NAV Display and at no time were we not in NAV during the entire departure phase. The Controller did not seem upset but he was adamant that we were well off course and suggested that perhaps we were not properly navigating and/or that our speed was too fast. This discrepancy is really a mystery. My First Officer and I reviewed everything again once we were in cruise and just simply can't come up with an explanation other that the Controller was wrong or;(much less likely) that the chart and FMS database are not correct.

We were cleared for takeoff on Runway 27L. We were cleared on the OPALE 1A [3A]. Not only did the Captain put in the check point from the release; but we checked the way points per SOP. When the [clearance] came over the ACARS; we then checked the points again on the departure. We were cleared for takeoff on Runway 27L. Just before we switched to Departure; DeGualle Tower reminded us we were on the OPALE 1A [3A] departure. I thought to myself that was a strange time to 'remind' us of the departure. I read back the clearance and switched frequency. We switched to departure and we were told to expedite through FL120. The Captain did a speed hold of around 170-180 KIAS and kept the slats out. When we made our first turn on the SID (just past PH276) [PG270] DeGualle Departure came on and told us we were 1.5 miles off course. I looked at my display and it showed L 0.1 which is normal on the turn. When we said we were showing on course; DeGualle came back and started reading the radials of the CGN [BT] VOR that we 'missed'. We reminded DeGualle that we were on the RNAV departure. Again the speed was quite slow so there is no way we were off course. The airplane was on the magenta line. The Captain then jumped on the radio. He read the SID directly to departure and read each way point to them on the frequency 'OPALE 1A [3A] Departure; PH276 [PG276]; Beauvais (BVS); OPALE.' It is a very simple departure. We were NEVER off course. As soon as the Captain read the points back; departure said it was for our 'information' only and no problem. They were never upset and acted like it was no big deal - only for our information. They also said it looks as if we were 'now correcting back on course'. I was like; what? We were still on the magenta line and never off nor were we trying to correct?? That's when I really started thinking they were screwing up. We were not correcting - we were never off course. I have to admit that this was one of the weirdest things I have ever been involved in. A minute or two later DeGualle said we were on course and call London Control. I am 100% confident that we were never off course unless the FMS database was incorrect.

MD11 flight crew departing LFPG on the Oaple 3A RNAV departure is informed by ATC that they are off course. The crew can detect no errors and their map display shows they are on course.

1793199

202103

1801-2400

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

38000.0

VMC

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Center ZZZ

Bombardier Learjet Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

IFR

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Class A ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1793199

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1793200.0

Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Horizontal 0; Vertical 200

N

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Human Factors

While cruising at FL380; ATC advised us of traffic approaching us at 10 miles; opposite direction; FL370. My First Officer visually verified the traffic; but we did not relay this to ATC. Within 40 seconds from being notified we initially received a (TA) Traffic Advisory then immediately followed by an (RA) Resolution Advisory. My FO (First Officer) immediately disengaged the autopilot and flew the RA commands. As PM (Pilot Monitoring) I backed up my FO due to the high altitude deviation and climb. I immediately then advised ATC of our situation and actions. We initially climbed 700-800 feet before the RA commands stopped. Once stabilized and safe; we descended back to our cruise altitude of FL380. At one point the RA indicated the Learjet was within 200 feet of our aircraft. There was no communication from the [Learjet] or ATC concerning their deviation from assigned altitude.From what we can determine; the Learjet vacated its assigned altitude of [Flight Level] 370 and continued to climb. At no point did we hear any communications from them or ATC speaking to them. They could have been with another controller/Center frequency. Clearly; we were RVSM airspace.[Suggest] the Learjet not vacating its assigned altitude and ATC advising the Lear of [their] deviation would correct this situation. There was no acknowledgment or explanation to us for the deviation or error.

In cruise at FL380; ATC advised us of traffic at 1o'clock and 10 miles. I was able to gain sight of the called Learjet shortly. Within 40 seconds we had a Traffic Advisory (TA) followed by a Resolution Advisory (RA). I disengaged the autopilot and flew the RA commands to climb. The Captain as Pilot Monitoring advised ATC we were climbing for an RA. I maintained sight of the traffic and saw him pass just beneath our right wing and during the maneuver as little as 200 feet below us. Once stabilized with the traffic no longer a factor I descended down to our assigned altitude and reengaged the autopilot. At no point did we hear any communication to the Learjet from ATC regarding us as they were supposed to be at FL370.Better communication via ATC needed to both us and the Learjet if they saw any altitude deviations from the Learjet. Did not hear other than the initial traffic call was given and only to us.

Air Carrier flight crew reported a NMAC while at cruise altitude.

1560136

201807

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Other Load Planning

Hangar / Base

Air Carrier

Other / Unknown

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Ground Personnel

1560136

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Person Ground Personnel

Routine Inspection

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Procedure

Procedure

This flight will have to be delayed until they can get 15 bags to secure the HAZMAT. The Ops Manager has requested that maybe we could use ballast to secure. I told them that I prefer bags. There is always a problem with this type of flight situation when there are no bags around to secure HAZMAT. I know we must follow the 15 bags policy; but what happens when the flight has to be there and there are no bags. Do we have a plan for this. I will not take any suggests from the floor (as I am hearing different suggestions on what can be done or to do). However I would like to come up with a solution that will help everyone in this situation and be consistent about it.

Load Planner reported compliance inconsistency between company policy and HAZMAT requirements.

989875

201201

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Climb

Class B ZZZ

Y

Gear Extend/Retract Mechanism

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface

989875

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

After takeoff I selected gear up and nothing happened. About 5-10 seconds later we got a GEAR DISAGREE WARNING. The First Officer (pilot flying) called for speed mode; heading mode; autopilot ON. As I was reaching for the QRH the gear safe lights started going berserk: 3 green; 3 yellow; 1 green; 2 yellow; 2 green; 1 yellow; etc. and the nose gear sounded like it cycled up and down 3 or 4 times.With gear lever down indications were three green and the nose gear stopped cycling up and down. Question was; can we really trust the 3 green indicators? We decided to do a flyby and get some outside help. On the first pass we used flaps 20 setting thinking any more would interfere with viewing the gear. As we passed by the EMS leader said it 'did not look like the nose gear was down 90 degrees.' Following a second pass; this time by company personnel; everyone was in agreement that the gear was; in fact; down. We made a wide pattern back around to get ready for landing.Throughout the event; I made numerous communications with Maintenance; the flight attendants; ATC; and PA's to the passengers. We reviewed the QRH for the Gear Disagree Down and Up Procedures and the Landing Gear Up/Unsafe Landing Procedure. The manual extension handle was fully stowed and the gear pins were stowed behind the First Officer's seat. I asked the First Officer if he was comfortable as the flying pilot or if he wanted me to take it. He said he was good and I had no reservations about his piloting skills. Landing was very gentle and we let it roll to a stop on the runway where gear pins were installed and the aircraft was towed to the gate. We landed overweight; touching down at 69;000 LBS. I entered discrepancies in the logbook for the gear disagree and the overweight landing in coordination with Maintenance Control.

A CRJ-700 flight crew returned to their departure airport when they received anomalous gear safe indications following takeoff.

1292623

201508

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

18000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class A ZZZ

Speedbrake/Spoiler

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 168; Flight Crew Total 9678; Flight Crew Type 9678

1292623

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Aircraft

Aircraft

We were operating ZZZ-ZZZ1-ZZZ2 as a through flight; utilizing the same aircraft for both flight segments. Inbound to ZZZ1 we had an ECAM (Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring): Flight Control - Spoiler Fault. The Flight Control System Display showed both #3 spoilers faulted (amber x's). We accomplished the QRH procedure; determined via visual inspection that the spoilers were retracted and consulted with [dispatcher] and [maintenance]. We continued and conducted a normal approach and landing at ZZZ1.Because this same fault had occurred several days earlier; maintenance elected to defer the affected spoilers by de-activating and locking them down. With the aircraft released by maintenance; we departed for ZZZ2.During the climb out we began to notice a slight airframe vibration. I referenced the Flight Control System Display and saw that the right aileron was deflected down and the left deflected upward. There was also a slightly greater than normal amount of rudder displacement.I switched the autopilot off and attempted to trim out the flight controls; but the airplane remained out of trim. There was a check airman on the flight deck conducting a line check; so the captain sent him to the cabin to do a visual inspection of the spoilers. He confirmed that the #3 spoiler on the right wing was partially extended.We again contacted [the Dispatcher] and [Maintenance] and advised them of the situation. The airplane remained fully controllable; and the effect of the raised spoiler on airspeed and fuel burn was negligible. The descent; approach and landing at ZZZ2 were uneventful. When parked at the gate the right #3 spoiler remained in its partially extended position.

A319 First Officer reported experiencing inflight vibration from a partially extended spoiler that was supposed to have been locked down by Maintenance.

1111160

201308

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

8000.0

VMC

20

Daylight

12000

2000

Center ZZZ

Personal

M-20 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Cruise

Direct

Class E ZZZ

Magneto/Distributor

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 3000; Flight Crew Type 2300

Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Confusion

1111160

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

I was flying in smooth air uneventful since takeoff from home base. All of a sudden I heard two soft pops and noticed that I was losing power and descending. I immediately switched tanks turned on aux fuel pumps and told Center I was declaring an emergency for loss of power due to engine malfunction or fuel issue. I asked for nearest airport and was told it was approximately 8 miles away. Looking in the area of my GPS I noted there were some low clouds limiting visibility of the ground. I asked about distance to an airport where I was familiar from numerous prior landings. Told that was 20 miles. I was unable to recover power and continued a descent toward the selected airport. ATC was very helpful giving me instructions on where to look as I cross checked with GPS and was able to concentrate on controlling my glide speed and descent. Clouds below began to dissipate and I could see Runway 32 markings ahead of me and below and by then most of the runway. I told ATC I was going to land on 32 and would begin to circle down. They told me to switch to Unicom 122.8. I did this and then noted complete loss of power on downwind. Although high I decided I would not have altitude for another circle on downwind so dirtied up the plane and dropping gear on turn to final I decided I had more than enough speed and altitude so put in full flaps and speedbrakes. I landed smoothly I did not want to brake hard to make the ramp turn so let speed bleed off on runway until full stop. I then got out of plane with my wife and got the tow bar out to move plane off the runway. A local pilot came up to me and said ATC wanted to talk to me to make sure things were fine. I told them that we were alright but had no power. The person I spoke to said he was [the] Supervisor and heard the conversation with the Controller. I said he did a wonderful job and allowed me to concentrate on flying the plane. We then pulled the plane by hand onto the ramp. No mechanic could come until Sunday. The Mechanic called first to say that it was the magnetos that failed but when he pulled them late this evening he said they were fine but whatever controlled the magnetos either a crankshaft lobe or camshaft lobe was broken off and so magnetos were not functioning all pistons and valves appeared to move correctly. Engine is Lycoming 0 time 2 years old with only 200 to 250 hours on it.

A M20J engine failed in flight because the magnetos ceased to function after the controlling cam shaft lobe apparently broke.

1623828

201903

1201-1800

BUF.Airport

NY

4000.0

IMC

TRACON BUF

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; GPS; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 23

Initial Approach

Class C BUF

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

1623828

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

1623831.0

Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Human Factors

We had been cleared for the ILS 23 Approach. Just after crossing TRAVA intersection; we started our descent and got a GPWS aural warning; 'Caution Terrain.' We were indicating 4;000 ft. at 200 knots with flaps 8. We then got the aural warning 'Too Low; Terrain; Pull UP' at this point I performed the EGPWS escape maneuver by adding TOGA thrust and initiating a climb. The captain notified ATC of our GPWS warning and that we were initiating a climb. ATC responded with radar vectors back to shoot the ILS 23 approach again. I leveled off at 5;000 ft. after the warnings stopped. We completed the second approach without incident.

Just prior to reaching TRAVA on ILS 23 going into BUF at 4000 feet and flaps 8; ATC told us to descend to 2300 feet. My First Officer (FO) as flying pilot started to descend and we got a GPWS 'caution terrain'. A few moments later 'too low terrain'. Being IMC; my FO executed the EGPWS escape maneuver. We informed ATC of our climb and came back around to do ILS 23 again. At the same point over the ground and same configuration; EGPWS did not go off this time. We landed in BUF without incident.

Air carrier flight crew reported a terrain warning while on the ILS 23 approach to BUF.

1826224

202107

1201-1800

ZZZ.TRACON

US

5000.0

VMC

50

Daylight

0

TRACON ZZZ12

Personal

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Training

Descent

Vectors

Class E ZZZ

TRACON ZZZ

Personal

Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Descent

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 38; Flight Crew Total 182; Flight Crew Type 100

Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1826224

Facility ZZZ.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1825631.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC

Vertical 300

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

Approx 5 to 10 miles west of ZZZ; I nearly had a mid-air with another aircraft while under ATC control. I was on an IFR flight plan but needed to return to ZZZ1 due to aircraft issue; and the controller cleared me to descend from 8000 feet to 5500 feet while asking me to turn Left; Heading 270. I continued to descend as the controller directed me next to turn Right; Heading 360. I did and was given a traffic point out to an aircraft flying slightly northwest; closing in on me. I acknowledged I saw the traffic on ADS-B. The controller asked if I could climb to 7;000 feet. After one attempt; I told him unable and watched as the other aircraft's ADS-B track closed in closely on me with the range in our altitudes decreasing. Finally when it appeared the tracks would soon be on top of each other; I turned to the right; then requested a turn to the right. The controller approved; then told the other aircraft to immediately turn left. Before pulling away; it appeared the other aircraft had 300 feet of vertical separation from me.

During the position relief briefing Aircraft X reported aircraft issues and requested to return back to ZZZ. The relieved controller turned Aircraft X left heading 230 and descended them to 5;000 feet. The relieved controller finished the briefing and I took over the position. Aircraft Y was roughly 10 miles south-southwest of Aircraft X and direct ZZZ1 at 7;000 ft. I descended Aircraft Y to 5;000 feet and switched him to ZZZ. The 2 targets converged and came within less than 2 miles of each other around 7;000 ft. I missed the other controller assigning 5;000 to Aircraft Y. Maybe I should have waited to take the position until the relieved controller finished helping Aircraft X work through their aircraft equipment situation.

TRACON Controller and a pilot reported a NMAC due to the Controller not being aware the Controller they had just relieved had descended another aircraft.

1098649

201307

1801-2400

ZLC.ARTCC

UT

12000.0

Center ZLC

Gulfstream IV / G350 / G450

IFR

Descent

Vectors

Class E ZLC

Center ZLC

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Climb

Class E ZLC

Facility ZLC.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1098649

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

Aircraft X was landing JAC from the east; and routed ZZZ...JAC. I had previously told the aircraft to depart ZZZ heading 255 vector for lower terrain. When he reached the appropriate MIA; I descended him to FL120. There was VFR traffic heading toward him northeast bound slowly climbing through about 112. I was very diligent about updating Aircraft X on the traffic. As they got closer; I told Aircraft X the traffic would come pretty close to him. I basically said that the traffic did not appear to be climbing fast enough to be a collision hazard; but just in case to turn 20 degrees right. After he started turning; the traffic was going to go behind him; but not by much. There was also a few hundred feet of separation. It was not a collision hazard; but close enough to get everyone's attention. Aircraft X then said he had the traffic in sight; but was still responding to an RA. Although the pilot didn't say; I was virtually certain the RA would have been a climb instruction; because a descent would have made no sense. I figured no problem. He sees the traffic; weather is beautiful; and he's about 16 miles from the airport. I asked him if he had the field in sight. To this he said no. When he didn't; I felt like I needed to take assertive action. If I turned him to the left; it would be toward the traffic; and even though he was likely past the traffic at this point; a climb would likely put him too high for final. I told him to make a right 360; and climb to 130. I had time to keep him in the 120 MIA; and it would climb him above the traffic on the next pass. The pilot acknowledged; and started climbing; but did not turn. I thought he was just turning slowly; and I was getting ready to tell him to expedite when he asked again if I wanted him to turn right. He hadn't started the turn yet. Due to the weather; and my knowledge of where the terrain actually was; I wasn't concerned about his safety. The wind was reported very light across the peaks; so I wasn't concerned about any significant turbulence either. In other words; I was concerned about clipping the MIA; but knew the pilot wasn't going to actually hit anything. I barely clipped the corner of the MIA; and missed it by a few hundred feet while the aircraft was climbing. Looking back; I feel like I took a legitimate course of action. I was using a routine vector; and was not expecting the RA. I recovered in what I believe was the safest manner practical. Just one of those things based on VFR traffic that is not in communication with the sector.

ZLC Controller described a momentary MVA infraction when issuing turn instructions to avoid a developing conflict with VFR traffic.

1843337

202110

1201-1800

ZZZ.Tower

US

1500.0

VMC

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 177; Flight Crew Total 1148; Flight Crew Type 1148

Distraction; Human-Machine Interface

1843337

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 192; Flight Crew Total 2748; Flight Crew Type 2748

Human-Machine Interface; Distraction

1843712.0

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Human Factors

We were cleared to 2000 ft. on the lateral path of Runway XX. I was at 210 kts. and in level change descending to 2000 ft. We called the runway and were cleared visual approach for Runway XX around ZZZZZ. I thought VNAV was engaged and asked for touch down elevation. I did not verify that VNAV was engaged. I asked for flaps 1 and flaps 5 to slow down. I was inadvertently in level change and the aircraft pitched nose down to maintain the 210 kts. I disconnected the autopilot and leveled the aircraft. During the repair; ATC called low altitude alert. We acknowledged that we were correcting and continued the landing normally.

Aircraft automation was selected with LNAV and level change while descending to 2000 ft. Subsequently cleared visual approach and PF (Pilot Flying) started configuring to slow and asked to set touchdown elevation in the altitude window. PF and PM (Pilot Monitoring) didn't verify appropriate vertical mode for phase of flight and aircraft pitched for speed on pitch descent below glidepath. PF disconnected automation and corrected while PM communicated altitude correction to Tower.

Air Carrier flight crew reported receiving ATC low altitude alert during visual approach. Excursion from altitude was due to flight crew failure to verify vertical VNAV mode selected.

1180378

201406

1801-2400

CMH.Airport

OH

0.0

VMC

Night

TRACON CMH

Fractional

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; GPS; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 28L

Landing

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Fatigue; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1180378

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Fatigue; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1180380.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

; Taxi

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Procedure; Human Factors

Ambiguous

Landing on CMH Runway 28L without landing clearance. On approach we were being vectored for the ILS 28L in VMC conditions. CMH Approach Control was issuing headings and various speed reductions before final approach fix. The last ATC communications to us were 'cleared for ILS 28L approach.' We flew the approach uneventfully and upon landing; and exiting the runway at A7 high speed; queried ATC if we should contact Ground Control. The Controller on frequency stated that we were transmitting on Approach frequency. This is when we realized that we did not/were never instructed to contact Tower Controller and we had just landed without landing clearance. We contacted Ground Controller and he gave us a vague clearance to taxi to the ramp. Due to multiple taxiway closures in the vicinity of our taxi route we confirmed our taxi clearance and proceeded to ramp uneventfully. Once on the ramp and parked we had a short conversation with Ground Controller about the incident and they did not seem too concerned about it. Some contributing factors that may have led to this event. We were on duty 6 hours prior to nighttime departure. As [a] crew we discussed after landing how distracting the [Runway] 28L new style bright LED runway and approach lights were. Also infrequent radio transmissions during final approach phase of flight created a sense of security; as a crew we should have been more vigilant and proactive in receiving landing clearance. ATC could be more proactive in assuring pilots contact appropriate controller/frequency.

I told Ground that we were never handed off to the Tower from Approach and he responded with 'yes I know; we had you the whole time; its ok.' I readback our taxi clearance back and we proceeded to the ramp. The Controller seemed to be OK with it since it was VMC and [there was] no other traffic in the area or on the ground.

A fatigued flight crew landed at CMH during late night operations without clearance. Fatigue and distractions including bright LED approach lights and a lull due to the lack of frequency activity.

1023758

201207

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Class B ZZZ

Squat Switch

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

1023758

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

1024363.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

Aircraft

'Nose A/G DISAGREE' status message appeared after takeoff. Climbing out; we consulted the QRH. Concerned that this switch controls 'stall warning and portions of the caution and warning system'; we discussed our problem with this airport's Maintenance and Maintenance Control. They advised us to return to the departure airport and we concurred. Dispatch was notified of our return and an emergency was declared with ATC. We landed overweight; normal touchdown; long rollout; minimal braking with Airfield Rescue and Fire Fighters standing by to monitor brake temps (all OK). Arriving at gate; Maintenance advised us that the nose gear air/ground switch was broken and removed the aircraft from service.

[Narrative #2 contained no additional information.]

After takeoff a B757 EICAS alerted NOSE A/G DISAGREE so an emergency was declared and the flight returned to the departure airport.

989573

201201

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

FBO

Duchess 76

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Landing

Class D ZZZ

Nose Gear

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Total 230; Flight Crew Type 15

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

989573

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Instructor

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 3500; Flight Crew Type 300

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

989574.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft

We put gear handle down and at first did not get 3 green lights; only the 2 main wheels. Then we recycled gear and saw 3 green lights; although the nose wheel light was dimmer than other 2. We did a low approach and Tower confirmed twice that gear was down so we landed on the second pass. The nose gear collapsed on the landing roll.

[Narative #2 had no additional information]

A BE76 nose gear collapsed on landing after initially failing to indicate down but after cycling indicated safe and with Tower-observed report of the gear down.

1133009

201311

0601-1200

OAK.Airport

CA

15.0

7800.0

VMC

6

Daylight

TRACON NCT

Personal

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

FMS Or FMC

Climb

Vectors

Class B SFO

TRACON NCT

Small Aircraft

1.0

Cruise

Class B SFO

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 65; Flight Crew Total 13500; Flight Crew Type 260

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1133009

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 450; Vertical 0

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure

After completing our initial climb to 2;000 FT on the OAK6 departure from OAK we were cleared an unrestricted climb to 15;000 FT. We were in a 4;000 FPM climb and advised by NORCAL Departure to make a left turn to 180 degrees. During that climb; at 7;800 FT and climbing fast I was asked to level off at 8;000 FT which we were unable to do in a timely manner due to our climb rate. As I lowered the nose and reduced power and the climb; we encountered an RA. At the same time NORCAL advised us to make an immediate left turn to 140 degrees. My training kicked in and I followed the commands from the TCAS and flew the aircraft abruptly into the commanded guidance bars; disregarding the turn to 140 degrees. Just as I was pitching the nose abruptly over to comply with the RA; I saw a single engine aircraft in a very steep left turn at my altitude and within 500 FT of my aircraft. Once I had the traffic in sight; I eased off the TCAS RA commands and flew the aircraft away maintaining visual contact with the single engine plane. We advised NORCAL of the RA immediately and had no response. Nothing was said after the incident. The problem I have here is that NORCAL had both of us on radar and turned me (the jet aircraft) into the oncoming light aircraft. This seems to be an issue that is getting worse and needs to be addressed.

A business jet departed OAK on the OAK 6 and during a high climb rate ascent was unable to level off after an amended climb clearance so the pilot took evasive to avoid the near miss traffic also under ATC control.

1040901

201210

1801-2400

ZZZ.TRACON

US

4500.0

VMC

50

Night

TRACON ZZZ

Personal

Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Climb

Direct

Class C ZZZ

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

Descent

Class C ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 2700; Flight Crew Type 1600

Situational Awareness

1040901

Conflict Airborne Conflict

Horizontal 5000; Vertical 500

Automation Aircraft TA

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Procedure

I departed in my Cessna 210; VFR for a return flight to my home base. I had asked Tower for radar services and Tower gave me a right turn out and then handed me over to Departure. Departure asked me what altitude I was climbing to and I told them 4;500 FT. I don't remember Departure's exact phraseology but they cleared me on course with a 'Climb and maintain 4;500'. I was never given any radar vectors or told a course to fly. My on course heading was just about straight west. Right after I checked in with Departure; I noticed an aircraft in the distance with a very; very bright recognition light on it. The aircraft was quite a ways above me and did not appear at that time to be moving across my windshield. I always pay special attention to any aircraft that does not appear to be moving in the windshield because I know that means that we are on a converging course. As I kept flying; the other aircraft appeared to be descending and I noticed that their recognition lights appeared to pulse alternately between two lights that I think were close together. Again; these lights were extremely bright and very attention grabbing but it also made it impossible for me to tell the size of the aircraft. I gradually turned a little bit to the southwest; I think probably around 30 degrees to the left of my original course. At this time; the other aircraft appeared to be slowly moving to the right across the copilot side windshield and I then knew that we were not on a converging course. I kept a close eye on the other aircraft. It would have been hard not to have because its recognition light was so bright. I was having a hard time judging distance but it appeared to be well clear of me. I had just leveled at 4;500 FT. I may have gone up an extra 50 FT; but I know I did not get to 4;600 FT. As the other aircraft was going behind me off my right side; I heard the pilot come on the radio and say something about his TCAS giving him a warning and he had to climb. I asked Departure what type of aircraft went behind me and he said it was a B737. I have very little knowledge about TCAS so I don't know what type of warning the other pilot got. I never thought that we were too close together. The only problems I see is that the bright recognition light made it hard for me to judge distance; but I still think that it was better for them to have such a bright light than to not have one. If Departure thought we were too close; he should have vectored one of us or given us a different altitude restriction.

C210 pilot on a night VFR flight in contact with Departure Control; observed very bright lights of a converging aircraft and altered course. As the C210 pilot overshot his assigned altitude he heard the traffic; a B737; report responding to a TCAS alert to climb. Traffic passed clear behind the C210.

1703492

201911

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Rain; Snow

Night

Air Carrier

B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1703492

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 247; Flight Crew Total 4538; Flight Crew Type 758

1703494.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Passenger

Taxi

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Weather

Human Factors

Last night I boarded flight X; a B777; flying from ZZZ to ZZZ1. While waiting for the boarding process to begin I noted the weather. The conditions at the departure airport were wintery. There was light snow falling prior to boarding. Earlier in the evening there had been periods of light rain. I noted that this would likely increase the trip time due to de-icing. I boarded the flight and took my seat [in the cabin]. Of note; this seat is located just forward of the left wing. I opened my window shades to see how much snow had accumulated on the wings to get some idea of how long the de-icing operation was going to take. I took a photo on my personal cell phone (attached) and sent it to my wife with a note (attached) that my arrival would likely be later than expected due to the need to de-ice the aircraft.Once the door was closed we pushed back as normal. The engines were started; and we began our taxi from gate. I sat back in my seat and tried to unwind from a long day of line flying. As we exited the ramp area I anticipated that we would be headed to the De-ice pad based on our direction of travel. I directed my attention to my personal tablet trying to find a movie to watch for the flight. After a couple of minutes; I looked outside again noting that we were taxiing at a fast pace and then realized we had passed the de-ice pad and were headed for RWY XX. At this point I realized the crew was about to depart without de-icing the aircraft. Reaching RWY XX we immediately entered the runway and began the takeoff roll. I knew there was nothing I could do at this point other than to document what I was seeing.I watched the rotation through my window noting that some of the snow was being blown off the wing and engine nacelle but much of it remained after liftoff especially on the leading-edge devices. We had; by now; passed the most critical part of the takeoff but I was so shocked that this had occurred it took me several minutes to consider what steps I should now take. I had considered contacting the crew in flight using the cabin interphone but decided that there was nothing to gain by doing so and I didn't want to alarm the cabin crew or passengers. I decided that I would email some of the managers and staff supervisors; as well as the Chief Pilot office in ZZZ1. During the roll-out I turned off my airplane mode and began to text the Operations and Maintenance Control managers. I again received no reply. Once we parked at the gate I decided to go to the flight deck and talk with the crew. It took several minutes for a clear path to develop. Once I had a clear path to the flight deck I went forward to talk with the crew. Upon reaching the flight deck only the First Officer was on board. The Captain had already left the aircraft. I introduced myself; handed the FO (First Officer) my business card and began to describe what I witnessed. I showed the FO the photos on my phone and advised him to file [a report]. I also told him that it was my responsibility to say something and that I would be reporting the event to the Chief Pilot. During our conversation the FO told me that during the walk-around one of the ground personnel had told him they had already 'squirted' the airplane. I found this difficult to believe since that is not the procedure in ZZZ.After my conversation with the First Officer I was able to talk with the the Operations Control manager. He advised me to talk with the crew; which I had already done; and to let them know that the Chief Pilot office would be contacting them; again something I had already done.I believe I have fully captured the events in this report from my point of view; but if you would like to discuss this further feel free to contact me.

An hour and fifteen minutes before takeoff; I showed at gate in ZZZ for my flight to ZZZ1. I began the normal First Officer cockpit flows and loading procedures. At the time; a mix of snow and rain was falling. The Captain showed shortly after me; and we discussed the weather. After the FMC had been loaded and ACARS initialized; I began to print the pertinent information from ACARS and the printer ran out of paper. Both the Captain and I tried to load new paper to no avail. I called maintenance to ask for help loading the paper and added that the flight attendant needed help with a cart which had locked wheels. A few minutes later; the Captain got the paper properly loaded. I left the aircraft to do the walk-around inspection.I did a thorough pre-flight in accordance with the FM (Flight Manual) and FOM (Flight Operations Manual) noting the wings and surfaces were clear of any adhering precipitation; which had turned to all rain by then. As I was leaving the area around engine #1; two ground crew personnel arrived. I introduced myself; and one of the men said he was with de-ice and that they had 'shot the wings' before we showed up at the aircraft and that everything looked; 'good to go.' The other man nodded his head in agreement; and I shook their hands and went back to the cockpit. I reported to the Captain my observations; and that I had discussed the aircraft condition with the de-ice personnel. The Captain added that he had been observing the ground equipment parked in close proximity and that they were clear of any precipitation. We pulled up the ATIS and the temperature was 34 degrees Fahrenheit. I then pulled up takeoff data that included 'wet' and 'anti-ice ON' numbers. After I briefed the planned takeoff data to the Captain; he went out to the jetway and observed the wing. When he returned he said things; 'looked good.'About that time; a maintenance technician introduced himself and entered the cockpit. He had fixed the cart and wanted to make sure we were able to load the printer paper. We spoke for several minutes and towards the end of the conversation; the Captain asked the maintenance technician how the jet looked to him on the outside. He said the jet was clear; and then left. While the Captain and maintenance technician were talking; I was monitoring the de-ice frequency to see what kind of activity was going on in the pad. I listened for several minutes and didn't hear any calls. After that; a customer service representative arrived at the cockpit and said we were waiting on one passenger; but that we wouldn't delay the departure for him. While we waited; the Captain and I continued to discuss the weather and our departure plan. The plan was for a reduced power; flaps 5 takeoff; wet runway numbers and anti-ice on because the ramp was wet. We updated the ATIS and the temperature was still 34. Since the temperature was above freezing and the precipitation had stopped; the Captain made the decision to taxi out normally. When I set the gate metering frequency in the radio; I could hear other aircraft calling and metering asking if they would require de-icing. About half said yes and half said negative. (This is an approximation on my part). I called metering and then ramp control and we taxied out and took off with anti-ice on. Taxi; takeoff; en route and landing were uneventful. After landing; we completed our parking checklist and sent the 'in' report. The Captain gathered his belongings and left. I stayed slightly after getting my stuff together and waiting for ground power to shut off the APU. After some time; still with no ground power; I decided to leave the aircraft. As I got to the door; a gentleman was in the hall between door 1L and the bathroom. I said; 'Hi;' and he turned and asked if I had been flying this aircraft. I said that I had been; and he said that he was sitting in the back on the flight and was scared on takeoff because we hadn't de-iced. I extended my hand and introduced myself because I couldn't see his company badge; but I could see his lanyard. He introduced himself and said he was a standards captain and worked at the training center and that he was very surprised that we hadn't de-iced before takeoff. I said the wings were clear on the walk around and he continued talking and said he had a picture of the wing; he tilted his phone towards me; but I couldn't see the picture. At this point I was concerned with the tone of the conversation and so I asked if he had spoken with the Captain. He said he had not. I was surprised at this because the Captain had just left the aircraft. He told me that I needed to call the Captain immediately and tell him that we needed to file a report and call the union. I told him that I had never filed a report before. (I was extremely flustered at this point and had forgotten that I have filed one before; but I'm not sure what the date was). He then said that I needed to talk to the Captain and to file one; but he did not elaborate as to why I should call the union. He said he was sorry and as I was feeling extremely uncomfortable at this point; I gathered my belongings and left the aircraft.

B777 First Officer and a Captain passenger reported being confronted by a fellow Captain flying as passenger regarding deicing.

1050870

201211

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-300

2.0

Part 121

Takeoff / Launch

DC Generator

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1050870

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

We initiated a maximum power takeoff due to deicing. With the combination of the cold weather and a light aircraft; the acceleration rate was noticeably greater than normal. Just as I completed setting the takeoff thrust; we both heard a click and immediately multiple Master Caution lights illuminated including 'Hyd' and 'Anti-ice' on my side. The Captain announced the abort and a very aggressive stop was initiated. We came to a stop on the runway and the Captain instructed me to tell the Tower. The aggressive stop was a result of the RTO activating. I did not make the 80 knot call out; but it was evident we exceeded that airspeed. I believe the acceleration rate; taking a moment longer to set max power; and the timing of the failure all contributed to me missing the call out. The Captain called for the RTO Checklist after coordinating with the Tower to have Fire and Rescue notified. I became frustrated with my inability to find it. I spent several minutes pouring over the QRH looking for it. I now know it is no longer in the QRH and am not sure how I was not aware of this. I feel I could have done a much better job assisting the Captain if I hadn't been so distracted trying to find the RTO Checklist.

Aircraft lost Flight Director Command bars and had multiple warning indications during the takeoff roll. RTO was initiated by the Captain and aircraft returned to the gate. First Officer spent considerable time attempting to locate the QRH page referencing an RTO event; only to discover it had been eliminated from the QRH.

1094411

201305

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Company

Air Carrier

Dispatcher

Dispatch Dispatcher

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Troubleshooting; Workload

Party1 Dispatch; Party2 Dispatch

1094411

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Dispatch

Routine Inspection

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

I'm only being made aware of the issue today. Two months ago; I had a flight between two west coast cities. Dispatch view prompted me to add a radio number due to a late inbound flight with the same flight number. Per policy I added radio number XXXT and made the change within Dispatch software and with ATC. Unknown to me the Dispatcher of the inbound XXX had made his flight XXXT as well. Dispatch software does not provide this information and we no longer have a function to tell which radio numbers have already been used or else I could have selected XXXA. Or in reality; had I known the inbound already had a radio number I could have left my leg alone completely. But as the system is set up now there was no prompt so we ended up with two XXXT's at the same airport at the same time. At the time of occurrence I was not aware of any of this. My crew did not report any problems to best of my recollection a month after the fact after having dispatched several hundred subsequent flights.

A Dispatcher reported that after a dispatch software program change he and another Dispatcher were able to assign an outbound flight and a delayed inbound flight the same code while both aircraft were at the same airport.

1209418

201410

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

VMC

Thunderstorm; Turbulence

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Fuel Quantity-Pressure Indication

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1209418

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1209420.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

N

Automation Aircraft Other Automation

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

While we were handling a radar failed indication; the FMS message 'COMPARE FUEL QUANTITY' appears on the FMS. The First Officer and I agreed that it was probably erroneous but it could be a fuel leak. We ran the QRH for fuel leak. The QRH says: (NOTE: An unexpected difference between the total fuel quantity indicated on EICAS and the total fuel quantity indicated on the FMS Fuel Management page may indicate a fuel leak condition.) We declared an emergency and Landed at the nearest suitable airport. After crash and rescue confirmed that we did not have a fuel leak; we taxied to the gate and wrote up the discrepancies.

Since there were thunderstorms along our route of flight; the captain and I decided to advise ATC of the failure and asked if they could vector us around the thunderstorms since our radar display was not accurate. A few minutes later ATC gave us new routing to bring us around the back side of the weather. We were then told by ATC to expect holding as no aircraft were landing due to thunderstorms. After running the QRH procedure for the situation; we broke out of the clouds and were able to remain VMC and visually avoid the convective activity. We were told by ATC that planes were now landing and to disregard holding.

The flight crew of an ERJ-170 responded appropriately to a 'Compare Fuel Quantity' ECAM message; declared an emergency and landed at the nearest suitable airport. A concurrent failed weather radar; and the presence of convective weather; turned out to be surmountable complicating factors.

1618861

201902

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

IMC

Snow

Night

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

1618861

Ground Event / Encounter Aircraft

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Human Factors; Staffing

Human Factors

Windy and snowy night at ZZZ. Boarded passengers and closed door. Got deiced and anti-iced at gate. Deicers couldn't deice our radome since the deicing truck couldn't get to the front of the aircraft. Deicer said they'd finish the deicing [and] spray the radome upon our push into the alley. We called for push. Ramp Tower cleared us to push. To the best of my knowledge; the Ramp Controller's exact words were; ''Cleared to push.'' The clearance was without qualification or further detail. Simply; 'Cleared to push.' I repeated same to our ground crew. We got pushed into the snowy alley. After resetting brakes; I asked ground crew to stay on interphone for a moment until I could re-establish radio contact with deicer (that is; so as to ask him if he needed engines off for the radome deicing). I believe the deicer's reply was that it didn't matter.I then cleared our ground crew to disconnect interphone; got pin and salute; etc. We started engines and deicer deiced our radome. Upon receipt of deicer's final report; and ground crew now gone; I was now able to toggle up Comm 2 audio (Ramp Tower). Our aircraft status was: stationary; parking brake parked; both engines running; and deicing and anti-icing fully completed. About the first thing I heard over Comm 2 was someone talking about having hit something.I initially thought it was a deicing truck (not ours; of course) somewhere out on the ramp that was discussing having hit something; but it turned out that there was now a [Company] 737 off our right wing - at our 3:30 position. He was telling us that as he had been taxiing forward (from a position behind us); the leading edge of his left wingtip (winglet) had contacted the aft edge of the winglet on our right wingtip.We remained parked - did not move - and called for [Company] Aircraft Maintenance to come out and inspect us. They came out and confirmed the aforementioned contact and confirmed some visible damage - but also said that our current state was safe: ''OK to get tugged back to the gate.'' We called for a tug and crew to tug us back to a gate. Due to the 28-knot winds gently buffeting our aircraft; we had not been aware of wingtip contact. There had been no jolt or bump perceptible to us (or; if there was a slight bump or jolt; it had been disguised by the wind.). Normal deplaning of passengers.

Air carrier Captain reported their aircraft being struck by another aircraft while sitting still on the ramp.

1228374

201412

1201-1800

VMC

Daylight

Personal

UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

Personal

Takeoff / Launch

Class G ZZZ

Hangar / Base

Personal

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Human-Machine Interface

1228374

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Person Flight Crew

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

Toy/Consumer Unmanned Aircraft System - Parrot S.A. Rolling Spider Mini Drone. We were flying it outside using an iPhone 6 Plus; via Bluetooth 4.0; and the Parrot S.A. FreeFlight 3.0 iOS application. The application has an altitude limitation option which was on by default to (according to my best recollection) on or about 9 meters (I can't access the option to verify the value without the UAS; but it was active). The aircraft was outside and went into an uncontrolled straight vertical climb. The Bluetooth 4.0 range is about 20 meters; which it rapidly exceeded and lost connectivity with the controller. The UAS; being so small (approximately 5 inches in length; 5 inches in width; and 2 inches height) continued to climb until we lost visual contact. The device had approximately 80% battery life remaining; and can fly up to 5-10 minutes at full charge. I do not know how high the UAS climbed out of control before it began a descent. The UAS has not been found. There were no other aircraft in the immediate vicinity. A brief search on[line] indicates other users having similar problems with these Toy/Consumer UAS devices.

Small drone operator reports losing control of a mini drone which disappears out of sight vertically and is not recovered. The drone had a pre programmed altitude limit of nine meters and was being controlled by an iPhone with a free flight application via bluetooth.

1462635

201707

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Night

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

GPS; FMS Or FMC

Parked

Class C ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Time Pressure; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch

1462635

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Procedure; Airport; Company Policy; Human Factors

Company Policy

Flight was dispatched to ZZZ with NOTAMs for ZZZ showing that no legal runway was open for the time of our arrival. Which caused us to divert to a nearby airport. It goes without saying I as the Captain told sole responsible for dispatching this flight under the supplemental air carrier certificate. That being said we as crew members must have some faith in the system. We have to ask why an airport that was NOTAM to be unusable a good [number of] hours before departure time was even allowed to be flight planed. I received my copy of the plan before departing the hotel. This is the problem we live with today; the crews are expected to go through all the paperwork and find all mistakes in a very short period of time. In this every increasing complex environment we operate in where it is not uncommon to receive up to 50 pages of information to be deciphered in a short period of time. The current operation is setting us up for failure. My only solution to this is to institute a dispatch system. The dual responsibility will go a long way making sure that more than one person is looking at all the information.

B767 Captain reported they diverted because the filed destination airport had been NOTAMed closed during the scheduled arrival period; but neither the Captain nor Dispatch caught the closure notice.

1379126

201606

0601-1200

CHD.Airport

AZ

1900.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower CHD

Personal

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class D CHD

Tower CHD

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

1.0

Part 91

Class D CHD

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 220; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 15

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1379126

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 300; Vertical 100

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Human Factors

While in the traffic pattern at Chandler Municipal Airport; under the direction of Chandler Tower; I was accomplishing touch and go landings. Several landings were made on runway 22L with left traffic being used and at least one on runway 22R with right traffic being used. On one of the touch and goes while on the upwind leg after takeoff; I had noticed that the tower frequency had been switched to ground control. On this specific aircraft there is a switch on the yoke that transfers the active and standby frequency. My guess is that when reading the landing clearance back to tower; the frequency switch button was depressed instead of the push to talk button also located on the yoke. Climbing through approximately 500 feet AGL; I noticed the frequency was not correct and immediately checked in with Chandler Tower. At that time I was not aware of any traffic conflict nor was advised of any traffic conflict. A full stop was requested and the traffic pattern was flown. On final approach; a landing clearance had not yet been given by tower so a go around was initiated. Another traffic pattern was flown and a full stop landing was made. The taxi in and shutdown was uneventful. I did not know of any traffic conflict until [later] when I was informed of a FAA Near Mid Air Collision System report being filed. This is the only anomaly that occurred during the flight and is why I am assuming this is when the near miss event occurred.

PA-28 pilot reported he was advised after the fact that he was involved in an NMAC in the pattern at CHD airport.

1054344

201212

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

31000.0

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Aeroplane Flight Control

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1054344

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Situational Awareness

1054349.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

Flight Control B Low Pressure Light illuminated in cruise. Followed QRH procedure and placed Flight Control B Switch to STBY RUD. B system quantity and pressure were normal. While autopilot A was engaged at the time; there were no apparent flight control issues; although there was increased oscillation in yaw. The procedure offers no additional steps or information. When we placed the switch in STBY RUD; the Feel Diff Press; Stby Rud On and Yaw Damp lights illuminated; which seemed appropriate for the procedure but were not mentioned in the QRH. I consulted Dispatch and Maintenance Control. Maintenance Control advised that flight control operation would be normal; however we would not have use of 2 flight spoilers. This is not mentioned in the QRH. Based upon this information and the increased yaw oscillation; we declared an emergency and diverted. With the anticipation of possible extra braking being needed; we requested ARFF meet the aircraft. Landed without incident. When ARFF advised that the brakes appeared normal; we terminated the emergency and taxied to the gate without further incident.

AT cruise (FL 310) B system flight control low pressure light came on. Completed flight control low pressure light checklist and diverted to ZZZ1 (Destination was ZZZ).Checklist provided no guidance regarding degradation of systems. Maintenance Control informed Captain that we would loose 'some of our spoilers.' Captain elected to use a longer runway based upon this input. Recommend specifying in the checklist that a normal landing is indicated in this situation if that is the intent.

B737-800 crew reports a Flight Control B Low Pressure Light illuminated in cruise and QRH procedure required placing Flight Control B Switch to STBY RUD. After consulting with Maintenance Control crew elects to divert to an airport with a longer runway.

1802823

202104

0001-0600

VHHH.Tower

FO

4500.0

Tower VHHH

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

FMS Or FMC; GPS; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS ILS RWY 25L

Initial Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Distraction

1802823

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

N

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Human Factors

ATC cleared direct LOTUS then ILS [Runway] 25L approach into HKG. Observed aircraft tracking direct LOTUS on LNAV; above path and on course to cross LOTUS above 4;500 ft. (which is the published altitude for LOTUS; the LOC course intercept). Vertical mode was FLCH to recapture the path; which was below us due to the ATC instruction to proceed direct LOTUS early in the approach. Captain armed the approach just outside of LOTUS. Called LOC capture over LOTUS; observed aircraft still above glideslope and stated 'glideslope alive'. Reported established; ILS Runway 25L to ATC; and HKG Approach instructed us to continue. Aircraft was descending steadily toward the glideslope at the required 180 kts. and I turned to my EFB (Electronic Flight Bag) for a moment to look up the next speed restriction. At this time ATC issued a low altitude alert and commanded a go-around; and the Captain followed up with a 'go-around; flaps 20' command and initiated the go-around. I selected flaps 20 and spun the altitude selector up to 5;000 ft.; as it was still set at the FAF altitude of 1;300 ft.; and notified ATC of the go-around. I initally looked at my MFD which was in TERR mode and saw no alerts or terrain indicated ahead; only yellow high ground 2-3nm right of course. I looked at the GS indicator and saw we were 1 dot below slope. I am unsure if the GS had captured; as by the time I looked at the FMA; the mode was already in TO/GA. Terrain was no longer the focus at this time as the aircraft climbed very rapidly and we reconfigured the aircraft and autoflight systems for the missed approach. We were initially instructed to fly the published missed except to maintain 6;000 [ft.]; then accepted vectors for another ILS approach to RWY 25L which was conducted without further incident. Following landing we copied a telephone number to call; which the Captain contacted after shutdown. The Tower Supervisor informed him that we were 200 ft. low at LOTUS; which is what prompted the low altitude alert. At time of writing I am unsure whether or not we were actually 200 ft. low at LOTUS. Immediately after the event I was sure we were above path and still descending toward the glideslope. Conversely; I know we were below GS when the GA (Go-Around) commenced; and cannot discount the controller's observations; nor the fact that FLCH does not protect against FMC altitude constraints. I had been monitoring the GS leading up to the event in order to call 'Glideslope captured' whenever it occurred; but as stated I looked away at the moment in question to look up the next speed constraint in the notes section of the approach plate (a speed constraint that; as I noted; we were still a few miles away from). With this in mind it's apparent that our vertical path was the more paramount of my PM (Pilot Monitoring) tasks and that I could have waited until the glideslope captured to look away. Especially in FLCH in a high-terrain environment; extra vigilance was warranted.

Air Carrier First Officer reported receiving a Low Altitude Alert from the tower controller.

1037902

201209

1201-1800

A80.TRACON

GA

No Aircraft

Facility A80.TRACON

Government

Approach; Departure

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Other / Unknown

1037902

ATC Issue All Types

Person Air Traffic Control

General None Reported / Taken

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

An equipment incident occurred as I was working Precision Monitor V (PV). I first started noticing that the keystrokes that we use to set up our distance measuring magenta line were acting erratic. We use the keystroke; 'enter' on the lead aircraft; slew to the trailing aircraft and 'enter' again. After I tried to slew and enter the lead aircraft; the cursor reset to the home position. I did not have very many lines up; so I did not meet the capacity of the system; which is six lines. I called the Supervisor to have a look. He in turn called an AF Technician over. The Technician had indicated that the scope had similar issues the day before and they may need to swap out the scope. Later all the Data Blocks on the scope stopped moving. It took me about three seconds to realize that the tracks had indeed frozen in place. I immediately shifted to my left and started sharing the PO position. There was an override wind on the finals; so compression was a large complexity issue. The Controller working PO and I had to judiciously choose which aircraft we put distance measuring lines on since two finals were sharing 6 total lines. No separation was lost. Equipment failures on the Precision Monitor scopes are becoming more common. When this equipment fails; controllers are left scrambling to different positions; sharing resources that are meant for one controller. At the most critical times (low ceilings; low visibility; wind override conditions); controllers are focusing on moving and communicating with FLMs/AF technicians; instead of having total focus on keeping aircraft separated. We need a solution to this problem. Apparently nothing is being done at the local level more than patching the problem. We need new; more reliable equipment in this building. Three failures in a week at the world's busiest airport is unacceptable.

A80 Controller described a PRM equipment failure noting failures of this equipment is becoming more common place and needs attention.

1072536

201303

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

8

1900

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Bonanza 35

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Landing

Visual Approach

Nose Gear

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 0; Flight Crew Total 3415; Flight Crew Type 251

Human-Machine Interface

1072536

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors; Aircraft

Human Factors

This was the second touch and go of the session. I turned final and was cleared for the option with gear and flaps down at 90 KTS; over the boundary fence at 85 KTS; touched down on the numbers. The nose gear collapsed as I reached to retract the flaps at the start of the go process. I do not remember the seconds of the actual collapse. The gear lever was down when the aircraft came to a halt; but some damage to the main gear doors may suggest that I wrongly started to move the gear lever instead of the flaps. With 251 hours in make and model; and the cluster of levers I needed to adjust; flaps; trim; throttle; all in a group at the left of the console; what would make me mistakenly reach right on my second touch and go of the day; if that is what happened? Fundamentals of instructing; addresses primacy; and I have 1;700 hours in Cessna 152 and C172 aircraft as student and instructor. That is my first introduction to flap levers and my most dominant one. It is possible that some early brain path took over as my eyes were outside looking to maintain runway alignment. Since the majority of pilots probably started out in Cessnas; regulators should consider prohibiting touch and goes in retracts; or insurance companies should say they will not cover them. A second issue is that as soon as the lock on the nose gear is broken; rapid collapse is inevitable. Not only the weight of the aircraft; but the forward motion conspired to force the wheel into the well. A forward folding design would still fail; but forcing the wheel forward against the motion would extend the time for deceleration and possibly allow time to shut off the fuel supply. This would minimize forces at the propeller strike and reduce damage.

Following a nose gear collapse; the pilot of a Beechcraft V35 suspects that he may have reached for the landing gear handle instead of the flap handle during a touch and go.

1601205

201812

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Total 15000

1601205

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

1601309.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant

Taxi

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft

While taxiing noted strong musty oil like odor. Notified A Flight Attendant and inquired about odor being present in cabin. She indicated a similar odor in aircraft. Immediately told her a return to gate was in progress. ATC notified and a 180 turn was safely completed on taxiway. Coordination between Ground; Ramp and Company was accomplished a new gate and taxi instructions were given. Accomplished QRC Quick Action Items; smoke/avionics smoke/fumes. Passengers notified of returning to gate. Taxied into gate. After arrival at gate Maintenance Control met us at gate and a fumes report was completed. First Officer complained of headache and throat soreness. 'A' Flight Attendant complained of dizziness; headache and breathing problems. As Captain; I experienced a headache. Possible oil and or chemicals (deicing fluid) being ingested into APU inlet and throughout air conditioning ducts.

Deadheading flight crew asked to speak to Captain during boarding. He alerted Captain to a smell of wet; dirty socks. Flight attendants took several walks through [cabin] to see what they thought. The odor was faint at the time and very centralized; almost like a coke exploded in a seat pocket and was starting to produce mold. FA2 did not smell anything in aft. As an entire crew we decided we would push back and be vigilant of any changes. During the safety demo we noticed the odor had gotten stronger. During compliance check the odor was so strong it started to cause my eyes to burn/water. By the time I was in the aft galley; Captain called to say it was so strong that we would return to gate. When I got to the front galley I had developed more serious symptoms; such as burning sensation in my throat and lungs as well as labored breathing. No passengers complained of symptoms during deplaning. Two deadheading pilots did. Maintenance informed us that this specific aircraft has had previous fume events; one of which was in October.

Captain and Flight Attendant of A319 reported strong odor and fumes when departing the gate. The odor became progressively worse during taxi so crew opted to return to gate and call to Maintenance.

1008159

201205

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

2500.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Class B ZZZ

Normal Brake System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

1008159

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

After takeoff received ECAM message Auto Brake Fault Brakes Released. Phone patch to Dispatch; conferred with Maintenance; declared emergency; burned off fuel to landing weight [and then] landed.

An A320 ECAM alerted AUTO BRAKE FAULT BRAKES RELEASE so an emergency was declared and the flight returned to the departure airport.

1237840

201502

4500.0

VMC

Air Carrier

B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model

FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS 30

Final Approach

STAR LIMKO ONE

MCP

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Relief Pilot; Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1237840

Aircraft X

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1238241.0

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors

I was an International Relief Officer (IRO) on the flight sitting behind the First Officer (FO). When we transitioned from the STAR to the arrival and cleared for the approach Localizer Directional Aid (LDA) Rwy 30; 4;500 ft was displayed and I assume that the Pilot Flying (PF) must have pushed the ALT button; since the aircraft started to go down to that altitude. The problem was that it was about 2 miles prior to LIMKO (IAF). I stated that we needed to be at 5;000 Ft. until we passed that point; but it was too late since the aircraft was already at 4;500 Ft. The ATC stated that we should have been at 5;000 Ft; but said that we could remain at 4;500 Ft. Since; the visibility is limited from that jumpseat; I did not see how we came to be at 4;500 Ft.; but I went off the voice call outs and thus made the remark that we needed to be at 5;000 Ft; but it was too late.

On the LIMKO1 STAR to LDA 30 TLV; assigned 5;000 Ft. MSL and 210 kts at LIMKO; leveled off at 5;000 MSL prior to LIMKO. ATC cleared us for the LDA 30 approach; I as Pilot Not Flying (PNF); set 4;500 MSL in ALT window (the next lower altitude prior to the approach); VNAV ALT displayed on FMA. Captain as First Officer pressed altitude selector; and we did not monitor the altitude restriction deleted on the FMC from ALT selector button push; subsequently; the aircraft descended to 4;500 MSL prior to LIMKO altitude restriction of 5;000 MSL. ATC noted the deviation from STAR; we acknowledged are current altitude of 4;500 MSL. ATC cleared us to next fix on approach at 4;500 MSL. No further incident noted.

B777 flight crew reports descending below charted altitude on the LIMKO1 arrival to LLBG which is detected by one of the IRO's and ATC but too late to prevent the deviation.

1686301

201909

1801-2400

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

25000.0

Mixed

Rain; Thunderstorm; Cloudy; Icing; 10

Poor Lighting

Night

14000

Center ZZZ; TRACON ZZZ

Personal

Lancair Evolution

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Descent; Cruise

Class A ZZZ; Class E ZZZ

Pitot/Static Ice System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Glider; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Sea

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 85; Flight Crew Total 2000; Flight Crew Type 45

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Physiological - Other; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1686301

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Procedure; Weather; Human Factors; Aircraft; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Aircraft

The plane had been at ZZZ for the previous two days for maintenance (replaced batteries; adjusted landing gear and landing gear warning system; and performed 411 and 413 IFR certifications). I departed ZZZ at about XA:30 local. There were rain showers in the area with patchy cloudy conditions and some localized thunderstorms and cumulus clouds. Expected conditions at the time of landing at my destination ZZZ1 were clear with light winds. This was my first night flight in the airplane but I felt comfortable flying the plane - departing in daylight and landing in clear night conditions. I consulted with my instructor prior to departure and he confirmed he felt the flight was manageable.Flight plan was filed for 23;000 ft. Climbout was normal through several cloud layers and deviations right of course to avoid thunderstorms. Some IFR; but mostly VFR between clouds and layers up to 23;000 ft. Pitot heat was turned on shortly after departure.It was getting dusk as I leveled off. I could see a stratus deck of clouds ahead at what appeared to be between 23;000 ft [and] 24;000 ft. I requested an altitude change to 25;000 ft which was immediately granted. My interior windows began to fog up and became coated with light ice. I turned on the defrost; but the fog and ice were growing and defrost didn't seem to do much good. Upon leveling at 25;000 ft in clear air I began to wipe down the interior windscreen with a towel to remove the fog and ice. I noticed my airspeed became erratic and then began to drop. I suspected ice in the pitot / static system. I confirmed the pitot heat was on. I assumed I was picking up ice. I could not visually detect any ice on the wings; but it was difficult to see because of the interior fogged and iced windows. When I wiped the interior of the windscreen it did not show any ice on the outside of the windscreen. Nevertheless; I turned on the de-ice; propeller heat; initial separator; and alternator (as discussed earlier that afternoon with mechanics as the proper procedure). By now it was mostly dark.My location was about 15 miles south of ZZZZZ heading direct to ZZZ1. The AOA (Angle of Attack indicator) began blaring loudly 'PUSH; PUSH' as my indicated airspeed dropped. The loud blaring 'PUSH' was constant and so distracting; it was hard to concentrate on anything else. I believed the problem was ice blocking the pitot / static system and that perhaps my pitot heat was not working; and; although I couldn't detect any exterior ice; perhaps some ice had accumulated thereby slowing my airspeed. I requested a lower altitude of 17;000 ft thinking that a lower altitude with warmer temperatures would help when combined with the de-ice systems I had turned on a few minutes earlier.Center was talking to me about a new altitude and heading but it was very hard to hear with the blaring AOA. The autopilot would not work with the indicated airspeed and my altitude began to fluctuate. I explained to Center I was having instrument problems and requested delaying vectors to sort out the issues. I couldn't hear most of what Center was saying; but attempted straight and level flight by hand as I evaluated the situation. Center approved delayed maneuvering in my current area.In the dark it took some time to find the AOA circuit breaker; which I pulled and the blaring 'PUSH; PUSH' finally stopped. At some point my instruments seemed to become more stable and reliable so I requested to resume flight to my destination but at a lower altitude of 17;000 ft thinking the ice issue had been resolved. However; quickly I realized the problems were not resolved and I requested a return to ZZZ. I [requested priority handling] with Center. They cleared me back to ZZZ. Soon; Center switched me over to Approach. I repeated my [priority request] and requested vectors to ZZZ.I realized my backup L3 instrument was giving me the same airspeed and altitude readings as the PFD so it was not useful. I erroneously believed the altitude indicator was working; but knew the airspeed was not reliable. I repeatedly asked Center and then Approach to confirm my altitude. In each instance they confirmed my altitude as being the same as shown on my altimeter. Flying back to ZZZ; Approach began giving me lower altitudes. As I pushed the nose over I had the distinct sense of descending but the altimeter either did not move or moved erratically. After several queries to Approach about my altitude; they asked me if I was suffering from vertigo. I'm not sure I could diagnose it under the circumstance; but I said no.The night was dark with overhead clouds and no ground references. At some point heading back to the ZZZ2 area and flying by hand since the autopilot would not work given the erratic instrument readings; I moved my attention to the cockpit trying to continue to trouble shoot and diagnose the problems. When I looked back at my heading indicator I realized I was turning in a spiraling descent. I quickly leveled the wings and corrected my flight path but it reminded me how easy it is to fall into a death spiral without any visual references.As I approached ZZZ3; Approach said I needed to begin descending and advised me not to worry about the restricted area because they had asked the military to turn it cold. I said I had been trying to descend for several minutes by pushing the nose down; but other than intuition I was unsure whether I was descending because of the erratic airspeed and altitude readings. I continued to periodically ask Approach what they showed as my altitude and they continued to repeat 17;000 - 18;000 ft. Soon some ground lights came into view. As I passed over them it was clear my altitude was no more than 2;000 - 3;000 ft above the ground. I immediately stopped my descent and again asked Approach about my altitude. When the Controller said 17;000 ft. I replied that his information was wrong and that my altitude was no more than 3;000 ft. He immediately told me to climb to 4;500 ft which was the minimum vectoring altitude in the area. I initiated a climb and enabled GPS altitude on my iPad ForeFlight which confirmed I was climbing through 3;500 ft. A few moments later; Approach said he realized he was only getting my ADS-B / Transponder altitude and was just reading back to me what my instruments were telling him. The Controller had no other radar altitude available to him.About this point; I concluded; given the difficulty of flying the plane with inaccurate instruments in night mostly visual; but some IFR; conditions; that trying to proceed to ZZZ was not wise. I told Approach I wanted to divert and land at ZZZ2. They instructed me to turn north and look for the airport beacon. I immediately saw the beacon and headed for it. As I approached they cleared me to land on Runway XXL. I could hear on the radio as ATC cleared other traffic and asked an [aircraft] on final to go-around.I was unable to immediately spot the runway because of the highway and other city lights; but I had the airport on ForeFlight and turned into a left downwind at what seemed about the right distance. I set my torque at the settings I learned in training less than two weeks before to deliver the desired pattern and landing speeds. On the downwind I saw the runway; turned base and then final. Although my instruments were reading crazy numbers; the final approach was smooth and stable and on the VASI visual glidepath. Landing was uneventful. Tower told me to stop on the runway; and switch to Ground who would guide me to the FBO. When I stopped on the runway; I took a picture of my instruments - they showed airspeed of 410 kts and altitude of 13;000 ft.Fire and rescue trucks followed me as I then taxied to [company] where the plane was hangered overnight. When I climbed out of the plane; the fire and rescue personnel asked if I was okay. I replied yes; thanked them; and they then departed. In the hangar; I powered on and off the systemtwice. Both times the system gave similar reading on the instruments as I had seen stopped on the runway. I also checked the pitot tube heat. It quickly got hot when turned on.

A Lancair Evolution pilot reported unreliable altitude and airspeed indications while in icing conditions and ATC echoing false readings; resulting in a diversion and CFTT before landing.

1474938

201708

0601-1200

DEN.Airport

CO

16000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZDV

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class E ZDV

Personal

Sail Plane

1.0

Part 91

Personal

Cruise

Class E ZDV

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1474938

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC

Vertical 400

Automation Aircraft RA

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

On climb out of Denver (Captain was PM; FO was PF); we were initially given a clearance to FL230. A minute or so later ATC reissued our clearance to maintain 16;000. We complied and the aircraft leveled at 16;000. ATC said something to the effect of once you are clear of traffic; we will climb you. We were trying to acquire the aircraft (which was said to be a glider); visually; but could not see it. I immediately looked at the TCAS and it displayed no targets. I changed mode from above to all; and it still showed no targets. ATC then said 'traffic no factor climb and maintain FL230'. As soon as she began to talk we got an RA immediately (the traffic was now showing on the navigation display) saying 'Descend; Descend; Descend'. The first officer immediately performed the memory items; disconnected the AP and began a descent. I responded to ATC by saying something like 'Unable; descending responding to an RA'. We descended about 300-400 feet and then we were clear on conflict. The glider flew about 400 feet on top of us slightly to our left; I am unsure of the lateral separation. After we ran the QRH and continued our climb to FL230; I checked with the flight attendants to make sure everything was ok in the cabin; everyone (including FAs) had still been seated in their jump seats with seatbelt fastened during the event. I began looking in the handbook for any further info. I found that this was indeed a NTSB reportable event and that an incident report was required. I followed the guidance and sent an ACARS to dispatch notifying them of the situation and providing the details outlined.As sent to dispatch:Prior to COORZ intersectionResponded to an RA while level at 16;000 ft descended about 300 feet; no dangerous articles onboard.I believe ATC should have vectored us off of course to avoid getting anywhere near the glider. As with gliders; they can rapidly change altitude and headings. While ATC did initially change our clearance from 23;000 to 16;000; perhaps a turn would have avoided this entire situation. I also think that because of rapidly changing altitudes abilities of a glider; that's why we were unable to initially acquire the target on TCAS.

A320 Captain reported a NMAC with a glider west of DEN at 16;000 feet.

1125565

201310

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

2.0

1600.0

VMC

5

Daylight

5000

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

MD-11

3.0

Part 121

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Final Approach

Other Controlled

Class D ZZZ

MCP

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Relief Pilot

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 145; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Distraction

1125565

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 36; Flight Crew Total 8000

Fatigue; Situational Awareness

1126697.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors; Aircraft

Ambiguous

We were cleared for an RNAV approach. First Officer was pilot flying while the Captain was pilot not flying. Weather was VMC below 5;000 FT AGL. Horizontal visibility was unlimited. We called the field visually at least 15 miles away. We were leveled off at 1;600 FT 5 miles prior to the FAF. We were hooked up to the autopilot and in NAV and PROF. He entered in the RNAV minimums of 660 FT on the FCP as we were on the approach phase. I reminded the Captain about the .3 RNP on the REF page and he then entered it in. Almost immediately; the aircraft started a descent while we were yet 2 miles prior to the FAF. We all were aware of the deviation; caught and corrected it after a descent of approximately 400 FT. The pilot flying corrected to 1;550 FT MSL acquired the VASI and manually flew the approach visually. When on the early descent; the Controller transmitted to us to 'check our altimeter setting and altitude.' We responded that we were correcting and that we were under control. As we were in visual conditions and on a visual approach backed up by the RNAV and as the Controller asked only if we would check our instruments; we thought that we were safe from any type of ATC deviation issues. At no time were we unsafe in our approach. At no time did the Controller use the pilot deviation notification procedures as outlined in the FAA Regulations under provisions of paragraph 2-1-26 of the ATC manual asking us to contact the FAA.

I was flying pilot on an RNAV approach. Per approach descended from 2;000 to 1;600. Just prior to FAF R/O prompted 0.3 for the FMS setup. It had been forgotten even though the RNP was showing far less than this value. This was a definite distraction. The aircraft descended as though on path but by 1;200 I took notice of this; disconnected autopilot and initiated a level off. Lowest about 1;100 MSL. About this time Tower issued an altitude alert; response was yes; correcting. Re Intercepted glidepath visually from about 1;300 FT with the PAPI; and continued with the approach; stable at 1;000 MSL. Had to ignore commands from Flight Director which was still commanding a descent that would have been well short. Normal landing and taxi in. Crew dispersed; I went to hotel; [and] other crew went home. Captain telephoned me later and we discussed whether to file a report. I did not feel we had violated FAR's; and if anything the system had worked as it was supposed to: to issue a timely warning. The crew response was already in action at the time of the warning. So didn't file at that time. Fatigue was a factor delaying reaction possibly. I had been woken from a planned afternoon nap by the maid attempting to clean. Do Not Disturb was ON. This happens more often than one would think; even with Do Not Disturb signs on. Worldwide; staff doesn't get the off hours and off pattern sleep habits this job requires.

MD11 flight crew reports descending below the FAF altitude after altitude capture with autopilot engaged; when the MDA is set in the FCP window. The aircraft descends 400 FT before climbing back and ATC takes notice.

1281587

201507

1201-1800

MSY.TRACON

LA

6000.0

VMC

Air Carrier

Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Descent

Class B MSY

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1281587

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1281588.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Automation Aircraft RA

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Human Factors

We were descending to 6;000 feet on a vector of 170 about 30 miles north of MSY. Passing 10;000 feet at 1;000 fpm we got an RA for traffic 900 feet below us. I immediately followed the commands of the RA which called for a climb; passing about 10200 feet; we received a clear of conflict call out. We informed ATC of the RA and that we were climbing. ATC acknowledged and said we were cleared to continue our descent. We continued to MSY for an uneventful landing.Failure of ATC to call out traffic and giving us a clearance through an altitude which was occupied by another aircraft. Also failure of the TCAS to give a traffic call out for which we may have been able to level off and prevent the RA.

As a footnote if you reference a report I submitted [about a year ago] the EXACT scenario happened. I mean EXACT. That is too much of a coincidence. There is something systemic.

Airbus widebody flight crew reported receiving an RA during descent into MSY; noting that ATC failed to advise them of traffic.

1622697

201903

1801-2400

ZAU.ARTCC

IL

32000.0

Night

Center ZAU

Air Carrier

B737-900

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Class A ZAU

Facility ZAU.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 23

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1622697

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

Aircraft X was transferred to the JOT/83 sector at FL320 tracking along J89.Approximately; 10-12 miles south of the RAN/JOT boundary I noticed Aircraft X executing a left turn. I immediately called the JOT/83 sector to inquire and noticed the flight plan route had been changed to direct ROBBY. I asked if the aircraft had just been turned and the JOT/83 replied in the affirmative and asked if I wanted the aircraft turned back.No transfer of control and aircraft was turned head-on into the Chicago Metro Southbound Departure corridor.What led to the event - In my opinion either an oversight or the culture of 'It's late [day] night' - procedures don't apply.Unless SOP's and other orders are considered optional; request control when issuing control instructions to aircraft not in one's area of jurisdiction.Carry out some performance management.

ZAU Center Controller reported that an aircraft was turned in his airspace without prior coordination.

1469496

201707

Daylight

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Low

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Flight Crew

1469496

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Procedure; Company Policy

Company Policy

Captain came out for lav break. I went in to the cockpit. First Officer said he was going to do the same but there was a delay in him coming out. Once he came out; not sure how door got closed but it did. Immediately Captain called and said she was reopening the door so I could come in.

A Boeing 737 Flight Attendant reported the cockpit door closed before she could get in to relieve the First Officer for a lav break.

1473098

201708

1201-1800

ELP.Airport

TX

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ELP

Air Carrier

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 14500; Flight Crew Type 3500

Workload; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1473098

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Person Air Traffic Control

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airport; Chart Or Publication; Procedure

Procedure

We were cleared for the Visual Approach and to land. On short final; as I usually do; I asked the tower if we could roll long on landing; and they approved. We do this since the runway is 12000 feet long; and the terminal where we park is at the far end of the runway. When approved to roll long; I usually roll all the way to the far end and exit at taxiway F or D; which puts us right near our parking gate. This was my intention in this case; and with Tower's approval; I had no indication that this would be any different than the many times before I have done so.As we rolled out; tower said to exit at H. This exit is at least 2000 feet closer than the one I was targeting; and they told me too late in order to make the H turnoff. We tried to let them know this; but the frequency was busy at this time; so we were unable. They noticed we had rolled past H; and they then told us to exit at G and to cross the hold short for runway 26L departure safety area. Taxiway G is a 90 degree turnoff and is also the same place as F; which is about a 45 degree turn off. I saw the sign for G; and started to turn; but my speed was still a bit high for a 90 degree turn; so I rolled more towards F and asked if I could use F. They said no; use G; expedite across. As I was rolling out and making these turns; I looked to my left; towards Runway 26L; and saw an aircraft on departure that would have flown right over us had we continued into the runway safety area. I had also heard them clear an aircraft to land on Runway 26L; and saw an aircraft that appeared to be short final for that runway. In the past; they have always been very protective of the runway safety area; as they should be. I've never been allowed to cross this area with an aircraft on departure; let alone as close as this departing aircraft was. I clearly heard the instruction to cross; but it didn't seem right; so I elected to stop and clarify. Confusion and blocked transmissions ensued.In so doing; I didn't clear the hold short line for my Runway 22. In the moment; I didn't think much of this. In my mind; there was no conflict with any aircraft behind me since I had been cleared to roll long; and didn't hear or at least factor in any radio calls to anyone else on 22. Turns out the reason they needed me to expedite was there was another aircraft landing on Runway 22 behind me. This never entered my mind at the time; as I was more concerned with what seemed to be a conflict with the Runway 26L departure and landing aircraft. Since I was still on Runway 22; the tower instructed the aircraft behind me to go around.This would not have happened had I simply continued my taxi. I heard the instruction; but it just didn't seem correct based on what I was seeing and thought was occurring. It seemed to me that the instruction given to me should not have been given. I made the decision to do what I thought was safer and stop the aircraft until I could get a clarification. In my mind; the only potential conflict was with the Runway 26L aircraft. I didn't think there was anyone using Runway 22 at the time. In the end; the only bad result was an inadvertent go around; and my own confusion and frustration that I probably could have avoided it happening; but I feel that my actions were warranted.

Air carrier Captain reported they did not completely exit the runway at ELP as instructed causing the Tower to have to send a subsequent arrival around.

1451005

201705

0601-1200

EWR.Airport

NJ

3000.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON N90; Tower EWR

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 22L

Final Approach

Class B NYC

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Type 247

1451005

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Procedure

This report is an informational/safety report. No deviation from a clearance occurred during this incident. In fact; that was part of the problem. We were arriving into EWR; being vectored for the ILS 22L in nice clear VMC. Dispatch had advised me on the flight plan that arrival rate exceeded capacity; so we were carrying extra gas. ATC put us into a very; very bad position; both physically and with respect to legal compliance with FARs. We had come up from the south on the PHLBO; and flown EWR's 20 mile arc. On base; we received the following clearance: turn right to (some dogleg heading; approximately 190); maintain 3000 until established; cleared the ILS 22L; 170 kts to BUZZD. It was odd that they were issuing clearances for the ILS in perfect VMC. But it wasn't just us. That's what everyone was getting. It was also odd that ATC left us at 3000 instead of the usual 2500 for glideslope intercept. (Later we realized this must have been because of Teterboro's pattern - everyone was getting maintain 3000 until south of Teterboro). The dogleg vector put us between BUZZD (FAF) and GIMEE; but had us coming in at a very shallow angle. And the wind was from the east; pushing us away. There was an aircraft 4 miles in front of us. It was obvious very quickly that were going to need to descend long before we were on the LOC ('established') in order to make the energy state work out normally. However; that was not our clearance. The clearance was to maintain 3000 until established. Although the vector brought us in outside the FAF; when we finally got case break on the LOC; we were very high. But that was not a surprise. I was flying; and I told the FO that I was going to fly the clearance; knowing that we were going to be high; but also knowing that the Airbus was capable of descending quickly to glideslope in the right configuration. As soon as we had LOC case break I called for flaps 3; gear down; punched off the autopilot; and started down. It was actually going to work out fine before 500 ft - until tower sent us around. Tower sent us around; with no explanation; about 4 miles out and at 2000 ft; with the aircraft in front of us just coming up on the threshold. Approach asked us for the reason for the go-around; and we didn't know. We told them tower sent us around. We ended up doing the whole 20 mile arc again; as is their routine out there. The second time around; the vectors were MUCH more conservative; and the clearance was for the visual. We landed without incident; just under 4900 lbs of gas.To summarize; ATC gave us a very poor (in geometry and energy state) and inappropriate (ILS clearance on a VMC day with arrivals exceeding capacity and tight spacing) clearance. As given; we had no choice but to comply with the clearance; even though we knew it was going to be tough to make the energy gates and landing. Our other choice at the time (advocated by my FO) would have been to cheat and descend in violation of our clearance. It was Catch-22. We realized later that another option would have been to ask for altitude relief; or try to get a visual clearance. But in the moment we did not think of that. Obviously; my concern here is that ATC put us in an impossible spot; and they need to be doing a better job of handling the traffic NOT at our expense (figuratively and literally). We had jumpseaters that day; and one of them pointed out that with the un-slotting of EWR; he has seen an uptick in this type of go-around. And it is likely to get worse as the summer progresses. During the go-around; which was calm and controlled; all callouts were made. However; we started at 2000 MSL; and at first were only cleared to 2500 MSL. I was hand flying; and the speed got away from me during the level off and I oversped the flaps (flaps 3). While that was happening; we switched to Approach and got cleared to 5000. I could have just continued climbing and avoided the overspeed; but I did not hear the clearance to 5000 in all the radio traffic and task saturation of the go-around.

A320 Captain reported experiencing a low fuel state due to questionable vectors and a Tower directed go-around at EWR.

1213224

201410

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

8000

UNICOM ZZZ

Personal

Amateur/Home Built/Experimental

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Landing

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 27; Flight Crew Total 485; Flight Crew Type 234

Situational Awareness

1213224

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Excursion Runway

Horizontal 20

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Evacuated; General Maintenance Action

Airport; Human Factors

Human Factors

Attempting to land at [a private airport] with 3500 [feet of] runway was unsuccessful resulting in running off the north end of runway by approximately twenty feet landing in a water pond completely submerging the airplane in water. Evasive action was near impossible as there were no less than three other aircraft flying overhead on a fly-by no more than 50 feet above me. Attempting to power had resulted in a midairup to go around would collision due to the close proximity of the overhead aircraft. No air traffic control was provided for approach; landing; takeoff and fly-by of aircraft. It is a see and be seen approaches; departures and fly-bys. There were no injuries sustained and damage was confined to aircraft; to include aircraft completely submerged in water; right center section of wing bent by coming into contact with small 2 [inch] - 3 [inch] diameter tree at edge of water; left and right wing tips; left and right wheel pants and both cowling cheeks upon coming into contact with water. I had no physical impairments or illnesses prior to; during flight and subsequent landing. Not on any medication affecting performance or judgment. My decision to go into the water resulted in damage to my aircraft to avoid injuries to bystanders and aircraft flying overhead.

While attempting to land at a private airport; the pilot of an experimental aircraft was unable to stop on the usable runway. Fearing a conflict with overhead aircraft if a go-around was attempted; the pilot ran off the end of the runway and into a pond.

1741625

202004

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Fire/Overheat Warning

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Distraction; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

1741625

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Ambiguous

[At] cruise; smelled like wire burning; put masks on; then visible smoke [was] coming from pedestal. Flew barber pole until approximately 15 km; landed; shut down airplane no more visible smoke; but still bad smell in airplane. Kept masks on [and] opened windows. Opened door; smell dissipated; deplaned. Mechanic found fire/overheat system circuit breaker popped wires were burnt. He told me Maintenance Control advised him this [has happened to several] airplanes. They believe alcohol from wipes is shorting out wires.

Air carrier Captain reported smelling a burning smell during cruise. Post-flight Maintenance briefing advised the pilots alcohol from wipes may be shorting out wires.

1749274

202007

1801-2400

Y23.Airport

WI

300.0

VMC

10

Dusk

UNICOM Y23

Personal

Small Aircraft

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class G Y23

Ultralight

1.0

Class G Y23

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1749274

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 200; Vertical 100

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

While landing Runway 17 at Chetek Municipal Southworth Airport (Y23) at dusk; an unlighted powered parachute; with no lights made a radical and unpredicted turn into the final segment of Runway 17. Evasive action was taken to avoid colliding with the powered parachute; a hard left bank and climb was initiated to avoid the unlighted powered parachute at dusk. Powered parachutes tend to fly out of Y23 in the evening time but are always lighted and typically communicate over the multicom.

Pilot reported a NMAC with a powered parachute while on final approach to Y23.

1874760

202202

1201-1800

VIS.Airport

CA

210.0

3.0

1100.0

VMC

10

Dusk

20000

CTAF VIS

Personal

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Landing

Visual Approach

Class E VIS

Personal

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Training

Landing

Visual Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Captain; Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 21; Flight Crew Total 7010; Flight Crew Type 245

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1874760

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 300; Vertical 100

Automation Aircraft TA

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was returning to my home airport and was aware of a couple of light aircraft in the traffic pattern. As I approached on a 45 to Runway 30 one of the aircraft had made a touch and go and had turned to crosswind. Both of us were making proper position reports. From his radio calls I felt I would be ahead of him but stayed outside a normal traffic pattern to ensure good separation. I was at about 1100 feet when I spotted the other aircraft in front of me at about 1130 position and slightly above me. At the same time I received a warning from my TCAD. I maneuvered lower and to the right of the other aircraft to ensure separation; since my speed was greater than his. I passed about 100 feet below and 300 feet to the right of him and landed without incident or other conversation with the pilot; other than normal position reports.I was surprised that he was that wide on downwind and was actually in front of me. In retrospect I should have been even further away from the airport on downwind and at a higher altitude to avoid any possible conflict.

Pilot reported a NMAC while entering the traffic pattern at a non-towered airport. Pilot maneuvered past the aircraft and landed.

1044988

201210

1801-2400

MDT.Airport

PA

VMC

Tower MDT

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

Final Approach

Class D MDT

Tower MDT

Hercules (C-130)/L100/382

Landing

Class D MDT

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Commercial

1044988

Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related

On the Captain's leg we received a stick shaker on very short final due to a C-130 that executed a practice go-around. The Captain landed uneventfully. The threat was the C-130's wake. I believe the Captain decided to land due to the aircraft close proximity to the ground and the lengthy runway. At that exact moment I felt like my attention on the aircraft remaining in a state where it was able to make a safe landing was a correct one. I feel that second guessing the Captain's decision to land or taking the controls would have been more dangerous due to our proximity to the ground.

CRJ-200 First Officer reported receiving a stick shaker on very short final from a preceding C130 wake vortex. Captain continued the approach to a normal landing.

1589812

201810

1201-1800

D01.TRACON

CO

VMC

Daylight

TRACON D01

Fractional

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Initial Approach

Class B DEN

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness

1589812

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

On arrival to APA. Moderate turbulence over the Front Range north of Denver. ATC vectored us east of downtown enroute to APA. Declared airport insight and cleared for visual approach. Had the RNAV GPS RWY 17L set in FMS for awareness and set 6800 ft in altitude alerter for mandatory altitude at LOWRE intersection. Position about 8 miles NW of APA. TCAS indicated two contacts; one along the extended centerline to 17L that appeared to be traveling north and another west of the airport in a right downwind for 17L. ATC recommended we turn to right base; which was outside LOWRE for aircraft to our east; traveling north; but we opted to continue on our angled course to join between LOWRE and CENTN (FAF) because the left turn to right base would have created conflict with that aircraft. The two other aircraft indicated +/- 100-200 feet vertically around our position. As we continued the aircraft to the east appeared to turn towards us while the one in the right downwind continued northbound; both closing our position. I turned off autopilot; turned southbound; and immediately descended below both aircraft about 200 feet as the SIC recommended we descend. TCAS gave us a TA but no RA. With both aircraft insight we then made the left turn to right base and conducted a stable approach visually to 17L.ATC and crew were aware of all aircraft and the situational picture but not the intentions of the other two aircraft other than they were in the pattern for 17L at KAPA. Thinking about and discussing our options afterward; we talked of how we could have just requested the actual IFR approach or having seen the aircraft on TCAS; asked tower if we could turn southbound to turn back for a 45 degree entry into the right downwind.

Fractional Captain reported evading two aircraft while on approach to APA.

1481586

201709

1201-1800

BUR.Airport

CA

4500.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON SCT

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class E SCT

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Total 8350; Flight Crew Type 3066

Situational Awareness

1481586

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Airspace Structure

Prior to FIL; we were told to fly heading 100; which was different than we expected for the Four Stacks Visual App 15 BUR. The 100 heading split Oat Mountain and San Gabriel Mountain; keeping our altitude higher than the recommended alt on approach (5000 feet abeam Oat). We were told to maintain 6000 feet until clear of traffic. We reported traffic in site and when clear we began a slow descent. However; as we descended we got a TCAS 'adjust descent;' call which we immediately complied with and slienced the warning. We did not expect our distance and rate to be a factor from the traffic in question. We had that aircraft in sight and continued our scan for other traffic as well as focus on the airport and ground track. While balancing the later two factors above; the TCAS alerted up to our proximity to the first aircraft; which while we adjusted our descent; that aircraft began a hard right turn. I can't be sure if that aircraft had adjusted his path into ours after we began our descent but if they had; that could have been the factor that triggered the TCAS to provide us with the RA which prevented an encroachment into an unsafe zone. After getting 'clear of conflict;' we continued scanning for other traffic as well as attempting to descend into BUR 15. Due to that first aircraft and another one descending into Whiteman airport; we were unable to descend and stabilize for the approach into 15. Prior to 1000 feet AGL; we went around and continued for vectors for Visual 8. Weather at time was VFR and we had the Four Stacks and airport in site 15-20 miles from the field as well as Whiteman. Winds at BUR were varying 130-180 at 8-10 knots which is why we chose RWY 15.Finally; our vectors for the approach were a combination of vectors for RNAV15 and Visual. The 100 heading was more in line with the RNAV15 approach which we had line selected and used to back up our SA.

An A320 First Officer reported that multiple traffic targets in the vicinity of Whiteman (WHP) caused TCAS alerts and necessitated maneuvering that prevented the A320 from achieving a stabilized approach by 1;000 feet AGL on the Visual Approach to Runway 15 at BUR. A go-around was performed and the aircraft subsequently landed uneventfully at BUR on runway 08.

1686485

201909

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

FMS Or FMC

Takeoff / Launch

Autoflight Yaw Damper

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Troubleshooting; Workload; Confusion

1686485

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight; Aircraft In Service At Gate

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

On the first takeoff attempt when we were cleared onto the runway; the Captain's PFD & ND failed along Yaw Damper; Pressurization panel; and L IRS. We told Tower we needed to clear the runway; called Dispatch; and returned to gate. Maintenance replaced L IRS however there were still issues. The Yaw Damper would not engage and the left stall warning would not test. The items were deferred and we attempt to complete the flight.On the second takeoff; airspeeds matched at 80 kts but soon after takeoff; Captain's airspeed indicator malfunctioned along with the Captain's altimeter. First Officer's and standby instruments agree and Captain's airspeed was indicating greater than 350 kts in the climb which also caused the overspeed warning to activate. We called company on Arinc because the ACARS had also failed and planned for an air return. We were also getting multiple other false warnings such as; but not limited to the PSEU; which is supposed to be inhibited in flight. Also received several false stall warnings. During our first approach attempt we received a wind shear report so we discontinued the approach; on the second attempt we landed without further incident.Aircraft X had a history of avionics problems. Captain's airspeed indications had been written up by a previous crew also. The cause of the problems wasn't identified before our flight and actually got worse.When an aircraft has multiple similar issues; ground it until the problems are positively identified and corrected; even if it takes days before it's released for flight.

B737-800 flight crew reported multiple system malfunctions; resulting in a return to the departure airport.

1571965

201808

0601-1200

IDA.Airport

ID

9500.0

Center ZLC

Air Carrier

Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Facility ZLC.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Confusion; Distraction

1571965

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

Aircraft X was cleared for an ILS approach via the SABAT transition. The transition altitude all the way to the localizer is 11;500 feet. The pilot descended to 9;500 feet. I checked the approach plate to see if there was a descending altitude on the transition that I missed; but I couldn't see one; so I queried the pilot about the procedure. He said I was correct; that the transition altitude remained at 11;500 feet. I gave the pilot a low altitude alert; then climbed him to the MIA [Minimum IFR Altitude] of 10;000 [feet] and vectored the aircraft onto the localizer.

Salt Lake ARTCC Controller reported an aircraft descending below a transition altitude by 2;000 feet.

1244084

201503

1201-1800

PBI.Airport

FL

0.0

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

None

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1244084

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

Upon arrival to gate at PBI. The Number 1 engine was running while we waited for the ground power to be connected. We got an ECAM that the forward cargo door was opened and then shortly after the rear cargo door was opened with a second ECAM. I feel this is a serious safety concern because there are personnel approaching the aircraft with an operating engine. The danger is both in front of the engine; i.e. the fan; and the rear of the engine with the exhaust. I believe that all personnel should remain clear of the aircraft until the engines are secured. Instruct all station personnel that they are not to approach the aircraft while an engine is running due to the danger both in front and back of the engine. Make this a company wide standard/policy. That they are not to go past the nose wheel aft while the engines are running.

An A319 Captain reported he was concerned when ramp personnel began working around the aircraft after taxi in while an engine was still running.

1767499

202010

1801-2400

LFPG.Airport

FO

0.0

VMC

Night

Tower ZZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1767499

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Distraction; Confusion

1767300.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airport; Human Factors

Airport

Initially planned 09R Dep as per Flight Plan and current ATIS. Briefed RANUX4G Dep. After obtaining clearance and new ATIS; Departure Runway was changed to 27L. Runway change procedures followed and new briefing for the RANUX4A from 27L briefed; FMS perf verified; data changed etc. While taxiing out we were told to contact GND at spot (removed). We did so and were given instructions to taxi; Spot; Q RWY27L. A discussion ensued with all 3 pilots about whether or not this allowed us to choose our own route to 27L. During this time I slowed to a taxi speed of about 4-5 knots; barely rolling; to give everyone a chance to absorb the call and catch up. We decided to err on the side of clarity and asked if we could taxi Spot; B; Q4; 27L. The answer back was no. What I heard was: Taxi Spot; BD8; D; Q; 27L. Ok; upscale the iPad and look for the route. Everyone else was doing the same. I was having a problem finding BD8; verbalized it and the RFO said I'll give you 'progressive'. We were still going less than 10 KTS when I made the turn to follow M in front of the Fire Station. Because of the lighting; signage; and the fact that I undershot the turn to stay on M; we rolled barely onto MD2. As soon as I realized my error; I stopped (cursed) and set the brake. I told the crew what happened and that we could not make the turn back to M and we would be unable to make a right turn onto any other taxiway to continue east bound. At that time; Ground called and told us that it appeared we undershot our turn and were on MD2. We agreed and asked what she wanted us to do. We were given a standby. During that time we discussed the only way out was to continue on MD2; MD1D; BD6; B and get going the other way. Ground came back on and asked if we could do exactly that. We concurred and we were given that exact clearance plus from B; BD9; Q; Q4 to 27L. It is nitpicking but I don't believe QD1 was ever given between D and Q. In any event. We got turned around. Didn't turn in a prohibited direction; didn't drag a gear truck through the mud or non-stressed area; didn't have to get towed and didn't shut down any taxiways or inhibit any other aircraft from their taxi. We got everyone on the same page and taxied to the end and took off. Once in the air; we debriefed the event as a crew. The initial taxi instructions were vague. The subsequent taxi instructions became confusing. The FO apparently didn't understand the taxi instruction; confusing BD8 for B; D8. I couldn't find BD8 on my chart while scaling up and sliding the chart around to understand the route. The RFO thought he had the route clarified only to lose the bubble at the end and was unable to communicate clearly what he was seeing. The signage in that area is abysmal. The lighting is glaring and the markings on the taxiways are not very clear/faint. And in our case; by the time we could verify our position; it was too late to fix it.With ongoing construction and changes at CDG; with being there previously and given taxi down B to QB7; Q4; 27L; etc. Even though we reviewed the taxi options and the standard taxi pages; we were given something unexpected and were unable to resolve what should have been a simple problem. I didn't realize how much of a problem it was until I undershot M on M2. I thought we had it resolved. I should have stopped; set the brake and sorted it out. Something that would also help would be to have ATC give instruction similar to ' Taxi from spot M via North Route 22; hold point XXX; RW27L'. We try to not set expectation bias by briefing TAXI routes. When they are given piecemeal instead of as a package; it gets confusing sometimes. We were finally able to alleviate these issues in CAN with canned routes. Not finger pointing; just a suggestion. It was my fault.

I was second RFO seated in the back in supernumerary seating; by the galley. I did notice some conversation after stopping then a left turn and some extra taxi movement and instructions. I was not seated in the cockpit during taxi out. Later I was told by the crew there was some confusion as to the finding the correct taxiway in which they were cleared. I know from experience that Paris taxi markings and lighting is subpar. There have been other occurrences in this same location. I even remember a hot topic published outlining the difficulties in taxiing in this area. Other flights have turned right onto delta and have left the prepared [surface]. I give accolades to this Captain for not falling in this trap after he had missed the correct turn on the correct taxiway. His actions saved the jet from leaving the prepared surface and allowed the flight to continue to destination and delivery of the freight; albeit with a few extra taxi clearances needed. Paris should take responsibility for these occurrences and get their taxiways up to par standards. The rest of the flight was uneventful. I believe [the cause] was confusion with taxi instructions and unable to discern the proper taxiway. My understanding is they did the right thing they were confused; they stopped the jet and figured out the problem. Then proceeded with an adequate solution.

Flight Crew reported unclear taxi instructions which resulted in an incorrect turn on a taxiway at CDG; Charles De Gaulle Airport.

1176756

201405

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

20

Dusk

20000

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Amateur/Home Built/Experimental

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Landing

Visual Approach

Gear Extend/Retract Mechanism

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 12; Flight Crew Total 434; Flight Crew Type 227

Other / Unknown

1176756

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

Left main landing gear failed to extend due to obstruction between the tire and the wheel well. Back up system of manual pump down failed to extend gear and overcome obstruction.

Experimental aircraft pilot reports failure of the left main landing gear to extend due to interference between the tire and the wheel well. The manual pump is unable to overcome the interference.

1098134

201306

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Rain

Excessive Humidity; Temperature - Extreme

Night

Air Carrier

B737-800

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

Scheduled Maintenance

Repair; Installation; Inspection; Work Cards

Fuselage Panel

Boeing

X

Hangar / Base

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Maintenance Inspector 1; Maintenance Lead Technician 5; Maintenance Technician 24

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1098134

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object

N

Person Maintenance

Other During Maintenance

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors

A B737-800 aircraft was just lowered from jacks after all three landing gears were replaced. Mr. Y and I were assigned to service all three landing gear struts. All gears had a nitrogen pre-charge that had to be removed prior to service with fluid and a final nitrogen charge. I cleared the aircraft of obstacles and connected tooling to deflate the left Main Landing Gear (MLG). I told Mr. Y and other technicians that the aircraft would be lowered. An Inspector was on a ladder in the left main landing gear wheel well when I was connecting the tooling; but was not there when I started bleeding the left main landing gear. The Shift Manager walked up and started talking to us at this time. A crack was heard and we saw the ladder the Inspector left in the wheel well under the keel beam area. We raised the left main landing gear to remove the ladder and saw that a panel and an intercostal had been damaged.Increase communication with everyone working around the aircraft. Pay more attention to clearing aircraft for Operational (Ops) Checks; etc.; and [do] not be distracted by others. [I] will not assume everyone will remove ladders etc. from around aircraft. Asked Supervisor and Lead Technicians to hand out all work cards and documents related to job assigned at start of shift. Not all related work cards were given to us at beginning of the job assigned.Tools (ladder) were incorrectly used; not moved away from aircraft after completing a task. All applicable work documents were not handed out at the beginning of job assigned. Talking with Shift Manager while job was in progress [was a distraction.] Complacency. Workplace distractions; interruptions. Physical health. High noise levels.

An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports about damage to the keel beam area of a company B737-800 aircraft when a left Main Landing Gear (MLG) was deflated. Contributing factors were heat; noise; lack of communications; distraction when Shift Manager started talking with the crew and maintenance work being accomplished during the MLG deflation.

1133136

201312

0601-1200

SFO.Airport

CA

500.0

Tower SFO

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 28L

Final Approach; Landing

Class B SFO

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1133136

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

Ambiguous

Get vectors in terminal area for [SFO] ILS 28L; told we are following B747. Captain said to stay a dot high on glideslope (GS) to avoid wake. I; pilot flying; agreed. As we started intermediate descent from about 6;000 FT to 5;000 FT we encountered moderate turbulence with rolling tendencies. Without hesitation I disengaged autopilot (AP); as I correctly interpreted encountering the 747's wake. Told the Captain (pilot not flying) that I was going to hand fly. He said no problem. A final vector/heading we were told to intercept localizer for Runway 28L. I engaged the VOR/LOC to arm and capture localizer. After getting LOC CAP displayed on FMA and following FD commands we were then told cleared for ILS Approach. I then armed APCH to capture GS. Captain said; 'GS alive' followed by GS CAP. I followed FD commands with AP off; continuing to configure with gear and flaps; fully configured in the slot by 1;500 FT AFL. AT approximately 700 FT AFL on GS Captain said LOCS not armed and that I was in HDG SEL with a 3/4 - full scale deflection to the right; meaning I was left of course. I began to maneuver the aircraft back to the right to get back on the LOC immediately and at almost the same time we broke out of the clouds and I maneuvered the aircraft back onto the LOC for a safe and smooth landing. We do not know why the aircraft fell out of LOC CAP mode and defaulted to HDG SEL. We never lost GS CAP mode. I was fully configured and on speed with no excessive maneuvering. We talked about possible go around but broke out of the clouds almost immediately when all this took place. While a go around may have been the better option; I felt due to rising terrain to the left and right of the aircraft may have put us in an unsafe situation since we were off the LOC and we did break out by 500 FT AFL. We advised ATC after landing they said no one reported problems with localizer. We took same aircraft [out] and had no similar problems.

B737-800 First Officer reported losing LOC capture on approach to SFO for unknown reasons.

1319855

201512

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Night

Air Carrier

A300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

FMS Or FMC

Taxi

Y

Unscheduled Maintenance

Pneumatic Valve/Bleed Valve

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Confusion

1319855

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft; MEL

MEL

Aircraft had MEL 36-11-03 HP Bleed Air Valves (#1) inop. During taxi out for takeoff; we got a single chime and the left ECAM displayed:AIR BLEED 1 HP VALVE STUCK OPEN (Amber)-AIR X FEED....................MAN-AIR X FEED....................IN LINE-BLEED VALVE 1.............OFFrThe Right ECAM displayed Bleed picture with the line from High Pressure (HP) to Intermediate Pressure (IP) from # 1 Engine Amber but inline; even though the HP switch was Off. The MEL calls for the HP bleed valve to be secured CLOSED. There is verbiage in the MEL that the associated PACK Valve may fault due to insufficient flow. We did not get a PACK fault at any time during this event. The MEL does not indicate that you may get an HP Bleed stuck open after being secured closed. I stopped the taxi in order to confer with maintenance about whether this was a normal indication. The Maintenance Center rep indicated that it could be normal so we concluded the call at which point I called the ZZZ Ramp and talked to Maintenance. The ZZZ station is the place the work took place so I spoke with the mechanic to make sure the HP valve was secured closed per the MEL. Maintenance stated that it was secured Closed so we then continued taxi and departed.Airbus Systems Manual 21-4-0-2 Item #8 indicates that a manually closed valve should be Amber cross-line on ECAM; not Amber in-line. Was the valve manually secured open instead of closed?[Recommendations]Would be helpful if the MEL had more amplifying remarks about ECAMS and other indications that may occur. It isn't clear that an ECAM stating that the HP valve is stuck open after being deferred closed is a possible indication you may get.

Reporter stated with the High Stage valve for the #1 engine manually closed that the ECAM should show Cross-lines across the Flow lines indicating it was closed. It did not; the ECAM indicated the valve was open. Reporter stated the valve was verified manually closed and MEL was ambiguous as to what the ECAM indication should be.The Reporter felt that the MEL needs to be more precise as to what the indications should be in the cockpit when a high stage valve is manually closed.

An A300 #1 Engine High Stage valve was manually closed Per the MEL but the indication on the ECAM showed the valve open which created confusion for the flight crew. The MEL was ambiguous as to what the flight deck indications should be.

1736770

202003

0601-1200

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

0.0

IMC

Snow

Tower ZZZZ

Air Carrier

A300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Direct

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1736770

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Person Flight Crew

Other Takeoff

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Procedure; Weather; Airport

Ambiguous

Performed RTO (rejected takeoff) in low speed regime; less than 20kt GS on Runway X due to aircraft controllability issues because of runway conditions. During deice ops I asked the Tower about the condition of the runway and when it was plowed last. ATC responded with a poor braking action report and plowed an hour and a half ago. I requested that the runway be plowed again prior to us taking off as it had been snowing continuously for hours. They agreed and we saw 3 plows start at the Runway X threshold and proceed down the runway. After deice ops we proceeded for departure on Runway X. Double checked APS (aircraft performance) and FOM prior to takeoff. Lined up with RWY X centerline; released brakes and gently advanced power towards 60%. Around 40 to 50% power the aircraft began to slide to the left. Immediately performed RTO procedure. Braking at this point was NIL. Reported RTO to ATC; exited runway and performed necessary checklists. The plows had done a very poor job of plowing the runway leaving portions of it unplowed. Notified ATC of the runway condition and braking action. Requested that the runway be replowed thoroughly before we would attempt a second takeoff. Due to the time involved with this and a couple of other departures ahead of us I elected to deice/anti-ice a second time due to possible holdover time issues. Runway replowed thoroughly and second takeoff uneventful. Cause: Weather conditions and less than adequate plowing of the runway. Suggestions: More diligent work performance of the plowing crew during deteriorating weather conditions. Pilots should not have to ask ATC for the runway to be plowed.

A300 Captain reported executing an RTO after the aircraft began to slide sideways. Captain informed ATC the runway needed re-plowing.

1079225

201304

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

30.0

15000.0

VMC

50

Daylight

CLR

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

MD-88

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Direct

Class E ZZZ

Turbine Engine

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 180

1079225

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

During climbout passing 15;000 FT MSL; the left engine stalled and was subsequently shutdown in accordance with our procedures. We returned to the departure airport for an uneventful landing. An emergency was declared due to single-engine operations.

MD80 Captain experiences a compressor stall on the left engine during climb. The engine is shutdown and the flight returns to the departure airport.

1327061

201601

1801-2400

IAH.Airport

TX

Night

TRACON I90

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class B IAH

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1327061

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors

We were cleared to intercept the localizer for 8R. The first officer said he was going to go to heading mode and then switch over to green needles for the intercept (but we were still many miles out) I stayed in white needles and intended on going green as soon as we were inbound as we were 20 mi out for the localizer intercept. When the first officer began to intercept; the autopilot took an excessively sharp turn; I realized something was not right. I had the first officer go back into heading mode; as I tried to figure out the sharp turn that the autopilot took. As I was trying to figure out why the autopilot was acting abnormal; the FO mentioned that maybe his inbound course was not correct. I quickly realized what the problem was (he must have flipped to green needles outside of the 30 mi 'blue needle' point) at that point; I helped him with the heading; and set his inbound course for him to get us back on course. As I was trying to help him with this; we ended up slightly off course from the localizer; ATC questioned us as I was trying my best to correct it. We said correcting for the localizer. I asked ATC if we caused a problem; and the response was; no you're fine. The first officer must have selected green needles prior to the '30 mi' or blue needle point. As a result; his inbound course was not correct; and when trying to intercept the localizer this caused the autopilot to take a sharp turn. Make a quick look at first officer's screen before intercepting the localizer. If something like this were to happen again; it will be my first instinct to look at the first officer's screen and double check our screens are in agreement. Also; probably should have just taken the controls at that point and got the first officer lined up and given the controls back. This would have avoided us being off course.

CRJ-700 Captain reported a track deviation on approach when the flying pilot First Officer selected green needles too soon.

1644675

201905

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

UNICOM ZZZ

Fractional

Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Parking Brake

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Other / Unknown

1644675

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Ground Personnel; Person Flight Crew

Other parked

General None Reported / Taken

Airport; Procedure; Human Factors; Equipment / Tooling; Environment - Non Weather Related

Ambiguous

We blocked in on the ramp in ZZZ at (time). We shut down according to our AOM procedure. I kept the parking brake set; knowing we were not chocked. After seeing the passenger off and cleaning and postflighting the plane; we still [were] not chocked. I asked the FBO agent if she could get us some chocks since none were available on the new ramp they were using. The sedan that was to drive us to ZZZ1 showed up at the plane. We loaded our bags into the sedan. Still waiting for chocks and not wanting to leave the plane unchocked; I asked the sedan driver if he could drive us to the FBO about 200 yards away so I could get the chocks myself. When we got to the FBO; the FBO agent was leaving the FBO with chocks in hand. I spoke to the crew that was taking our plane to brief them of its status and fuel load. I happened to look out at the plane only to see it slowly rolling across the ramp. Two pilots from [FBO] were attempting to stop it. The sedan driver quickly drove us back to the plane. By this time the chocks were placed on the nose wheel. One of the [FBO] crew members said he had injured his right calf in attempting to physically stop the plane. I contacted the Company and spoke to the [Chief Pilot]. When back on the plane; [name] and I both noticed that the parking brake was still set. While chocked; we started the plane; checked the brakes and taxied to another part of the ramp. I set the parking brake again and brought the left engine up to about 60%. The brakes held. We shut down the plane. By this time the crew from [FBO] had departed the airport in their plane. I briefed the crew who were taking 583 of the situation; and they assumed control of the airplane for their trip to ZZZ2. I understand the ramp we parked on was recently opened but yet there were no chocks immediately available. Chocks should be located anywhere planes are expected to park. Also; would it be possible to have airplanes carrier their own set of chocks for instances like this?

Small Transport Jet Captain reported aircraft began to roll from parking position even though parking brake was set. Captain reported FBO had not yet inserted wheel chocks.

1331855

201602

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

2500.0

IMC

Snow; 2

Night

2500

TRACON ZZZ

Corporate

Citation II S2/Bravo (C550)

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Vectors

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 34.6; Flight Crew Total 15846; Flight Crew Type 565.7

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1331855

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

I was Pilot In Command (PIC) on a CE550 and weather was 2;500 overcast 2 miles with light snow. After about 3 minutes into the flight the left engine oil light illuminated with the oil pressure showing 40 psi. We returned to the airport by being vectored for the ILS; landing uneventfully 8 minutes after the light illuminated. I didn't shut down the engine feeling that it was safer to land with it operating at reduced power. Opening the oil access door; I noticed the loss of oil was from the dipstick not being fully locked in place. I had preflighted the aircraft a few days before the scheduled flight; and recall the oil level in both engines was in the normal range. I can't believe that I would not have secured the dipstick into its proper place. It is so routine. My inactions of not checking the oil dipsticks to make sure they were secure was the reason for this incident.My judgment was further clouded because after new oil was put into the engine I completed the two day trip. I wrongly perceived that having some oil pressure after landing I could still go on the trip. I regret not having a discussion with my supervisor and the other pilot about doing so. While taking full responsibility for my actions; the 'get the job done' attitude may have overshadowed my judgment. If any of us had raised some doubt; I don't believe we would have departed. I have implemented a new procedure that after the oil is checked by one pilot; the other pilot will check to make sure everything is secure.

A CE550 Captain reported a low oil pressure indication on the left engine shortly after takeoff and returned to the departure airport. Post flight revealed that the dipstick was not locked in place; causing the oil loss and the reporter was likely the last person to touch it. The oil is then replaced and the flight departs on a two day trip without any additional maintenance.

1297761

201509

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

Dash 8-300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Parked

APU Electrical

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1297761

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1297765.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Evacuated

Aircraft

An electrical anomaly occurred upon taxi in to the gate. After deplaning the passengers all electrical power was removed from the aircraft. Under direction from maintenance control ground power was introduced to the aircraft to try and diagnose the problem. At that point the 'Check Fire Detect' warning light illuminated with no other indications. I smelled what I believed to be smoke. I exited the aircraft to perform a visual inspection from the exterior and saw smoke pouring from a vent in the tail section of the aircraft. The automatic thermal fire suppression system had not discharged. I got back on the aircraft and ordered the remaining crew members to evacuate. I manually discharged the APU fire bottle and called ground control to send the fire trucks then removed all electrical power from the aircraft again. Some sort of electrical malfunction caused a fire to start in the tail section of the aircraft.All appropriate check lists and immediate action items were performed. Nothing really could have been done to prevent this other than being extremely cautious when diagnosing an electrical problem. In my opinion it would have happened regardless.

After landing; started APU taxiing in to the gate. APU starter light did not extinguish. Cycled APU off; then on; but it did not restart. Noticed APU AUX breaker (N8) was popped. GPU voltage was low; so we requested a different one. Began getting erroneous lights; such as 'touched runway' along with others. After hooking up different GPU; the 'check fire detect' light illuminated; but we had no other signals from the control panel. We went outside to check; and saw smoke coming from the APU. The Captain went back onboard; discharged an extinguisher bottle; and advised ATC to roll Crash Fire Rescue to our location.

DHC8 flight crew reported attempting to start the APU during taxi in to the gate but the APU starter light did not go out and the APU did not start. A second attempt is also unsuccessful. After deplaning at the gate; smoke was detected coming from the APU compartment; the APU fire handle was pulled and Crash Fire Rescue was called.

1010481

201205

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Elevator Trim System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 416

Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting

1010481

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Check Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 436

1010483.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft

All checklists/procedures were properly done prior to takeoff. We then aborted the takeoff due to the Takeoff Warning Horn sounding. Horn did not sound until approximately three to five seconds after takeoff power was set (88.4% N1). The Captain aborted takeoff at approximately 75 KIAS and cleared the runway. We ran the rejected takeoff and Takeoff Configuration Warning Horn Checklists and calculated brake cooling. Horn sounded again when Captain did a throttleburst.We discussed possible problems/solutions. He ran the stab trim forward 'about a dot' and redid the throttleburst with no horn. I mentioned that it was still in the green band on my side before he ran it forward; but apparently 'my side' indicated a higher setting (i.e. 5.2 vs. 4.9). The Captain then notified Dispatch and we told ATC we could take off again after the cooling period. We ensured the aircraft was properly reconfigured for takeoff (i.e. rejected takeoff re-selected) and the Captain made several more throttlebursts. The second takeoff was uneventful.

Brake cooling was 16 minutes. A subsequent throttleburst check gave an immediate Takeoff Warning Horn. Flaps were checked at 1; speedbrake handle down detent; and the trim checked in the green at 4.9 units. However; I noticed the First Officer's trim pointer indicated closer to 5.1 units; so I trimmed the First officer's side to 4.9 (Captain's side now 4.8); and moving the thrust lever forward now produced no horn. Had I checked across the center console to view the First Officer's trim pointer I would have set the trim conservatively with the disparate pointer closest to the edge of the green band further towards the center of the green. If the pointers aren't matching; I'd notify Maintenance to recalibrate.

A B737-300 rejected their takeoff upon receipt of a takeoff warning horn determined to be the result of the Captain's trim indication being in the green band; but not the First Officer's. By electing the most conservative of the two displays a subsequent takeoff was uneventful.